Problems of Communism

MAY-JUNE 1973



CHINA

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Dwight H. Perkins

Political Succession
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Siberian Oil and Gas
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Soviet Religious Policy
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Jack Perry
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Problems of Communism

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MAY-JUNE 1973 VOL XXII

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Cover: Liu Shang-hsiu, Chairman of the Lingpao County Revolutionary Committee, joins peasants in farm work. Photo from *China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 9, 1968, p. 26.

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Looking Inside China

EDITOR'S NOTE: Developments in the last few years have opened new windows into the People's Republic of China for outside observers and at the same time have given birth to new perspectives on old issues. The following articles deal with two aspects of the current Chinese scene in this context. Mr. Perkins reexamines the country's economic progress since the late 1950's in light of the increasing information that has become available after a long statistical blackout. Mr. Ting looks at the question of the political succession to Mao in the wake of Lin Piao's ouster.

An Economic Reappraisal

By Dwight H. Perkins

Ever since the blackout on statistical data from the People's Republic of China began in the early 1960's following the disruption of the nation's data-reporting services, outside appraisal of China's economic performance has had the character of an occult art. Controversies have raged through the relevant literature over whose estimates most accurately portrayed the state of the economy, and both the estimated figures and their interpretation have differed considerably. One group of analysts, for example, argued that China's total farm output in the mid-1960's was no higher than in 1957—a claim which, if true, would have meant that per capita farm production had fallen considerably, given the intervening growth in population. Another group, however, countered with evidence that agricultural output not only had kept pace with population increases but perhaps had even kept a bit ahead of the number of mouths to be fed.

In the spring of 1973, the end of controversy about China's economy is not yet in sight—and perhaps never will be. But the raw material that will make it possible to narrow the range of disagreement between contending analysts is once again beginning to trickle out of China, as the PRC government has at last resumed publishing statistical indicators of national economic performance. To be sure, the statistical blackout of the 1960's was never total, and the volume of data now being released is still small, leaving great gaps in coverage. Nevertheless, the contrast between 1973 and, say, 1969 in this area is very striking—as indeed it is in many other areas as well.

What is it that the new information tells us, and does it jibe with what we thought was happening in the Chinese economy in the middle and late 1960's? First let us see what fresh light this informa-

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tion sheds on the rates of growth achieved over the past decade and a half. Then let us attempt an analysis of the policies and organizational changes that lay behind this performance.

Growth Rates in Industry

For many years there has been little doubt that Chinese industry, particularly the producer-goods sector, was growing faster than agriculture and production for consumption in general. Data released during the past two years, however, have made it clear that the differential has been even larger than we had previously thought. It is not that farm output grew more slowly than previous estimates had indicated, but rather that industrial output grew more rapidly. To mention only one key indicator, total steel output in 1970 was 18 million tons and rose to 23 million tons in 1972 (see Table 1), whereas earlier estimates for the middle and late 1960's had generally placed annual steel production at 10 to 12 million tons.[1]

There are still not enough data to come up with a precise estimate of industrial growth, in terms of value added, between 1957 (the last year of plentiful and accurate statistics) and 1972, but a plausible and reasonably narrow range of estimates can be reached. Two kinds of relevant data are now available for the last few years. On the one hand, there are output figures for several important commodities (a number of these are presented in Table 1). On the other hand, there is an officially-released estimate of the gross value of industrial output in 1970, which can be compared—not without some difficulty—to the official figures for the 1950's.

On the basis of the figures given in Table 1, China's crude steel output grew at an average annual rate of 10.2 percent between 1957 and 1972. It does not necessarily follow, of course, that the close correlation that existed in the 1950's between steel production and the total output of producer goods continued into the 1960's. In the 1950's, steel itself and machinery (a big steel user) accounted for a high proportion of the total industrial development program, whereas in the 1960's chemicals, petroleum, nuclear weapons, missiles, and conventional weapons became the leading sectors. Even so, steel and machinery continued to account for a substantial portion of the growth in producer-goods industry, and in addition there were apparently a number of slow-growing sectors (*e.g.*, coal) which tended to offset the impact of chemicals and the like on the growth rate. Hence, even for the 1960's, it is plausible to assume that total producer-goods output increased at a rate similar to, if not identical with, that of steel—say, 9 to 11 percent per year.

Somewhat similar reasoning can be applied to the industrial consumer-goods sector. Again on the basis of the data in Table 1, cotton textile output between 1957 and 1970 grew at an average rate of 4.1 percent a year, although the failure to report any figures for 1971 and 1972 may indicate that output in those years was below or only slightly above 1970. Since most manufactured consumer goods in China are, like textiles, still heavily dependent on agricultural raw materials, and since, moreover, the overall agricultural growth rate was certainly less than 4 percent a year (see below), it is reasonable to assume that the growth rate for industrial consumer goods as a whole closely approximated the relatively low rate for cotton textiles. On the other hand, output of some consumer items not dependent on agriculture, such as bicycles and cloth made of synthetic fibers, is known to have grown at a much higher rate than the average.

Table 1: Selected Output Data for the People's Republic of China, 1957-72

	1957	1970	1971	1972
Crude steel (million tons)	5.35	18	21	23
Chemical fertilizer (million tons)	.63	14	17	20
Petroleum (million tons)	.46	20	25	29
Cotton cloth (billion meters)	5.05	8.5	n.a.[a]	n.a.
Grain (million tons)	185	240	250	240

[a] "n.a." indicates figures are not available.

SOURCES: The 1957 figures were published by the State Statistical Bureau in various periodicals. The 1970, 1971, and 1972 data are either from Edgar Snow's interview with Chou En-lai (*The New Republic* [Washington, DC], March 27, 1971) or from various 1971 and 1972 yearend press releases issued by the New China News Agency.

[1] Steel output, according to Chou En-lai, probably did fall to 10 million tons in at least one year during the main phase of the Cultural Revolution (1967-69), but it is likely to have been well above that figure in 1965 and 1966. See Edgar Snow's report of his talks with the Chinese Premier in *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), March 27, 1971, p. 20.

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A short article such as this is clearly not the place to attempt to present all the arguments and evidence behind a particular set of estimates. The above figures are presented simply to give some idea of what is involved and what the remaining gaps in our knowledge are. Nevertheless, we can use these figures as a starting point toward arriving at an estimate of overall Chinese industrial growth. Thus, if we apply average growth rates of, say, 10 percent for producer goods and 4 percent for consumer goods to 1957 value-added figures for these sectors (in 1952 prices), the result is an annual growth rate for industry as a whole (including mining, handicrafts, and utilities) of about 8 percent for the period between 1957 and 1972.

A careful study by Thomas Rawski, using more data (including provincial data) and a slightly different methodology, comes up with a rate of growth for all industry of 9.4 to 10.4 percent per year between 1957 and 1971.[2] The addition of 1972 would lower the rate somewhat, but not significantly. Rawski's figures are for the gross value of industrial output, not for value added, and use of the latter would probably, although not necessarily, lower the indicated growth rate further. The only recent official figure thus far given out by the Chinese for total gross value of industrial output, namely the figure for 1970 ($90 billion) given by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to American newsman Edgar Snow,[3] also suggests a growth rate of 9 percent per year for the 1957-70 period, although it is unclear whether the figure was calculated in prices comparable to those of the 1950's.

An average annual rate of growth of 8-9 percent in industrial value added between 1957 and 1972 does not, of course, imply that there was steady growth throughout the period at that rate—far from it. Accelerated development in 1958-59 was followed by a sharp decline in 1960, then by recovery and renewed growth in the early and mid-1960's. Subsequently, when the Cultural Revolution was at its height in 1967-69, it certainly disrupted industry and transport for a time. However, it has now become clearer than ever that these disruptions did not have a long-lived impact. All indications are that China's industrial output in 1970 was above that of 1966, perhaps by a significant margin.[4]

In 1971, the gross value of industrial output was officially stated to have increased by 10 percent over the preceding year,[5] and other published data are consistent with that claim. No figure for 1972 has yet been published, however, and all indications are that the rate of output growth fell sharply. The decline stemmed only partly from difficulties in agriculture, as the rates of growth for steel and petroleum—neither of which is dependent on farm-based raw materials—likewise dropped, although still remaining relatively high.

In sum, the recent statistical information from China seems to confirm that the average annual rate of industrial growth from 1957 through 1972 was approximately 8 to 9 percent. It should be added that this rate, though quite respectable, was well below the rates of the First Five-Year Plan period (1953-57), when the officially estimated rate of growth was 19 percent a year. But a decline from that rate was almost inevitable. The abnormally high growth rate of the 1950's resulted from the existence of much unused capacity at the beginning (1952) and an excessive diversion of investment resources away from other sectors toward industry—a diversion that was bound to have a dramatic impact on output performance in what was then still quite a small sector of the economy.

Growth Rates in Agriculture

Our knowledge of the rate of growth is more solidly based for the agricultural sector than for industry. For one thing, we have a nearly complete series for grain output in the 1960's and early 1970's, and grain accounts for over half the output growth in terms of value added for the entire sector.[6] In addition, we also know something about a number of other key crops. For example, since raw cotton output is closely correlated with the production of

[2] Thomas G. Rawski, "Chinese Industrial Production, 1952-1971," forthcoming in *Review of Economics and Statistics* (Cambridge, Mass.).

[3] See Snow's report of his interview with Chou, *loc. cit.*, p. 21. The $90 billion figure was converted into US dollars at the official exchange rate, but Chou did not specify whether it was based on current or constant prices and, if the latter, for which year. Prices, particularly of industrial products, have been quite stable in China since the early 1950's; however, there have been some variations.

[4] Data for nine provinces plus Peking collected by T.G. Rawski (*loc. cit.*) indicate considerable increases in industrial output in these provinces between 1965 and 1970, but except for Peking, Kirin and Szechwan, the provinces included were not major industrial centers.

[5] New China News Agency (henceforth cited as NCNA), Dec. 31, 1971.

[6] In 1957, for example, grain (including potatoes) accounted for 59 percent of the gross value of agricultural output (in 1933 prices). See D.H. Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968*, Chicago, Aldine, 1969.

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The Kuochuang brigade of Hsiaohsien County, Anhwei Province, achieves productivity gains in the 1970 harvest.

—Photo from *China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 2, 1971, p. 18.

cotton textiles (with a one-year time lag), and since we now know—as pointed out earlier—that cotton textile output grew at an average rate of 4 percent a year from 1957 to 1970, it follows that the growth rate for raw cotton from 1957 through 1969 must have been approximately the same. By the same reasoning, the apparent decline in cotton textile output growth in 1971 (inferred from Peking's failure to report the production figures for those years) suggests that the same was true of raw cotton output after 1969. As for such other major agricultural crops as soy beans, peanuts and other oil-bearing seeds, the fact that exports of these items have yet to recover to the levels of the 1950's[7] suggests that their rate of output growth has been slow, perhaps below the rate of population increase.

Finally, we have an official Chinese estimate of the gross value of agricultural output in 1970 ($30 billion), although it is uncertain (as in the case of industry) whether the prices used in arriving at this figure are close enough to the prices of the 1950's to make comparison meaningful.[8] If prices in 1970 and 1957 were the same, then the agricultural growth rate averaged 2.3 percent per year. If prices rose (and it is highly unlikely that they fell), the growth rate would be slightly lower. Either way, the rate of increase in the value of farm output as a whole appears, not surprisingly, to be highly correlated with the growth rate of grain output, which averaged 2.0 percent annually between 1957 and 1970, or 1.7 percent if the calculation is carried through 1972 (based on the output figures in Table 1).

Of course, as in the case of industry, production in agriculture did not rise along a steady path. After a bumper harvest in 1958, grain output fell sharply in 1959, 1960 and 1961, and it had only just recovered to the 1957 level by 1963. Between 1963 and 1971, as a result of a major shift of investment resources to agriculture, growth averaged nearly 4 percent, although a decline of 4 percent in 1972 brought the average for the period 1963-72 down to 3.1 percent.[9]

The improvement in the rate of agricultural growth, though it may seem small, is highly significant. Available evidence suggests that China's population, as in the 1950's, continues to increase at a rate of about 2 percent a year.[10] Thus, the growth achieved in agriculture since 1963 has been enough to enable China not merely to keep pace with the food needs of the people, but also to recover the ground lost as a result of the stagnation in agriculture between 1957 and 1963.

Growth in GNP

Estimating the rate of growth of China's Gross National Product (GNP) is more problematical than estimating the growth rates for industry and agriculture alone. In 1957 these two sectors accounted for roughly 77 percent of China's total GNP; hence, to arrive at a growth rate for GNP over the 1957-72

[7] Chinese trade figures are based on reports of China's trading partners and appear in various places, including A.H. Usack and R.E. Batsavage, "The International Trade of the People's Republic of China," in *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment,* A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1972.

[8] Snow interview with Chou, *loc. cit.*, p. 21.

[9] The figures for 1971 and 1972 were released by NCNA, Dec. 28, 1972 (see Foreign Broadcast Information Service *Daily Report,* Dec. 29, 1972, pp. 3-4).

[10] No official figures on the growth of China's population have been published since the 1950's, but Chou En-lai has recently told at least one visitor that the rate is still about 2 percent per annum (see *The New York Times,* Jan. 28, 1973).

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period, one must have a figure for the remaining 23 percent, *i.e.,* the services sector. Unfortunately, there are almost no solid data on which to base an estimate of growth in services. About the best one can do is to assume that certain services (finance and trade) grew at the same rate as industry plus agriculture, and that others (residential rents, personal services, and government administration) kept pace with population. On this basis, the annual growth rate for the service sector as a whole between 1957 and 1972 can be estimated at about 4 percent.

Combining this figure with the indicated growth rates for industry (8 percent) and agriculture (3 percent), we arrive at an average annual rate of GNP growth between 1957 and 1972 of between 5 and 5.5 percent. If, however, we calculate on the basis of 1933 prices instead of those of 1952 (because the former give weights to industry and agriculture that are closer to those of other less developed nations), the indicated rate of GNP growth falls slightly, to between 4.5 and 5 percent.[11] In 1971 the rate appears to have risen to between 7 and 8 percent, but in 1972 it fell back to between 3 and 4 percent, mainly because of the poor grain and cotton harvests and the secondary effects of those poor harvests.

In any event, it appears from the foregoing discussion that, in spite of the economic setbacks of 1960-61 caused by the Great Leap Forward and the Soviet withdrawal of technicians, and in spite of the disruptions resulting from the Cultural Revolution in 1967-69, China has managed an overall rate of economic growth that has kept well ahead of the increase in population. Most of the rise in per capita product has resulted from growth in the producer-goods sector, but if 1963 is used as a base year rather than 1957, there has also been some increase in the per capita availability of consumer goods.

Investment and Planning in Industry

Let us turn our attention now to the factors responsible for this quite respectable economic performance. One factor of major importance has apparently been the maintenance of a high rate of investment. While there are no official figures on the investment rate, it is possible to arrive at some general conclusions on the basis of what we know about the producer-goods sector. Thus, it is clear from the reasoning in the preceding sections that the share of producer goods in China's GNP has doubled between 1957 and 1972, and we know that these goods are generally used for one of three purposes—*i.e.,* for investment, as inputs into other producer and consumer goods, and for the production of military equipment.[12] Given the much higher rate of growth in the output of producer goods as compared to that of consumer goods, the proportion of total producer-goods output used as inputs into the production of consumer items has undoubtedly declined. As for the military share of producer goods output, even though China's expenditures on military equipment and installations have risen sharply, particularly since 1960 when Soviet military supplies were cut off, it is unlikely that they could have absorbed all of the very marked increase indicated above in the overall share of producer goods in GNP. Hence, the most plausible conclusion is that there was a rise in the proportion of such goods allocated to investment.[13]

A second major factor in China's economic performance over the past decade has been the regime's arrival in the early 1960's—after years of experimentation and changing policies—at settled ways of organizing the economy that have evidently proven effective. Because the organization of the industrial sector is quite different in form, if not in spirit, from that of agriculture, the two will be dealt with separately. Let us look at the industrial sector first.

In the early 1950's, China introduced the highly centralized Soviet system of planning and control, complete with a powerful planning commission in Peking which, in principle, was expected to exercise direct control over all industrial firms above the handicraft level. However, because China had tens of thousands of industrial firms with widely different technologies and, in many cases, with primitive accounting procedures, it was found to be totally impossible for the central authorities to keep track of performance at the plant level in each of these enterprises. To remedy this situation, it was decided

[11] These calculations are based, in part, on data for the year 1957, in 1952 and 1933 prices, from T.C. Liu and K.C. Yeh, *The Economy of the Chinese Mainland, National Income and Economic Development, 1933-1957,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 66.

[12] Producer goods can also be exported, but Chinese exports of such goods have been quite small.

[13] It is also possible, of course, that the share of machinery and equipment in investment rose in the 1960's, but the rise would have to have been very large if the rate of investment remained the same as in the 1950's or fell.

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in late 1957 and early 1958 to decentralize authority over production and even over investment choices, but this decision was carried out in such a way during 1958 and 1959 that there was in fact no authority responsible for coordinating inputs and outputs. The result was chaos, with firms churning out items that were often of low quality and of little use to anyone.

Beginning in the early 1960's, order was restored —not by recentralizing economic authority in Peking, but by placing it in the hands of provincial and county (*hsien*) planning and control organs. Individuals firms still had to meet essentially physical output targets and stay below targeted levels of input use, but principal responsibility for drawing up these targets was in the provincial and county seats, not in Peking. Only a few enterprises were controlled at the national level, and the number of firms in this category appears to have declined throughout the 1960's. As long as most of a firm's inputs were purchased within a given region and its output sold within that same region, there was no need for coordination on a national scale.[14]

With regard to the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the economic structure, the available evidence suggests that it was largely limited to the manner in which the planning and control apparatus conducted itself, and that it entailed few major changes in the *formal* planning system. How the Revolution affected the behavior of the economic apparatus can be inferred from criticisms that began to appear in the Chinese press in the early 1970's with respect to the conduct of cadres during the 1967-69 period. The criticisms implied that many cadres had failed to distinguish "rational rules and regulations from revisionist practices of controlling, restricting and repressing the working masses" and had taken the mistaken position that "all rules and regulations which obstruct anarchism are no good."[15] Such complaints strongly suggest that the Cultural Revolution witnessed a recurrence of at least some of the excesses that had marked the 1958-59 Great Leap Forward. As indicated earlier, however, the excesses of the Cultural Revolution period slowed growth only temporarily, mainly because they were not allowed to get out of hand as in 1958-59. Thus, the early 1970's were dominated by calls in the press to end anarchy, to strengthen management and accounting, to make more careful inventories of warehouses, to pay more attention to veteran workers, and to emphasize product quality. At the same time, a number of individuals who had been severely criticized during the Cultural Revolution as architects of the economic policies of the early 1960's, most notably Ch'en Yun, were rehabilitated —another possible sign of a return to the main lines of pre-Cultural Revolution policy for the economy.

Other key features of the industrial policies of the 1960's that have continued unchanged into the early 1970's include special emphasis on the development of military equipment industries, on rapid expansion of agricultural support industries (most notably the chemical fertilizer industry), and on a major increase in the number of rural-based small-scale firms of many types.

The effort to expand small-scale rural industry merits closer attention. Rural China has always had small-scale handicraft industries for the processing of food and similar activities, but what is different today is that the concept has been extended to a number of industries that hitherto were not typically either small in scale or rural-based. This effort, too, began during the Great Leap Forward, when there was a drive to develop small enterprises such as the much-publicized "backyard" iron and steel furnaces. As in the case of so many other activities connected with the Leap, implementation of the program, though energetic, was poorly thought out and resulted in waste of raw materials and poor quality of output. Most of the backyard furnaces were closed down in the early 1960's, as were many other small plants, but in others an attempt was made to rationalize production procedures rather than to close the plants down altogether. Apparently the effort was deemed successful, for the number of small plants was once again on the rise by the mid-1960's. By 1970, thousands of such enterprises dotted the countryside, and hundreds—perhaps even thousands—more were built in 1971 and 1972.

Although there are many kinds of small-scale firms, they are centered mainly in five industries: iron and steel, cement, chemical fertilizer, energy (coal and electricity), and machinery (chiefly farm-machinery repair shops, but also production of simple tools). The development of rural-based cement and chemical fertilizer plants is, perhaps, the most unusual aspect of the program in comparison to what is found in other less-developed

[14] The planning and organization of Chinese industry are discussed at greater length in D.H. Perkins, "Plans and Their Implementation in the People's Republic of China," *Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Association* (Menasha, Wisconsin), 1973.

[15] Numerous Chinese radio broadcasts in 1971 and 1972 criticized cadres for behaving in this manner during the late 1960's.

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

A "top-bottom" oxygen converter at the small Yentai iron-and-steel complex in Shantung Province.

—Photo from *China Pictorial*, No. 6, 1971, p. 9.

countries today.[16] In 1971, some 60 percent, or 10 million gross tons, of China's total chemical fertilizer output was produced in such small rural plants, while 40 percent of China's cement output was produced by 1,800 small enterprises (the addition of 600 more small cement plants during 1972 brought the percentage of total cement production up to 48).[17]

Unfortunately, we do not yet have enough information to judge whether the development of these small-scale rural plants makes possible more efficient use of China's endowment of productive resources, characterized by surplus labor and short capital. What we do know is that such enterprises have helped to familiarize millions of Chinese farmers with modern industrial technology. This effort seems bound to produce both economic and social benefits, the latter by breaking down the sharp distinction that exists in so many less-developed societies between the sophisticated, modernized cities and a primitive countryside.

Agricultural Organization and Policy

It is agriculture, however, that lies at the heart of China's economic problems, for the agricultural sector must not only provide the ever-increasing amounts of food required by the country's mounting population but also generate surpluses needed to help finance the development of industry. As pointed out earlier, while the rate of growth in industry has far exceeded that of agriculture, the latter has shown

[16] A useful first-hand description of a number of small-scale Chinese rural industrial plants can be found in Jon Sigurdson, "Rural Industry—A Traveller's View," *The China Quarterly* (London), April-June 1972, pp. 315-32.

[17] NCNA, Dec. 28, 1972.

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marked improvement since the early 1960's, so that output is now expanding at a pace more than adequate to take care of population growth. Let us now look at the changes in agricultural organization and policies that have brought about this significant improvement.

During the period extending from the start of agricultural collectivization in China in the winter of 1955-56 up to 1962, the Chinese Communist regime experimented with a wide variety of organizational forms. In 1958 and 1959, under the banner of the Great Leap Forward, virtually all remaining non-collectivized farming activities (the peasants' private plots and the small free markets) were abolished, and the farmers were organized into communes of 4,000-5,000 families each, with control over their activities centralized in the hands of the commune leadership. These innovations, however, contributed to a sharp recession in agriculture which forced a reversal of policy. In the depths of the rural depression in 1961, many areas experimented with something called the "agricultural responsibility system," which was tantamount to a virtual abandonment of collectivized agriculture.

This period of instability in agricultural policy ended in 1962, when China finally settled on a basic organizational structure for agriculture which has not undergone any major changes since. The larger existing communes were split up into several smaller ones, and at the same time authority over the planning and management of labor and crops was decentralized to a considerable degree from the commune to a small subunit of the commune, the production team. The production team was also made the accounting unit, a change which meant in effect that whatever profits (or losses) the individual team made (after taxes) were no longer pooled and shared with the entire commune but accrued to the team itself. Whereas several thousand families had shared the fruits of their collective labor in the initial communes, now only several dozen families did so. Even before this, moreover, small private plots and rural free markets had been reinstituted in order to revive declining food production, and these institutions were continued after 1962.

Shopping in the Wu Hsi market.

—1971 photo by Hugues Vassal, Gamma.

There have, of course, been minor adjustments in this basic organizational pattern since 1962. Over the next few years, for example, the amount of land in private plots (which were supposed to be kept to about 5 percent of total cultivated acreage) appears to have increased slightly.[18] During the Cultural Revolution, there was some talk of restricting or abolishing private plots, as well as of recentralizing more authority in the hands of the production brigade (a unit above the team but below the commune), but little if anything was actually done along these lines. The rural areas were generally kept out of the mainstream of the Cultural Revolution, and they appear to have suffered little disruption of any kind in that period—certainly not enough to affect crop output.

As of 1971 and 1972, there continued to be little indication of any major change in rural organization or general agricultural policy. If anything, it is possible that the independence of the individual production teams may have increased, inasmuch as "self-reliance" has been the leitmotif of the "Learn from Tachai" Campaign, which has played such a big role in the Chinese countryside in recent years.[19] The basic idea of "self-reliance" is that all units should try to produce as much of their own needs as possible and thus minimize their dependence on others; however, this sort of self-sufficiency neces-

[18] At least that was the case in four communes visited in 1965 by Shahid J. Burki. See his book, *A Study of the Chinese Communes, 1965*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969, p. 35.

[19] Tachai is the name of a production brigade belonging to a commune in Shansi Province. The brigade was singled out as a model for all of China.

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Table 2: Foreign Trade of the People's Republic of China

(in millions of US dollars)

	1959	1962	1966	1970	1971
Total Imports	2,060	1,150	2,035	2,183	2,247
Machinery and Equipment	1,058	52	490	395	495
Metals	248	62	280	560	605
Wheat	0	200+	330	275	204
Chemical Fertilizer	44	27	150	190	180
Total Exports	2,205	1,525	2,170	2,063	2,364
Textiles and Clothing	651	523	470	490	550
Foodstuffs	412	156	595	655	800
Total Trade	4,265	2,675	4,205	4,246	4,611

SOURCES: Most of the data for 1959 and 1962 are from figures compiled by Alexander Eckstein (on the basis of trade statistics of China's trading partners) and published in his *Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1966. Data for other years were compiled by the US Consulate-General, Hong Kong, and published in various issues of the periodical *Current Scene*.

sarily implies a reduction in the influence of outsiders on decision-making at the production-team level.[20] The higher authorities must instead resort to more indirect methods of exercising control.

An interesting example of the use of such indirect methods was the government's decision in 1971 to raise the purchase prices of bast fibers, oil seeds, and sugar.[21] In 1972, in spite of a generally poor harvest, the output of these items increased 20 percent in the case of sugar and rapeseed (a major oil seed) and 40 percent in the case of bast fiber.[22] It is possible that unusually good weather in the relevant regions or, perhaps, even direct orders from the central authorities to emphasize these items were more responsible for the increases in output than the higher prices offered, but the most plausible explanation is that the farm production teams responded with alacrity to the incentive of better prices. In contrast to this experience, major increases in the purchase prices of certain lagging cash crops in 1956 and 1957 had failed to stimulate higher outputs of these items (in 1957, in fact, all declined); however, the farm cadres at that time had been operating under clear directives to emphasize grain output and consequently had not been at liberty to raise the gross income of their units by concentrating on crops yielding higher monetary returns.[23] Now the production teams seem to have enough autonomy to be more flexible in their production decisions.

Autarky in Trade

It is readily apparent from the preceding survey of China's economic performance in the last fifteen years, that the government's overall policy of economic development has been characterized by a strong element of autarky, or an emphasis on achieving "self-reliance" or self-sufficiency both within the economy and on a national and international scale. It may therefore be relevant to see how this tendency has manifested itself in the PRC's foreign trade over approximately the same time span.

Some pertinent trade data for various years between 1959 and 1971 are presented in Table 2. Several conclusions are immediately apparent from the figures. First, China's total trade in 1971 was only $346 million, or 8.6 percent, above the previous peak level of 1959. Since world prices in the meantime had risen by more than the indicated percentage increase, China's trade in real terms was still below the 1959 level. Further, between 1959 and 1972, China's economy had grown con-

[20] For a more thorough discussion of the emphasis on "self-reliance" in rural China in the early 1970's, see Audrey Donnithorne, "China's Cellular Economy: Some Economic Trends Since the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly*, October-December 1972, pp. 605-19.

[21] NCNA, Dec. 31, 1971.

[22] NCNA, Dec. 26, 1972.

[23] For further discussion of these developments, see D. H. Perkins, *Market Control and Planning in Communist China*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 70-71.

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

The Taching oil field has contributed heavily to China's expanding domestic oil production. The photo shows Chang Hung-chih, Vice-Chairman of the field's Revolutionary Committee, at work.

—Photo from *China Pictorial*, No. 9, 1971, p. 4.

siderably, as indicated earlier, so that trade as a percentage share of GNP (X + M/GNP) fell from between 7 and 11 percent in the 1950's to under 5 percent in the early 1970's.[24]

China's declining dependence on foreign trade emerges more clearly in relation to specific items. In the 1950's, for example, the PRC had to import virtually its entire supply of petroleum, *i.e.*, about 3 million tons a year, whereas China produced 29 million tons domestically in 1972 (see Table 1) and may soon become an oil exporter. Again, as seen in Table 2, over half of China's total imports in 1959 consisted of machinery and equipment and included a large number of complete plants, reflecting the fact that the domestic industrial development program was heavily dependent throughout the 1950's on complete plant imports from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In contrast, throughout the 1960's and early 1970's there have been few Chinese purchases of complete plants, and machinery and equipment imports by 1971 were less than half of the 1959 level, with most Chinese investment in new plants and equipment being supplied from domestic sources.

China also is no longer dependent financially on the outside world. Foreign aid from the Soviet Union in the form of long-term credits ended in the mid-1950's, and all such credits had been repaid with interest by 1965. Since then, although the PRC, like all countries, has resorted to short-term credits to facilitate trade, it has neither sought nor received long-term credits. Instead, in fact, China has become one of the world's major aid-givers, her commitments in 1970 and 1971 averaging about US $600 million a year, exclusive of aid to North Vietnam.[25]

The PRC's policy of economic self-reliance, or lack of dependence on foreign trade and aid, does not imply, however, that Chinese trade with the outside world is going to wither away. China's trade in 1971 was slightly above 1970, at least in money terms, and the increase in 1972 was even larger. Nevertheless, there are no signs of a reversal of the basic disposition toward autarky.

Incomes Policy and Growth

One further matter that merits attention here is the rather unusual fact that China has endeavored to couple its pursuit of rapid economic growth with a policy of eliminating inequalities in income distribution. This sets the PRC clearly apart from the rest of the less-developed countries of the world. Although a good many of the latter have espoused some form of "socialism" during the past few decades, it has in most instances been socialism for the rich, and particularly for the bureaucracy. Great effort has been made in these countries to find jobs in state enterprises and government offices for the newly-emerging elite, but relatively little has been done to keep the incomes of this elite from rising too far above those prevailing among the great majority of the people.

The PRC has deliberately followed a different path. One of the central purposes of the Cultural Revolution, for example, was to prevent or reverse the rise of a new elite class based on the party-

[24] It is not possible to calculate the share of trade in GNP with precision because we do not have a single figure for GNP in, say, 1970: equally important, statistics of China's trade are calculated in prices different from those used in estimating GNP.

[25] Leo Tansky, "Chinese Foreign Aid," in *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, *op. cit.*, p. 372.

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government bureaucracy. As a result of this effort, all but a handful of cadres in the various government and party offices are now required to go to the countryside and work at unskilled jobs for considerable periods, and youth, instead of moving steadily up the educational ladder, are expected to spend several years at manual labor before they can even be considered for admission to university. Numerous other measures have been adopted with a similar purpose.

Apart from such measures to prevent the re-emergence of elitist attitudes, the Communist regime set out from the beginning to reduce the range of income differentiation between different types of labor as well as between different levels of skill and responsibility. While substantial disparities in income still remain, these disparities have certainly been sharply reduced in comparison to those that existed in China before 1949 or presently exist in other less-developed nations. However, most of the steps in this direction were taken in the 1950's, and there has since been a slackening of efforts to push ahead with income equalization as this policy has come into conflict with the requirements of growth and the policy of self-reliance.

The nature of the problem can be seen most clearly in agriculture. In the 1950's, the newly-established PRC government effected a major redistribution of rural incomes by first confiscating the land of landlords and redistributing it to the poor peasants and then incorporating the peasants' holdings into cooperatives in which earnings were based solely on labor and not on the amount of land brought into the cooperative. Welfare funds were set up within the cooperatives; grain was distributed at least in part on the basis of need rather than individual production; and education and health services were provided gratis or at nominal cost to members of the cooperatives. But several sources of inequality remained. Families with more and better workers, for example, received more income per capita than families made up of the old and weak. The continued existence of private plots also gave an advantage to those with relevant farming skills, particularly if their village was near an urban center where produce from the private plots could be marketed. By far the most important continuing source of inequality, however, was the diverse amounts and quality of land in farming units.

Because of these differences, farm incomes varied considerably. A 1965 study of 13 communes, for example, showed that the ratio of income per worker between the richest and the poorest commune sampled was 3.4 to 1.[26] Moreover, this differential obscures the fact that in the poorest communes the income of some production teams was below the average for the whole commune, while some teams in the richest commune earned incomes higher than the commune's average. In effect, the smaller the basic producing and accounting unit, the greater the inequalities of income in the countryside. For the past decade, the basic unit has been the production team consisting of only a few dozen families, and it has been kept small because the initial experience of the communes proved that large units were less efficient.

Measures that could offset the continuing differentials in farmers' incomes have, in general, not been extensively resorted to. No major effort has been made, for example, to move people around so that all units would have lands of equivalent productivity to farm; nor has the agricultural tax been either very large or very progressive (there is a slight progression). Furthermore, investment in agriculture has most often been channeled into the naturally better-endowed areas where it would have the biggest impact on productivity, rather than into the poorer areas where it would help bring about a more equalized distribution of income. For example, in the drainage area of the Yellow River, a generally poor and dry region, grain output rose by only 7 percent between 1957 and 1970, whereas in the rich and wet middle and lower Yangtze Valley, by contrast, grain output in 1971 was 69 percent above the 1957 level;[27] and much the same picture emerges in the case of cotton. The obvious explanation is that it has been the areas that can best use chemical fertilizers—generally the areas with plentiful supplies of water—that have received the lion's share of the fertilizer supply.

The policy of self-reliance also is often in direct conflict with a policy designed to redistribute income more equally. If communes and production teams are expected to rely on their own resources, those that save and invest more and that work harder and more effectively will naturally get ahead of the others, and those that are better endowed to start with will often have an advantage over all the rest.

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[26] Shahid Burki, *op. cit.*, p. 29. The poorest commune in this sample, it should be noted, was considered a success story by local authorities.

[27] These percentages are based on official Chinese statistics reported in Thomas G. Rawski, "Recent Trends in the Chinese Economy," forthcoming in *The China Quarterly*.

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A "barefoot doctor" (in this case a graduate nurse) applies first aid in the fields of the Hsinhua Commune.

—1971 photo by Hugues Vassal, Gamma.

It is an obvious point, but one that is frequently overlooked.

Our knowledge of income distribution in China's urban areas in the early 1970's is less solidly based than our knowledge of the corresponding situation in the countryside. In the 1950's, of course, city dwellers as well as inhabitants of the rural areas experienced a major redistribution of incomes. The incomes of the wealthy who remained were sharply reduced, while those of the poorest groups were raised and the basic needs of the latter were guaranteed through the rationing of key commodities. Wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers and between managers and workers were based on a scale similar to that of the Soviet Union.

Visitors to China in 1972 have reported that the eight-grade wage scale, with the top-grade wage three-plus times the bottom, continues to be the basis of wage determination in the larger enterprises just as in the 1950's. Professional and managerial staff are generally paid wages equivalent to or a bit higher than those of the most skilled workers. It appears, however, that the average wages paid to professionals have declined somewhat in recent years as younger engineers and technicians have replaced those trained before 1949. If this trend is verified by more systematic studies and continues, it would indicate a significant narrowing of income differentials in urban areas.

In sum, China still seems to remain committed to the principle of equalizing incomes, though the pace of such efforts has naturally slowed down by comparison with the rapid and drastic changes of the 1950's. The fact is that the PRC is still a relatively poor country and cannot afford to push the redistribution of income too vigorously at the price of markedly slowing down the rate of economic growth. During the Cultural Revolution the pursuit of social goals closely related to issues of income distribution did slow down or stop growth for a time, and it consequently was an effort that could not be sustained indefinitely. China has not abandoned these social goals in the early 1970's, but it does appear to have given them a lower priority in a generally successful effort to accelerate growth.

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What the ordering of China's priorities will be in the future is probably not known even to the current leadership of the People's Republic of China. We

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do, however, know something about the range of likely alternatives.

If the policies in effect today are continued, there is reason to believe that China's rate of economic growth will rise above the levels of the 1957-70 period. A high and rising level of investment should itself be enough to ensure that result. But there is a cloud on the horizon, and it looms in the vital agricultural sector. Expansion of farm output may prove to be more difficult in the late 1970's than it was in the late 1960's when large crop increases were achieved mainly through greater use of chemical fertilizer. China appears to be reaching the limits of what can be accomplished by this means alone, and the next steps are likely to prove either expensive (*e.g.*, harnessing the rivers of the north for irrigation purposes) or uncertain (*e.g.*, the development of new, improved seeds).

There is, of course, always the possibility that a renewed drive toward income equalization and related social goals, particularly if carried out in an atmosphere like that of the Cultural Revolution, or a situation of political instability created, say, by a succession crisis, might cause a departure from the present policies and slow down or halt the pace of growth temporarily. Over the longer run, however, the only question is whether China's national product will grow more or less rapidly. The elements of continuity in Chinese economic policies since the early 1960's suggest that no set of leaders is likely to stray very far from what has proven to be a successful formula for sustained development.

The Succession Problem

By Ting Wang

For a number of years, the question of the succession to Mao Tse-tung has played an important role in China's internal politics, and with Mao now 79 years old and in somewhat uncertain health, that question becomes of increasing significance in the Chinese political milieu. As long as Mao remains on the scene, of course, he seems able, by the sheer force of his leadership talent and his enormous authority within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to check and balance different party factions and to maintain a political equilibrium. However, the leadership gap that will arise when he is gone will not be filled easily, and the power balance among various factions will in any case undergo drastic change. Hence, a rising storm of dissension could conceivably spill forth past Peking's Gate of Heavenly Peace.

This article will explore the succession issue from both short- and long-range perspectives. Predictions about the shape of the future are always hazardous and appear especially so in this case in light of the upheavals, purges, and rehabilitations that have taken place in China during recent years. Nevertheless, it does seem possible to identify at least some features or parameters of the state of affairs that will likely prevail after Mao's departure.

The first point to be made concerns the manner in which the succession is likely to be worked out. Historical precedents and the current Chinese situation alike suggest that it will involve fierce struggle, and that the victory of the successor (or successors)

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will be legitimized only by the disappearance or submission of his (their) rivals. In short, the transition will hardly be smooth and orderly.

As for historical precedents, one can cite two types—the succession pattern in pre-Communist China and that under other Communist regimes. The transfer of political power in China prior to 1949 never resulted from a set of accepted, well-defined, institutionalized procedures. Under China's monarchic system, for example, transfer of imperial power occurred through inheritance within the family or by the employment of violence by groups outside the family. Even the method of inheritance did not always entail political peace, for in order to win and ensure legitimacy, the aspirants within the ruling group often resorted to violent measures. For instance, although Emperor T'ai-tsung (627-49 A.D.), the founder of the T'ang Dynasty, was quite an enlightened and great ruler, he obtained power in an extremely ruthless fashion. He killed his elder brother (the first in line to succeed to the throne) and his younger brother, and he forced his father to abdicate. Ts'ao Chih, a well-known Chinese poet of the third century and himself a victim of the brutal court politics, vividly described the frequent fratricide in the following verses:

They were boiling beans on a beanstalk fire;
came a plaintive voice from the pot,
O why, since we sprang from the selfsame root,
should you kill me with anger hot?[1]

The transfer of power in other Communist states has been marked by similar strife and contention as a consequence of the unstructured and haphazard fashion in which it has taken place. In the USSR, for example, the disappearance of a commanding leader has typically produced severe clashes among top figures of the Soviet party because of a divergence of political views or in defense of vested interests. After the death of V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin, the party's General Secretary, joined with C. Y. Zinoviev and L. B. Kamenev to repress the Trotskyites in order to consolidate his position; later, he collaborated with N. I. Bukharin, M. P. Tomsky, and A. I. Rykov to eliminate Zinoviev and Kamenev from the leadership; finally, he brought about the expulsion of Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov from the ruling group and eventually liquidated them.[2] In the wake of Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev cooperated with Georgi Malenkov and others in purging and executing L. P. Beria, the secret police chief, as a dangerous threat;[3] subsequently, Khrushchev turned on his main rivals, including Malenkov, V. M. Molotov, etc., and ousted them from positions of significant influence.[4]

While history does not inevitably repeat itself, the fact that the Peking regime has not developed a regular procedure for replacing its top political leadership renders the succession patterns in pre-1949 China and in the USSR instructive. Moreover, the character of the present Chinese political system tends to reinforce their relevance. Those in charge of the party and state machinery monopolize—as well as totally control the distribution of—prestige, fame, and material resources; hence, political power has become equated with privileges, material well-being, and personal renown. People believe that "he who has power has everything, and he who is without power has nothing." Thus, the principal leaders tend to feel that surviving and thriving in such a political environment means attaching the highest value to personal power.

One further aspect of the existing situation lends additional weight to the historical precedents. Mao has twice sought to designate his successor in order to avoid the debilitating effect that a struggle for power after his demise might produce, but each time the effort has turned out badly from Mao's standpoint. Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, regarded at different times (and in Lin's case officially named) as the successor, both endeavored to enhance their power at Mao's expense. Thus, it appears unlikely that Mao will try a third time to appoint an heir.

Collective Leadership Initially

In these circumstances, the aspirants to Mao's leadership mantle will find few constraints against internecine battles to settle the succession issue. However, such battles will not necessarily com-

[1] Ts'ao Chih was a loser in the struggle to succeed his father, Ts'ao Ts'ao, as premier, and he suffered persecution by his elder brother, Ts'ao P'ei, the victor in the struggle. Allegedly, Ts'ao Chih was ordered to compose a poem in the short time required to walk seven steps, or face execution. Hence the poem cited above, which won Ts'ao Chih a pardon. For the story, see Lo Kuang-chung, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms,* trans. C. H. Brewitt-Taylor, C. E. Tuttle Co., 1959, Vol. 2, p. 198.

[2] See, for example, Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled,* rev. ed., enlarged, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967, pp. 149-61.

[3] *Ibid.,* pp. 161-64, and *Khrushchev Remembers,* tr. and ed. by Strobe Talbott, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1970, pp. 323-41.

[4] Fainsod, *op. cit.,* pp. 164-75.

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mence right away. In the immediate post-Mao period, in fact, they will probably be muted, and the current patriarchal system seems destined to give way at least temporarily to one of collective leadership. Two factors make the establishment of a ruling coalition quite likely.

To begin with, the elites who may contend with one another for Mao's position after his death are relatively equal in strength, prestige, and authority. In the past ten years, Mao has done his utmost to deify himself, to make himself an idol that commands reverence. Under such conditions, senior party leaders—even those endowed with great talents and ability—have been overshadowed and have had no real chance to attain major prominence in their own right. As a result, none boasts sufficient prestige and authority to run the party single-handedly and enforce patriarchal rule.

Both in traditional China and in other contemporary Communist polities, the normal outcome of such circumstances has been the emergence of a collective leadership. Throughout imperial Chinese history, the founder-emperors of dynasties enjoyed extraordinary personal prestige and power because of their outstanding exploits in founding states and because of policies generally designed to stabilize social order; therefore, they were able to exercise a strong ruling hand. But subsequent emperors, for the most part lacking these advantages, discovered their power curtailed and even under challenge from rivals within the court's ruling circles. The situation during the T'ang Dynasty affords a good example. Li Yuan (Emperor Kao-tsu) and Li Shih-min (Emperor T'ai-tsung, a son of Li Yuan), who established the dynasty, managed to maintain a firm grip on the reins of authority. However, the third emperor (Li Chih, Emperor Kao-tsung) encountered assertive rivals within the court's ruling group, and the assertiveness increased during the reigns of ensuing emperors, with struggles for imperial authority occurring frequently.

In the Soviet Union, immediately after Lenin's and Stalin's deaths and Khrushchev's ouster, no leader boasted a significantly greater amount of prestige and power than any other. Therefore, collective leaderships took over the reins of authority, though there was a formally designated main secretary of the Communist Party in each case.

A second factor conducive to the formation of a collective leadership has to do with the probable attitudes of middle- and upper-level cadres of the CCP regarding "inner-party democracy." After the experience of working under Mao's patriarchal rule, they may well deem a diffusion of power desirable in that it would not only protect them from the capricious whims of a single individual but also give them greater scope to exercise their own personal initiatives. Their views will tend to carry appreciable weight in the immediate post-Mao period, for since none of the top party leaders will have the stature to assert full control over the regime, rivals for supreme authority will need to court support from below in order to try to enhance their positions.

Makeup of the Collective

The individual participants in the collective leadership—and hence the serious contenders for Mao's mantle of supreme power—will have to possess some particular qualifications. For example, dominant influence in certain functional areas of public life, as well as recognition and backing by the masses, will be exceedingly advantageous. The ability to dispose of military power will also have relevance, especially in the event that a severe political struggle develops and produces social chaos. By no means negligible, too, will be such things as previous contributions to the party, personal renown, and organizational ability.

Leadership cadres with substantial qualifications along these lines fall into three categories:

(1) The "royalists." This group includes such persons as Chiang Ch'ing, Mao's wife and a Politburo member in her own right; Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, First Political Commissar of the Nanking Military Region and First Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, as well as a member of the Politburo; Wang Tung-hsing, Director of the Central Committee's General Office and an alternate member of the Politburo; and Yao Wen-yuan, Second Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee and a member of the Politburo. The members of this group are Mao Tse-tung's favorites, and because of their identification with the policies pursued during the Cultural Revolution, they have a certain appeal among the low-ranking cadres and "rebel" youths who are dissatisfied with the country's Establishment. All those in the group admittedly suffer from a serious vulnerability in that they lack any long-standing ties with the People's Liberation Army—indeed, the vast majority of the senior and middle-level PLA officers probably are highly suspicious of them. Their close association with Mao, however,

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seems likely to assure them of representation in the leadership for at least a short period of time, for other political groups would doubtless hesitate to elbow them aside right away and thus risk charges of disloyalty to Mao.

(2) The bureaucrats, particularly those with rich administrative experience deriving from long tenure of top posts in the central government, and with demonstrated ability to direct diplomatic and economic activities. This group encompasses veteran officials like Premier Chou En-lai; Vice-Premiers Li Hsien-nien and Nieh Jung-chen, and even Ch'en Yun, once a powerful Minister of Commerce. (All the foregoing men except Nieh are also members of the current CCP Politburo. Though Nieh does not belong to the top party body, he serves as one of the three vice-chairmen of the highly important Military Affairs Commission of the CCP Central Committee.) Such individuals not only wield considerable power in the government, but they likewise have a strong base of support among government cadres. After the death of Mao, their organizational abilities and administrative experience will undoubtedly ensure them representation in the nucleus of the new leadership, for such talents will be vital not only to the consolidation of the successor government and the maintenance of a functioning administrative system, but also to the effective conduct of diplomatic and economic activities, the further development of science and technology, and—above all—the prevention of anarchy and disorder. It should be noted that participants in the collective leadership from this group will not necessarily come entirely from among the professional bureaucrats in the central government. Some career officials in posts outside the capital have distinguished themselves in government and party administration and in dealing with disturbances and disorders, and they wield substantial political influence today. Hence, a few of them could wind up playing significant roles in the national leadership, too.

(3) Career military officials in Peking and in the outlying areas of the country. At the moment, Yeh Chien-ying, Hsu Shih-yu, Ch'en Hsi-lien, and Li Te-sheng hold high places in the party as well as major posts within the military structure. All but Li are full members of the Politburo, and Li has alternate-member status. In addition, Yeh serves as one of the three vice-chairmen of the CCP Central Committee's Military Affairs Commission; Hsu, as First Secretary of the Kiangsu Provincial Party Committee; Ch'en, as First Secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Committee; and Li, as First Secretary of the Anhwei Provincial Party Committee. Whether these specific individuals will become key members of the successor regime is hard to judge just now, but they and the most able elements of the "Young Turks"—e.g., Yang Te-chih, who is a member of the CCP Central Committee, Commander of the Tsinan Military Region, and First Secretary of the Shantung Provincial Party Committee; and Su Yu, who is a member of the CCP Central Committee, a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee's Military Affairs Commission, and a Vice-Minister of National Defense—certainly seem distinct candidates for such a role. If these officers vanish from the political stage, however, others will likely move into the new power nucleus. The generals as a group definitely appear destined to play a significant part in the political life of the future.

Wang Tung-hsing (left), Director of the CCP Central Committee's General Office and head of the secret police, and Li Te-hseng (right), Director of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army and First Secretary of the Anhwei Provincial Party Committee, both alternate members of the CCP Politburo, with American visitor Frank Coe at the CCP's 50th anniversary celebrations in July 1971 in Peking.

—Photo from China Pictorial, No. 10, 1971, p. 61.

It should be underscored that the preceding classification is not in terms of identifiable factions but in terms of political power bases and political views. For example, Yeh Chien-ying, Ch'eng Hsi-lien, Hsu Shih-yu, etc., were included in the same category not because they have formed themselves into a

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faction but because their power rests on the same political foundations, because their ideological and policy preferences—insofar as we can discern them—are comparatively similar, and because their interests are generally the same. The power base of each of the three groups tends to be self-evident, but the character of their political views may need further explication. Though they all adhere to dialectical materialism in their world outlook, their ideological and political perspectives differ significantly.

The professional bureaucrats, as a result of the fact that they belong to the "haves," harbor a strong desire to consolidate the present regime and to maintain the established political order. They have held power at the central and local levels for a long time. Indeed, they have served and are serving as leaders not only of party and government organs but also of economic and business enterprises. Since they have more direct responsibility for fostering economic development and for carrying on diplomatic activities than the members of the other groups, they tend to have correspondingly greater contact with intellectuals of advanced learning and with economic and diplomatic experts, and these contacts have provided them with a more comprehensive and more penetrating understanding of both the national situation and the outside world, comparatively speaking, than members of the other groups possess. This, in turn, has encouraged them to demand social stability and to frown on social disturbances which might disrupt the nation's administrative operations, diplomatic activities, and economic development. Their political philosophy is to pursue "unity" by reconciling "opposites"—that is, the so-called principle of "seeking great sameness while accepting small differences." They do not renounce "revolutionary" goals, but at the same time they advocate the adoption of realistic and flexible policies. While they do not truly "represent" the broad masses, they attempt to mitigate the contradictions between the masses of workers and peasants on the one hand and the government on the other, so as to ensure a stable environment for economic growth. Though they do not deny the existence of a contradiction between the West and China, they are quite eager to improve relations with the West, seeking not only "unity" out of contradictions but also the expansion of China's international trade so as to provide equipment, facilities, and markets for its economic development.[5]

In contrast to the bureaucrats, the royalist group, who constituted the "opposition" before the Cultural Revolution (in that they bore no responsibility for the development of the economy and the conduct of diplomacy) and who today "represent" low-level cadres and "rebellious" youth, are interested in "revolution," believing that they can create a new world of their own out of revolutionary upheavals and chaos. Their ideological perspective is that of the revolutionary principles of the Paris Commune of the 19th century. They want to "break through" the political traditions of the CCP and smash the established political order of the state so as to seize government and party power and to implement what they consider the "revolutionary line." Therefore, their political approach is to expand and amplify conflicts and contradictions and to emphasize "continuous revolution." Their analysis of the national situation and the outside world tends to be one-sided and radical—they do not feel con-

Hsu Shih-yu, Member of the CCP Politburo, Commander of the Nanking Military Region, and First Secretary of the Kiangsu Provincial Party Committee, hosts Dang Tran Thi, leader of a delegation of the Central Committee of the South Viet Nam National Liberation Front.

—Photo from *China Pictorial*, No. 10, 1971, p. 60.

[5] These ideological and political views differ widely from those of the palace group. The conflict between the May 16th Corps and the State Council during the Cultural Revolution affords a concrete illustration of the differences. For more detailed information, see "Resolutely Crush the Counterrevolutionary Adverse Current of Bombarding Premier Chou," in *Chu-ying Tung-fang Hung* (Canton), Sept. 13, 1967; and Revolutionary Rebels' Commune of the Peking Steel College, *Revolutionary Students Unite and Smash the Counterrevolutionary Conspiratorial Organization "The Black 'May 16 Corps,'"* September, 1968.

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tent with the status quo and entertain illusions about revolutionary power. They pay little attention to economic interests or to the desire of the masses for peace, and the specific policies they advocate contain elements of "left-leaning adventurism."[6]

The professional soldiers, in common with the professional bureaucrats (with whom they share the status of "haves"), defend the established political order and seek social and political stability in order to assure national security. However, the tactics that they favor for maintaining the authority of the CCP vary somewhat from those of the professional bureaucrats. The professional soldiers attach greater importance to the militarization of administration and, insofar as economic development is concerned, pay more attention to the development of military-oriented industry than do the bureaucrats. Between the professional soldiers and the palace group there are sharp contradictions. Certainly, the professional soldiers do not approve of the "left-leaning adventuristic" line of the palace group and do not like to see existing society threatened with destruction.[7]

Chou En-lai: A Key Figure

If Chou En-lai is still politically active and in sound health when Mao passes from the scene, he will in all probability be a key element in the post-Mao leadership. At present, Chou evinces no signs of a wish to become Mao's "successor." In fact, given his astuteness, his knowledge of Mao's character, and his own advancing age, he would be unlikely to manifest such aspirations or, indeed, to harbor a desire to rule in Mao's fashion. Yet there appears to be no one else on the political horizon who is better equipped to serve as the nucleus of the new collective leadership—and this may remain true for at least some time to come.

Perhaps Chou's greatest asset stems from the fact that he has had charge of the central government for a long period of time, and has thus acquired a solid political base among the bureaucrats in the government hierarchy. At the same time, he is not simply the chief representative of the government bureaucracy at the top of the political hierarchy. As an "old guard" of the party and the army, he also carries weight with the party secretaries and veteran army cadres.

Many observers seem to believe that Chou lacks influence in the army, but they forget that he has had important ties with the army from time to time throughout his career. For example, he was the planner of the "August 1 Uprising" in 1927. As head of the Military Affairs Commission of the CCP Central Committee in the early 1930's, he led the Red Army in its struggle, and he only handed over his military responsibilities to Mao Tse-tung in 1935 after the Ts'unyi party conference. For a while after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Chou held the post of Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council concurrently with his other duties. Although he had no direct hand in guiding the army after he relinquished this job, he did renew his association with the army for several years beginning in 1966, during which period he was thought to be serving as a Vice-Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission of the CCP Central Committee.[8] As a result of these sporadic links, Chou probably enjoys some latent influence in the armed forces, at least among the army commanders and above.

In addition to widespread support, Chou possesses personal attributes of a kind that will undoubtedly be crucial in the sort of political circumstances that will most likely prevail when Mao dies. First, Chou has distinguished himself for his ability and fortitude in handling disputes in the provinces and for his smoothness and patience in dealing with political matters. (These qualities were especially evident during the Cultural Revolution.) When political troubles arise, others tend to push Chou to the fore even if he does not want to assume responsibilities of his own accord. Second, his long experience in the diplomatic sphere has provided him with a deeper grasp of the international situation and of China's diplomatic enterprises than most other political figures can boast. Third, his direct responsibility for the development of China's national economy, culture, education, and science has afforded him many opportunities for contact with economists, industrial management staffs, and other highly-

[6] For relevant documentation, see Wang Li *et al.*, "The Proletarian Dictatorship and the Proletarian Cultural Revolution," *Hung-ch'i* (Peking), No. 15, December 1966; Lin Chieh, "The Newborn Things as Unconquerable," *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (Peking), April 8, 1967; and The Taching Commune of Peking Petroleum College, "The 27 Fiendish Crimes of Chi Peng-yu," leaflet dated Feb. 26, 1968.

[7] The conflicts between local military commanders and the Red Guards—especially that at Wuhan—during the Cultural Revolution testify amply to this point.

[8] Often during the Cultural Revolution, Chou even issued orders directly to the army.

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

Premier Chou En-lai and Chang Ch'un-chiao (right), First Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, like Chou a member of the CCP Politburo, with Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, atop the Shanghai Building in October 1971.

—Photo from *China Pictorial*, No. 12, 1971, p. 11.

trained intellectuals. Such contacts have given him a broader view of China's long-term interests and practical needs than many other top leaders have.

Chiang Ch'ing's Role

Since, to Mao, his wife Chiang Ch'ing probably represents the most dependable "close comrade-in-arms," a few words about her future role also would appear to be appropriate. The changes in the order of seniority of Politburo members since the fall of Lin Piao in September 1971 have greatly enhanced her political position. Before September 1971, the ranking of the top 11 members of the Politburo went as follows: Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, Huang Yung-sheng, Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan, Yeh Chien-ying, and Li Hsien-nien. Now the order is Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, K'ang Sheng, Tung Pi-Wu, Chu Te, Liu Po-ch'eng, Chiang Ch'ing, Yeh Chien-ying, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan, and Li Hsien-nien.[9] Though formally Chiang Ch'ing remains seventh on the list, she has in actuality moved from seventh to third—*i.e.*, just below Chou and Mao—if one considers only active Politburo members. Before the 1971 shake-up, the four individuals between Chou and Chiang Ch'ing, all of whom were in their sixties, constituted active elements of the ruling nucleus. Currently, three of the four—Tung Pi-wu, Chu Te, and Liu Po-ch'eng—are in their late seventies or eighties and in a state of semi-retirement, seemingly playing only a supportive role in the body's affairs. The other, K'ang Sheng, has been inactive for some time, possibly because of ill health.

There have likewise been recent signs that Mao and Chiang Ch'ing both wish to build up her prestige within and outside the party. For example, Peking newspapers and Radio Peking have from time to time published or broadcast articles exalting her "revolutionary model theatrical works." Perhaps most interesting, the latest edition of the *Atlas of the World* put out in Peking not only eulogizes Mao's exploits but praises Chiang Ch'ing as well at two points—without once referring to Chou En-lai or any other leaders.[10]

Mao's enormous prestige and Chiang Ch'ing's special relationship to him give her considerable political advantages which she can exploit in the post-Mao era. So does her immense influence among the "rebel" youth and low-ranking cadres who are unhappy with the existing order of things. However, she also has some major handicaps that cloud her political future. She is physically weak and often gets sick,[11] a tendency which offsets her compara-

[9] See *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), October 1971 to April 1973.

[10] See *Shih-chieh t'i-tu* (Atlas of the World), 1972 ed., Peking, Map Publishing Press, 1972.

[11] On the subject of her health, see Ting Wang, *Chiang Ch'ing ch'ien ch'uan* (A Brief Biography of Chiang Ch'ing), Hong Kong, Contemporary China Research Institute, 1967.

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Chiang Ch'ing (Madame Mao), member of the CCP Politburo, converses with Dutch film director Joris Iven in mid-1971.

—Photo from *China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 10, 1971, p. 61.

tive youth (she is less than 60 years old); and she lacks a firm political base, enjoying only limited influence in the party and the army. Moreover, she owes her present standing to political connections and not to any really concrete contributions to the party. In light of the deep roots of the concept of "reward according to one's merits" in Chinese culture, it will be difficult for her to obtain the vigorous support of party cadres and army men in the absence of extraordinary pressure from some outside source.

As regards this last consideration, one must remember that the Chinese people traditionally believed that a man must have rendered especially meritorious service to the state to qualify him for posts like prime minister or minister. It was considered incompatible with the established moral standard to gain office through special connections with the imperial court or through the use of illegitimate means such as force. For example, two prime ministers in Chinese history—namely, Yang Kuo-chung of the T'ang Dynasty, who was the brother of Yang Kuei-fei, Emperor Hsuan-tsung's favorite concubine; and Wei Chung-hsien of the Ming Dynasty, who was a favorite of Emperor Ch'ung-chen—have always been held in particular contempt by the Chinese people because these men attained their positions without having made any significant contributions to the state.

This traditional concept of "reward according to one's merits" has quite clearly survived within the Chinese Communist Party. In the early 1950's, for instance, Politburo member Kao Kang took umbrage at the fact that his chief rivals, Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai, occupied posts senior to his, for he maintained that the "red party" (*i.e.*, the section of the party that operated in the guerrilla base areas where Kao had served) had advanced the party cause more than had the "white-area party" (*i.e.*, the section of the party that operated in areas under non-Communist control where Liu and Chou had carried on their activities during the early stages of the Communist struggle for power).[12] Similarly, the cadres of district-level party committees in Kwangtung and Shantung often clashed with cadres from other places on the ground that since the former had set up the "revolutionary bases" in these provinces, it ran counter to the moral principle of "reward according to one's merits" to have cadres from other places telling them what to do.[13]

On balance, Chiang Ch'ing does probably possess enough assets to retain her current political position for at least a while. Beyond that, she will have to prove herself in the storms of political struggle.

The Collective's Policies

If Chou becomes the most important figure in the collective leadership after Mao's death, what effect will his prominence likely have on the character of the regime's policies? On this subject, one can venture only a few general observations.

Since some of the new powerholders are bound to be "royalists," it seems most unlikely that any large-scale anti-Mao campaign will get under way immediately. Consequently, Mao's image as an idol will probably persist for some time. However, such a situation does not mean that Chou and his partners will institute no changes. Without serious prejudice to Mao's political dignity, they could conceivably undertake major initiatives of an essentially practical nature.

In foreign policy, the collective leadership might well try to improve its state relations and minimize its theoretical row with Moscow, for both China and the Soviet Union are feeling the economic burden of military confrontation. It might exhibit even greater flexibility in dealings with other countries than the current government has, and it could become more active in the United Nations so as to consolidate

[12] "Resolution on the Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih Anti-party Alliance," approved by the CCP National Party Conference, March 21-31, 1955, in *Jen-min Shou-ts'e* (People's Handbook), Peking, 1956, p. 77.

[13] See, for example, Ezra Vogel, *Canton Under Communism*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969.

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China's position vis-à-vis the Third World. It might step up "united front" activities at home and abroad so as to win the backing of the non-party elements, the intellectuals, and the overseas Chinese and thus to isolate and undermine the anti-Communist forces in Taiwan; at the same time, it could launch an all-out "peace offensive" aimed at splitting Taiwan's local anti-Communist front. While such an offensive would not necessarily succeed, it would undoubtedly complicate the problems of the Taipei government.

With respect to domestic policy, the new power-holders will likely show increased concern for economic performance. To achieve greater productivity, they will probably adhere to the rural policies associated with Liu Shao-ch'i—*i.e.*, they will allow the peasants to keep small plots of land for private production and to engage in private enterprise as a means of solving their own economic problems, thus easing the contradictions between the peasantry and the government.

Such policies, of course, would not mean that Chou En-lai and company were forsaking revolution. Indeed, it would be deadly wrong to interpret these kinds of quite limited concessions to the peasantry as a manifestation of an intention to lead China onto the road of "democracy" and "liberalization," or of an immediate preoccupation with the material life of the people. Tactical flexibility in struggle serves the strategy of socialist revolution. According to the concept of "the unity of opposites," the "smile offensive" is only another form of "revolution." In short, China in the age of Chou En-lai seems most unlikely to undergo a "peaceful transition" to a Yugoslav type of "modern revisionism."

The Longer Term

Much of the preceding analysis, it must be pointed out, is based on the assumptions that Mao will die within a relatively brief period of time—say the next two or three years—and that Chou En-lai will still be a major force in Chinese politics when Mao disappears from the scene. But these assumptions could prove erroneous. For example, Mao could live for, say, another ten years. In this case, Premier Chou, who is already 75 years old, may possibly have predeceased him, and even if Chou should remain alive,

"Generation" and Age of CCP Cadres

Generation	Other Designation	Year Joined CCP	Age Range [a]	Average Age	Present Rank [b]	Representative Figures
First	Veteran cadres	1921-26	65-85	75	1-6	Mao Tse-tung Chou En-lai Chu Te Yeh Chien-ying
Second	1927 or Old Red Army cadres	1927-33	60-70	65	2-8	Li Hsien-nien Chen Hsi-lien
Third	Long March cadres	1934-36	55-65	60	4-10	Chang Ch'un-ch'iao Wang Tung-hsing
Fourth	1937, War of Resistance, or Yenan cadres	1937-45	45-60	55	6-13	Chiang Ch'ing Chi Teng-k'uai
Fifth	Liberation War cadres	1946-48	40-50	45	11-18	Chao Hsin-yuan Lu Man
Sixth	1949 cadres	1949-52	40-45	42	14-21	Yao Wen-yuan
Seventh	New cadres	1953-73	25-40	35	17-25	Wang Hung-wen Hsu Ching-hsien

[a] Estimates of the ages of cadres are based on the memoirs of representative cadres, collected in such sources as *Hung-ch'i P'iao-p'iao* (The Red Flag Is Waving), Peking, 1957 *et seq.*, and *Hsing-huo Liao-yuan* (The Spark Resulting in the Prairie Fire), Peking, 1958 *et seq.*

[b] The ranking classifications employed in this breakdown are those to be found in *Chung-ying tsai-cheng fa-k'uei hui-p'ien* (Collection of Financial and Administrative Laws and Regulations of the Central Government), Peking, 1957. High-ranking cadres fall in the 1-13 range; middle-level cadres, in the 14-17 range; and basic-level cadres, below grade 17. There are 30 grades in all, but those below grade 25 are clerical in nature.

Some of the "representative figures" listed in the next column—Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Wang Tung-hsing, Chiang Ch'ing, Yao Wen-yuan, Wang Hung-wen, and Hsu Ching-hsien—hold political positions much, much higher in rank (generally in the 2-8 range) than other cadres of the same generation. The rankings given in this column, however, refer to the generation as a whole.

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he would probably be too old to be any longer an active force in Peking's political picture. Or Chou En-lai could conceivably fall from power in a new round of intraparty conflict before Mao's demise. Under such circumstances, the transition to a new leadership would likely be a great deal less smooth than it would be if Chou assumes the key role in the new leadership.

The problem of the succession is further complicated by Chou's age in any event. This suggests that even should Mao pass from the scene in the relatively near future and Chou form the nucleus of the new CCP leadership, Chou will not be at the helm for an extended period. Thus, a fierce struggle for succession not dissimilar to that which appears probable if Chou loses his position or dies before Mao's departure will ultimately ensue. It behooves us, therefore, to ask what cadres—or at least what groups of cadres—will figure in that struggle and what the broad character of their relationships with other cadres will likely be.

In approaching these questions, one must first take into account the "generation" (defined in terms of the date of entry into the party) and age groupings of CCP cadres. The table on page 21 attempts to delineate these groupings. It should be noted that available data on the dates when cadres joined the party and on their ages are incomplete. In making the breakdown presented here, the author has relied on both this piecemeal information and his own experiences when he worked on the mainland.

Ch'en Hsi-lien, Member of the CCP Politburo, Commander of the Shenyang Military Region, and First Secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee, welcomes Salem Robaya Ali, Chairman of the Presidential Council of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, to Shenyang in summer 1971.

—Photo from *China Pictorial*, No. 10, 1971, p. 60.

At the moment, members of the first and second generations hold the chief positions of power in the CCP Politburo and the State Council, and the average age of these generations is 75 and 65, respectively. Let us suppose that Chou En-lai dies ten years hence. By that time, most of the cadres of these two generations will either have died, too, or be close to death, and those remaining will by and large be too old to play important roles in the political process. The only possible exception is a small group of cadres including such men as Ch'en Hsi-lien (age 60), currently a Politburo member; Li Te-sheng (thought to be 60), now an alternate member of the Politburo; and Wu Te (59), now First Secretary of the Peking Municipal Party Committee—all of whom will still be relatively youthful, have already demonstrated their organizational abilities, and possess rich experience in political struggle.

The bulk of the future contestants for political power, then, will come from the third-generation (Long March) and fourth-generation (War of Resistance) cadres. Of the two groups, those from the fourth generation are likely to be the more important. This generation, now averaging 55 years of age, not only contains a substantial number of persons with strong political aspirations, but also enjoys comparatively greater assets than the members of the third generation. Those in the fourth generation participated in the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-45) and the Liberation War (1946-48) and have thus had contacts with the armed forces. They have worked as members of party committees or as government officials, and many have also managed economic enterprises or assisted in the conduct of diplomatic activities. They generally have fairly strong political bases in some government organ, a certain locality, or the armed forces.

Aside from Chiang Ch'ing[14] and Chi Teng-k'uei—respectively a member and an alternate member of the Politburo—the fourth-generation cadres still work in local party and government organs in posi-

[14] She, incidentally, never had a role in the armed struggle against Japan, though she went to Yenan in 1940.

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tions of secondary importance or serve in the State Council as deputy ministers, assistant ministers, or department directors. Some examples of those of outstanding ability would include Chao Tsu-yang, a Vice-Chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and Ken Ch'i-ch'ang, a Secretary of the Honan Provincial Party Committee.

Many cadres of this generation, of course, have never received any publicity in the press, and their names are largely unknown to outside observers. Yet their virtual anonymity at this juncture does not mean that they cannot become leading actors on the future political stage in Peking just as much as those who enjoy a fair degree of political prominence today. Indeed, the latter individuals may fade from view as a result of a variety of factors such as poor health, political mistakes, etc. What one can say with certainty is that representatives of the fourth-generation cadres will probably loom exceedingly large on the Chinese political landscape over the next decade.

Institutional/Ideological Groups

A second way of appraising what cadres will be involved in the eventual struggle after Mao and Chou are gone and what the likely relationship of these cadres with one another will be, is in terms of groupings based on institutional affiliations and political outlooks. Here, three groups—the "royalists" or the "palace" group, the bureaucrats, and the professional soldiers (all of which have been defined and described previously)—seem to be the crucial ones.

In the uncertain situation that will prevail, extreme confusion and chaos could beset Chinese society, and even the threat of disorder gives professional soldiers strong political assets. One has only to look at the history of modern China to find manifold illustrations of the translation of military power into political power during times of internal trouble there. In 1912, for example, Yuan Shih-kai, the Peiyang warlord, was able to assume the presidency of the newly-founded Republic of China, and hence political power, from Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the first provisional president, largely because Yuan had superior military force at his disposal. After the toppling of Yuan Shih-kai, Li Yuan-hung succeeded to the presidency, but power quickly slipped into the hands of Premier Tuan Chi-jui, warlord of the Anhwei faction, as a consequence of the military might at his command. In the post-Chou era of the People's Republic of China, then, professional soldiers will probably exercise greater power and influence than they do now. They may even acquire a paramount position in the course of the political struggle.

Yet the professional soldiers will need the bureaucrats in the party and government as allies. The bureaucrats have administrative experience and skills in managing the economy and handling diplomacy, and the professional soldiers will have to mobilize these skills in order to stabilize society and consolidate the regime. The bureaucrats also possess influence in the party and government systems upon which the professional soldiers must rely in order to resist and thwart the interferences of the palace group and the "rebels" it supports.

At the same time, the bureaucrats will need the professional soldiers as allies, for the bureaucrats cannot maintain their political posts or implement their political line without substantial support from the military. Two other factors further enhance the likelihood of the formation of an alliance between the two groups (though one cannot even then rule out the possibility of "struggle in unity"). First, there are almost no purely professional soldiers in China comparable to military professionals in the West. Many of the so-called professional soldiers have concurrently held positions of party or governmental leadership for a long time. Second, the bureaucrats often began their careers in the armed forces; in some cases, they still retain military posts. These ties and the resultant tendency to identify to some extent with the views and opinions of the military facilitate unity in the face of threats to common interests, and both the bureaucrats and professional soldiers suffered from the same harassment, persecution, and assaults of the palace group during the Cultural Revolution.

Conclusion

To sum up, then, the long-term future appears likely to bring a tacit understanding between the professional soldiers and the bureaucrats to try to contain and reduce the power of the palace group. Moreover, the odds against the palace group emerging victorious over such a coaliton seem quite high. The palace group, it is true, does at the moment enjoy a close relationship with the secret police (Wang Tung-hsing is the head of the secret police

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as well as Director of the CCP Central Committee's General Office); thus, members of the group may gain the support of certain secret-police units. However, almost all members lack a solid base of political power (only Chang Ch'un-ch'iao boasts one—in Shanghai). Furthermore, virtually none of the key figures in the group—*e.g.*, Chiang Ch'ing, Yao Wen-yuan, Wang Hung-wen, Hsu Ching-hsien—participated in the Anti-Japanese Resistance War, the Liberation War, or the Korean War; consequently, they have no direct relationship with, and exert no influence on, the armed forces. Still further, the members of the group lack political prestige both within and without the party. Before the Cultural Revolution, they had no experience in working in party or government organs, and even now they are still without practical experience in the economic and diplomatic spheres. Perhaps most crucial, the revolutionary principles of the Paris Commune that they have advocated and the "left-leaning adventuristic" views that they have espoused are strongly opposed by most cadres as well as by the masses.

On the other hand, it does not appear probable that the palace group will disappear entirely from the leadership. The task of ensuring a minimum of stability in order to meet the demands of economic growth—which involves not only preserving a national center of power but also preventing conflicts among the cadres of the three groups from paralyzing it—will likely compel all groups to accept some measure of compromise. In short, while a coalition of professional soldiers and bureaucrats will probably occupy the commanding positions within ruling circles, the leadership will constitute a "collective" of elements from the three groups, thus presenting a facade of "great party unity." However, the strength of the palace group at the center will almost certainly be quite limited, and its influence on policy will be correspondingly far less significant than in the short term.

Just what the balance of power between the professional soldiers and professional bureaucrats will be no doubt will depend on social conditions. If extreme chaos and disturbances develop around the country, the professional soldiers cannot but play a more important role than the bureaucrats in the leadership. On the other hand, if no manifestations of social unrest occur at all, or at least if a fair degree of stability returns after the redistribution of power at the central and local levels, the bureaucrats are likely to outweigh the military in the ruling coalition.

As for the precise policies that the collective leadership described above may pursue, one can only venture a general observation or two. It seems most improbable that the new regime will follow what is now called the line of "extreme left-leaning adventurism"—*i.e.*, the policies in effect during the Cultural Revolution—in either the domestic or the foreign spheres. There are several reasons why this appears unlikely. Not only will the makeup of the collective leadership probably be based on compromise, but the bureaucrats will in all probability enjoy great influence in it. Moreover, the pressure of society for moderation and even for reform of existing policies will presumably be quite great in such a situation. Hence, the political line of the future leadership in Peking will most likely resemble that which Chou En-lai appears to favor at the moment.

In conclusion, however, it should be underscored that efforts to peer into the long-range future run considerable risks of projecting prevailing conditions forward indefinitely. New and unexpected developments could conceivably alter the picture entirely. Therefore, the foregoing long-term projections must be viewed as much more tentative than those advanced regarding the results of an early succession.

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West Siberia: The Quest for Energy

By John P. Hardt

Rapid development and qualitative improvement of fuel and energy resources are important requisites of the current and long-term development of the Soviet economy. In the USSR—as in the developed West—petroleum and natural gas have won favor as the preferred contemporary energy sources, having displaced coal, wood and peat, and not yet being seriously challenged by atomic power. In emphasizing exploitation of domestic oil and gas resources, the Soviet planners have accorded particular importance to development of the fields of West Siberia. The West Siberian complex—with related transmission, transportation and processing facilities—figures as one of the major capital investment efforts of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75), although serious development of the region actually began during the previous plan period (1966-70). The Soviet government has publicly committed itself to this massive and—as we shall see—risky project in an attempt to create an important new regional industrial complex and to help meet expanding domestic and export requirements for oil and gas. Prospects for the ambitious undertaking depend not only on Soviet success in overcoming the very real risks involved but also on the favorable resolution of a series of critical political issues which affect the West Siberian venture in a major way—ranging from resource-allocation priorities and regional planning techniques to attitudes toward the role of foreign trade and credits in Soviet development.

There is an apparent correlation between the performance of a modern industrial economy and the level of its energy supplies.[1] Moreover, improvement in labor productivity and capital-output ratios such as the Soviet leaders seek to achieve requires increased availability and expenditure of energy. Finally, the decision to expand private ownership of motor vehicles in the USSR will have its desired incentive effect only if there is adequate fuel to run the new autos. The Soviet planners evidenced an awareness of these linkages in the 1971-75 Plan, which targets a 39-percent increase in national income to be fueled by an increase of 33.7 percent in annual energy output by 1975 (as compared to 1970). Petroleum and natural gas are to provide the lion's share of the additional energy for Soviet domestic and export needs, as can be seen from the accompanying diagram on page 26.

Beyond its immediate impact on Soviet domestic economic performance, oil and gas production also has important foreign-trade ramifications. First, these commodities are an important component of Soviet trade with the developed West, comprising 29 percent of exports in this direction during 1971.[3] Future expansion of commercial relations, especially

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[1] For example, in 1971 Soviet gross national product (GNP) was 548.6 billion dollars and primary energy of the USSR was the equivalent of 1,291 million metric tons of coal, whereas GNP in the United States was 1,000.4 billion dollars and primary energy was the equivalent of 2,130 million metric tons of coal. See Peter G. Peterson, *US-Soviet Commercial Relationships in a New Era,* US Department of Commerce, Washington, DC, August 1972, Annex A, p. 35.

[2] N. K. Baibakov, Ed., *Gosudarstvennyi piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnovo khoziaistva SSSR na 1971-1975* (State Five-Year Plan for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1971-75), Moscow, Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1972, pp. 23 and 98.

[3] Peterson, *op. cit.,* Annex B, p. 14.

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with the United States, depends on substantial increases in exports of petroleum and natural gas. Second, these commodities also figure importantly in economic relations between the USSR and Eastern Europe. In particular, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have substantial requirements for Soviet oil and gas, and future demand is likely to increase exponentially. The USSR must meet these needs or run the risk of seeing its East European allies turn to Middle Eastern or other fuel sources, and of thereby losing an important lever by which it can control the area.

Trends in Soviet Energy: 1970-75
(by source, in percent)



[a] For purposes of comparability, Soviet economists convert physical output of various energy sources into units of "conventional fuel" (*uslovnoe toplivo*), measured in metric tons containing 7,000 kilocalories.

SOURCE: N. K. Baibakov, Ed., *Gosudarstvennyi piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnovo khoziaistva SSSR na 1971-1975 gody* (State Five-Year Plan for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1971-1975), Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1972, p. 98.

The Wager on West Siberia

The Soviet stake in rapid development of domestic oil and gas production is thus high, and the central role of the West Siberian project in these plans is readily apparent. Two-thirds of the increase in Soviet petroleum output during 1971-75 is scheduled to come from the West Siberian fields,[4] and the USSR Minister of Petroleum Industry, V. D. Shashin, expects the region to account for 75 to 80 percent of incremental output for the 1970's as a whole.[5] Siberian natural gas deposits have a similar pivotal role in Soviet plans for that energy source. West Siberian gas output, which amounted to 318 billion cubic feet in 1970, is expected to rise to 4.6 trillion cubic feet per year by 1975. In that year, Tyumen Province in West Siberia is expected to be the leading producer of both oil and gas among all Soviet provinces.[6]

In attempting to assess the prospects for West Siberian development, one must begin with a clear understanding of the risks involved—risks which have prompted one observer, Robert Campbell, to term the whole undertaking a "desperate gamble."[7] Elsewhere, Campbell noted:

The important issue is how costly it will be to keep oil and gas output in the new areas of Western Siberia growing. On the surface there is complete official optimism on this score, but one can't help

[4] Baibakov, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

[5] *Oil and Gas Journal* (Tulsa, Oklahoma), Aug. 24, 1970, p. 128.

[6] For Soviet predictions concerning West Siberia and Tyumen Province, see *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 8, February 1973, p. 2; *Pravda* (Moscow), July 11, 1971; *Sovetskaia Rossiia* (Moscow), Dec. 9, 1971; *Gazovoe delo* (Moscow), No. 12, 1972, p. 4; and *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (Moscow), No. 4, 1973. Already in 1973, Tyumen Province is expected to become the leading producer of petroleum (see *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* [Moscow], No. 5, January 1973, p. 1).

[7] See his contribution to *Changing National Priorities*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economic Priorities of the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, June 1970, Part 2, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office. It was noted that the Middle Ob fields are noncommercial by standards on the Alaskan North Slope. The best Tyumen wells reportedly produce only 300 tons or 2,190 barrels a day; a marginal North Slope well will produce about 2,600 barrels a day, and an average well is expected to flow 10,000 to 15,000 barrels daily.

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having doubts because of the difficult conditions and the fact that the Ministry officials seem always to have been much less enthusiastic about the potential of the region than is the party.[8]

A number of factors highlight this uncertainty. In the first place, Soviet claims of "proven" or "explored" reserves of these resources in West Siberia must be carefully scrutinized. While there seems to be little question of the existence of abundant reserves of natural gas, confusion over the definition of "proven" or "explored" resources complicates planning and investment decisions.[9] The extent of oil reserves is still more problematic. An apparent shift in the definition of "proven" reserves to include those which are only "probable" by Western standards (and, for that matter, by former Soviet usage) has an ominous ring to those familiar with Soviet statistical legerdemain.[10] To paraphrase Khrushchev (from his criticism of bloated agricultural statistics), the USSR cannot fire its diesels with statistics. Some Soviet geologists appear to buttress their claims concerning Siberian reserves with new, unproven geological theories evocative of Trofim Lysenko's ill-founded "solution of the grain problem." [11]

When reading Soviet estimates of West Siberian reserves, one should also recall that in 1970 the Japanese were apparently discouraged from participating in the exploitation of natural gas in Northern Sakhalin when the USSR revised downward earlier optimistic estimates of "proven" reserves on the island.[12] An ironic sequel to this episode occurred in November 1972 when a Soviet proposal for Japanese participation in the exploitation of gas deposits in the Viliuiskoe oil field near Yakutsk—offered as a substitute for the Sakhalin project—floundered, apparently again over the issue of the reliability of Soviet estimates of proven reserves.[13]

The "attractiveness" of the West Siberian oil and gas deposits has doubtless been enhanced in official eyes by the unpleasant realization that production in the Ural-Volga fields of the Tatar and Bashkir autonomous republics and in Kuibyshev Province was peaking out sooner than anticipated.[14] The oil deposits of the Mangyshlak Peninsula of West Kazakhstan have also proved disappointing inasmuch as their high paraffin content complicates exploitation. The result is an implicit imperative to locate more promising sources of oil and gas.

Beyond the issue of the size of West Siberian reserves, there is considerable debate even within the Soviet Union over the costs of exploiting these deposits. Highly placed academicians and party representatives argue that the cost will be lower than comparable development in European Russia.[15] Yet some Soviet professional economists have argued that such optimistic estimates understate the cost of transmission facilities and of essential social overhead. The latter have estimated that Siberian development costs may be two to four times the costs of further development of the Ural-Volga fields.[16]

The fact that most of the gas reserves of West Siberia are located in the Urengoiskoe and Medvezhe fields—within 200 kilometers (or 124 miles) of the Arctic Circle—adds a major element of technological difficulty and uncertainty. The permafrost has complicated geophysical prospecting and resulted in the sinking of a number of costly dry holes in areas of "indicated" deposits; it has also occasioned major cost overruns and time delays in the extraction of gas and the development of transmission networks. According to the *Oil and Gas Journal,* Soviet scientists "admit they don't know what will happen, for example, when large-diameter development wells are drilled through thick permafrost in the trans-Arctic." [17] (Oil development—occurring at

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[8] *ASTE Bulletin* (Washington), Fall 1970, p. 11.

[9] *Neftianoe khoziaistvo* (Moscow), No. 3, 1971, pp. 1-62; and N. S. Lvov, *Resursi prirodnovo gaza SSSR* (Resources of Natural Gas in the USSR), Moscow, Nedra, 1969, pp. 33, 36.

[10] For different Soviet views on this matter, see M. M. Brenner, "On Proportions in the Petroleum Extraction Industry and the Method for Their Determination," *Geologiia nefti i gaza* (Moscow), No. 11, 1968; and F. F. Dunaev, *et al., Problema opredeleniia ratsionalnykh sootnoshenii mezhdu zapasami i dobychei nefti* (The Problem of Determining the Efficient Correlations Between Oil Reserves and Output), Moscow, VNIIOENG, 1967.

[11] See for example Academician A. Sidorenko of the USSR Ministry of Geology, "Oil Riches—In the Service of the Economy," *Pravda* Feb. 25, 1971. *Cf.* F. G. Gurari, "Oil and Gas in West Siberia: Prospects, Problems," *Priroda* (Moscow), No. 1, 1971, pp. 16-23.

[12] Kyodo News Service from Tokyo, Feb. 18, 1970; *Oil and Gas Journal,* March 1970, p. 26; and Kiichi Saeki, "Toward Japanese Cooperation in Siberian Development," *Problems of Communism* (Washington), May-June 1972, pp. 8-9.

[13] *Izvestia* (Moscow), Nov. 1, 1972. Although a rich potential may exist, the area is still relatively unexplored, and proven reserves are small.

[14] See *Neftianoe khoziaistvo,* No. 3, 1971, pp. 1-62.

[15] For example, see A. Probst, "Toward a Prognosis of the Economic Development and Productive Specialization of the Eastern Regions of the USSR," *Seriia ekonomicheskaia* (Moscow), No. 5, 1970, p. 69.

[16] T. Khachaturov, "The Economic Effectiveness of Capital Investments," *Kommunist* (Moscow), September 1966, pp. 66-67. See also Leslie Dienes, "Issues in Soviet Energy Policy and Conflicts over Fuel Costs in Regional Development," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), July 1971, pp. 26-58.

[17] *Oil and Gas Journal,* Aug. 24, 1970, p. 128.

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lower latitudes in the Samotlorskoe and neighboring fields, is fortunately hampered only by the difficulties of the taiga and swampy terrain.)

There is the further possibility that Soviet turbodrill technology, which works well in the shallower Ural-Volga drilling operations, may prove ineffective in West Siberia, where wells must be sunk considerably deeper. Some Soviet observers, in fact, believe that American rotary-drill technology, proven in Alaskan conditions, may be better suited to West Siberian conditions.[18] Campbell has noted that the US rotary drill is a standard, all-purpose tool which is most efficient at depths below 1,500 meters. However, conversion by the Soviets to this technology would also necessitate purchase of better drill pipe capable of withstanding torque and turning the bit.[19]

However, the importation of drilling technology and large-diameter transmission pipe could place heavy demands on Soviet hard-currency reserves. An alternative is to finance such imports on a barter basis, *e.g.*, to trade petroleum output for pipes.[20] In this way, the output of the West Siberian fields would be at least partially mortgaged. Similarly, the "Comprehensive Program" for Comecon integration obligates the USSR to deliver oil and gas output to East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in return for investment by these countries in the expansion of Soviet production of these commodities.[21] The question then emerges of how much domestic oil and gas consumption the Soviet Union would be able to derive from such an approach to developing its West Siberian deposits.

Soviet workmen battle the taiga swamps to lay a road along a section of the Surgut-Nizhnevartovskii oil pipeline.

—Photo by A. Skurikhin, TASS, via Sovfoto.

A final element of uncertainty is the highly optimistic time-frame allotted for completion of the major West Siberian projects—*i.e.*, the five years of the 1971-75 plan period. This is roughly half the time allotted for other similar Siberian projects.[22] In this context, it should be reiterated that what is involved in West Siberia is not just the drilling of more oil and gas wells but the integrated development of extraction, refining, transmission, and related consuming facilities. Although no one link in this complex chain is a uniquely critical bottleneck, there is a high degree of indivisibility and interrelation among the numerous projects. For example, oil extracted from the southern part of Tyumen Province must be transported—via barge, pipeline, and rail facilities still under development—to an expanded refinery at Omsk or other refining centers along the main east-west pipeline. Petrochemical and related industries must be expanded, or even built from scratch (as at Tobolsk), to utilize the new resources.

Directives and Delays

In light of all these manifold uncertainties and complications, one can reasonably ask whether the Soviet Union can and/or will see the West Siberian oil and gas project through, and if so, at what cost. In order to get the anticipated payoff from this gamble, the Soviet leadership must—at the very least—continue to accord the numerous interrelated construction projects high investment priority and must effectively coordinate and optimize development of the region. To this end, a joint party-government directive on West Siberian development issued in

[18] *Neftianik* (Moscow), No. 1, 1971, p. 5.

[19] Robert W. Campbell, *The Economics of Soviet Oil and Gas*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, pp. 108-20. In fact, the Soviet Union has already made purchases of such equipment in the West.

[20] This approach was discussed by Soviet Oil Minister V. D. Shashin in an interview published in *Oil and Gas Journal*, Aug. 24, 1970, p. 22.

[21] See Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "Comecon Integration," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1973, p. 35.

[22] See G. A. Prudensky, Ed., *Ekonomika stroitelstva i osvoyeniia novykh predpriiatii* (Economics of the Construction and Breaking-In of New Enterprises), Moscow, Stroiizdat, 1966, p. 26. Indicative of the problems involved in Soviet capital construction was the revelation that some 901 out of the 1,243 large or "titled" projects of the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan were started *before* 1966, *i.e.*, more than five years earlier (*Voprosy ekonomiki* [Moscow], No. 6, 1971, p. 8).

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January 1970 instructed various USSR ministries, including the Ministry of Defense Industry (a rare public reference to this organization), to coordinate their efforts to assure expeditious completion of the many West Siberian projects.[23] The fact that West Siberian construction accounted for about one-third of the list of the 75-odd large or "titled" construction projects specifically mentioned in the Directives for the Ninth Five-Year Plan is possibly further evidence of the high priority accorded development of that region, although it may also reflect in part the relative newness of plans for the region.[24]

Despite such apparent priority, the West Siberian projects have experienced numerous setbacks and bottlenecks. For example, party officials of Tomsk complained in July 1971 that "prolonged disputes [between the Ministry of Chemical Industry and the Ministry of Petroleum Industry] over raw-material sources have resulted in inexcusable and irreparable losses of time" in the construction of the Tomsk Petrochemical Complex, originally scheduled for completion in 1975.[25] There have also been delays in the completion of transmission networks, with the result that even utilization of existing production wells has had to be kept well below capacity. As one comment put it,

One would think that the growth rate of petroleum extraction is so high that it cannot get any higher. But the oilworkers say that it can. For instance, there are many drilled wells that are inoperative. What is wrong? The wells are ready—but there is no output. They will produce crude oil when the petroleum-collecting network reaches them, when storage tanks, high-pressure pumping stations, etc., appear near the wells. But the construction workers are not coping with the growing volume of work. "Unfinished work" on oil-field facilities has grown to 211 million rubles' worth.[26]

Moreover, there is evidence that construction brigades working on oil and gas pipelines are competing with one another for the same welders, pipe, and other materials.[27]

However, the regime seems more determined than ever to forge ahead with the West Siberian ventures. This resolve may, in fact, have been strengthened by the failure of the Soviet economy to meet its overall targets for oil and gas production in 1972.[28] Indeed, shortfalls in energy output may rival the well-publicized agricultural disaster of 1972 in their negative impact on fulfillment of the 1971-75 Soviet economic plan. According to the one source, the rate of increase in natural gas output registered in the USSR for 1972 was the lowest since World War II—at a time when peak growth rates had been expected by Soviet planners.[29] The major shortfalls in gas production were in the Northern Caucasus, while shortfalls in oil production occurred in the Old Baku and Grozny fields.[30] By contrast, Tyumen Province performed well, producing some two million tons of oil over its 1972 quota.[31] On the basis of this performance, the Soviet planners, while scaling down overall 1973 production targets for oil from



Construction work on the Tyumen-Surgut railroad in 1970.

—Photo by I. Sapozhkov, TASS, via Sovfoto.

[23] For the text of the decree, see *Pravda*, Jan. 15, 1970.
[24] For the directives, see *ibid.*, April 7, 1971.
[25] See the letter of a Secretary of the Tomsk Party Committee published in *ibid.*, July 10, 1971.
[26] *Ibid.*, March 4, 1972.
[27] *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 11, 1972.
[28] See article of Premier A. N. Kosygin in *Kommunist* (Moscow), December 1972; *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, Dec. 14, 1972; and Theodore Shabad, *The New York Times*, Dec. 14 and 24, 1972.
[29] *Oil and Gas Journal*, No. 1, 1973.
[30] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 8, February 1973, p. 2.
[31] *Ibid.*

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429 to 423 million tons and for gas from 256 to 238 billion cubic meters,[32] have placed increased emphasis on production in West Siberia to offset the disappointing results elsewhere.[33]

Investment Issues

Success on this front—as noted above—will depend on the scope and effectiveness of investment in the West Siberian region. However, West Siberia is only one of numerous claimants on investment resources under the 1971-75 Soviet economic plan. Others include the agricultural sector,[34] the consumer-goods sector, non-ferrous metallurgy, and the electrification program. And this says nothing of the existing or potential claims of the defense establishment on the allocations pie. Clearly, the Ninth Five-Year Plan is every bit as taut—*i.e.*, overcommitted—with regard to investment funds as its predecessors. This became particularly evident during 1972 when the Soviet economy suffered a severe slowdown as a result of agricultural disasters. In an address to the December 1972 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, N. K. Baibakov, Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, indicated that total capital investment in the Soviet economy for 1973 would amount to 96 billion rubles. Although he advertised this as a 3.5-percent increase over the "anticipated" growth in investment for the year,[35] it actually amounts to an absolute decrease in investment from the 100.9 billion-ruble figure mentioned in press references prior to 1972.[36]

In light of the strong commitment of the Soviet leadership to development of the civilian sectors of the economy, one may surmise that the claims of the military sector have been reduced—or at least held constant. If so, this would mark a reversal of the trend observed in the 1960's, when military outlays grew at an estimated annual rate of some 7 to 8 percent compared to an annual growth of only 5 percent in Soviet gross national product.[37] While such a reversal of priorities is not unprecedented in Soviet history—witness Khruschev's decision to base the 1959-65 Seven-Year Plan on a combination of military demobilization and increased civilian investment—it is not clear that the current party chief, Brezhnev, is in as strong a position as the former First Secretary was when he faced down the Soviet defense-industrial establishment in the late 1950's. However, Brezhnev may have attempted to increase his options in this regard by causing the publication of optimistic Soviet press reports on progress in negotiations with the United States and its West European allies.[38]

Of course, history also tells us that such clear-cut decisions are not necessarily the rule, and that the Soviet leaders are perhaps more likely to try "muddling through"—shifting resources back and forth among competing sectors as successive allocations pinches arise.[39] Such a resolution of the problem of conflicting demands on resources is, however, becoming less feasible in current Soviet conditions. What we are dealing with now—whether in West Siberian development or advanced weapons systems—are highly complex projects involving advanced technology and skilled manpower, with relatively long lead-times and high indivisibility of resources. Once the leadership becomes committed to a given project, such as West Siberian development, the cost of a reversal to, say, full-scale deployment of SS-9, SS-11, or other advanced missile weaponry would be very great indeed. Resources committed to the former could not be easily shifted to the latter. Furthermore, failure to see the regional development through to completion would impede adequate utilization of costly production facilities already completed and would squander the results of expensive prospecting activities already accomplished.

From every evidence, the Soviet leadership has indeed opted to commit the necessary inputs of capital, advanced technology, and manpower required to exploit the energy potential of West Siberia. Despite the tightening resource-allocation picture, they have pledged the Soviet government to step up investment in oil and gas production and transmission facilities, particularly those in West Siberia.[40]

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] See V. D. Shashin, USSR Minister of Petroleum Industry, in *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 4, 1973, p. 19.

[34] Douglas B. Diamond, "Principal Targets and Central Themes of the Ninth Five-Year Plan," in Norton T. Dodge, Ed., *Analysis of the USSR's 24th Party Congress and 9th Five-Year Plan*, Mechanicsville, Maryland, Cremona Foundation, 1971, pp. 47-53.

[35] *Pravda*, Dec. 19, 1972.

[36] *E.g.*, see *Izvestia*, Dec. 20, 1971.

[37] Diamond, *loc. cit.*, p. 52.

[38] See, *e.g.*, *Pravda*, Feb. 14 and March 31, 1971.

[39] One is reminded of Brezhnev's own admission of such shifting of resources in a speech to the October 1968 plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee (*Pravda*, Oct. 31, 1968).

[40] *Pravda* of Dec. 19, 1972, reported that investment in the extraction of oil and gas and in pipeline construction would increase by 18 percent in 1973. *Izvestia* of Dec. 20, 1972, noted a targeted increase of 1 billion rubles in these sectors. These figures seem to have at least preserved the priorities of the Ninth Five-Year Plan.

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

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As if to underline the regime's commitment to the latter development, Premier Kosygin himself spent four days in January 1973 making a well-publicized tour of West Siberian construction sites.[41]

Integrated Planning

In light of the great costs involved, the limited supply of investment resources in the Soviet economy, and the highly interrelated nature of the numerous West Siberian projects, there is a strong imperative for Soviet planners to optimize the process of development in the region. The Soviet economy cannot afford a repetition of the widely criticized fiasco of East Siberian hydroelectric development, where a major new energy source was created —at great cost—without concurrent development of consuming industries and population centers.[42] The fact that discussion of the West Siberian complex has included direct references to the Ural-Kuznets Kombinat plan of 1931—*i.e.,* an undertaking of the old production-engineering type of planning—is not reassuring on this score. That earlier regional project appeared to have been largely a politically based decision. The economic justifications presented were based on very shaky data.

On the other hand, there has been some promising talk of the application of mathematical modeling and integrated regional planning techniques to projects such as the West Siberian development. V. Krasovsky has claimed that multibranch coordination and modeling of capital construction programs, by reducing costs and shortening construction time, would augment growth of the Soviet national income over the 1971-75 period by 27 to 29 billion rubles.[43] Articles on West Siberia by S. M. Vishneva and by A. G. Aganbegian indicate interest in the application of such methods to development of the oil-and-gas complex of that region.[44] Furthermore, there are definite signs of sympathy for the integrated-planning approach on the part of General Secretary Brezhnev.[45]

Increased impetus might be given to this trend should the Soviet Union succeed in enlisting Western capital in the long-range development of the West Siberian deposits. Professional economists of Mr. Aganbegian's Institute of Economics and Organization of Industrial Production in Novosibirsk would presumably be better equipped to coordinate long-term planning efforts with American or Japanese industrialists than would the traditionalists in Moscow currently in charge of West Siberian development.

There are, indeed, various factors which argue in favor of seeking large-scale involvement of Western capital and technology in the West Siberian complex. Such participation might help to relieve the pressure on limited Soviet domestic investment resources, and it might also help Soviet engineers to overcome the technological problems of exploration, extraction and transmission of oil and gas in the difficult climate and terrain conditions of West Siberia. Consequently, the USSR has shown growing interest in exploring various forms of trade and joint ventures with the United States, Japan, and other developed industrial countries of the West.

Such arrangements for Western participation in Soviet oil and gas exploitation may be divided into three categories entailing ascending degrees of involvement. The first is a *barter-type arrangement* in which specific industrial products needed for West Siberian development are imported into the Soviet Union in return for exports of Soviet oil or gas. For example, in 1969, the Thyssen, Mannesmann firm of West Germany agreed to provide the USSR large-diameter gas transmission pipe on a credit of DM 1.2 billion repayable in 10 years at 6-percent interest, with repayment to be made through Soviet deliveries of natural gas to West Germany scheduled to begin in 1973.[46]

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[41] See *Pravda, Izvestia* and *Sovetskaia Rossiia* items of Jan. 15-16, 1973.

[42] See *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 8, 1966, pp. 55-56. The present author discussed this problem in the chapter "Investment Policy in the Soviet Electric-Power Industry," in Gregory Grossman, Ed., *Value and Plan: Economic Calculations and Organizations in Eastern Europe,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1960.

[43] *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 6, 1971, p. 14.

[44] See *Ekonomika i matematicheskie metody* (Moscow), Vol. 7, No. 2, 1971; and *Sbornik "Neft i gas Tyumeni"* (The Collection "Tyumen Oil and Gas"), No. 5, Tyumen, 1970 (cited in *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 6, 1971, p. 8).

[45] Brezhnev spoke directly to this point at the 24th Party Congress: "The integrated approach to planning and the adoption of major decisions of a national-economy nature is becoming more and more important. The very nature of the tasks confronting us is such that their accomplishment, as a rule, calls for coordinated efforts by many branches and economic regions. . . . Do we have any positive experience in this field? Certainly. To speak only of the past few years, we have the program for an upswing in agriculture, the program for the development of the vast petroleum-bearing region in West Siberia, the program of space research, and others." (*Pravda* March 31, 1972.) Further evidence of his advocacy of integrated planning is cited in Craig Wilde's article "Issues in the Development of Siberia and the Far East," in Norton T. Dodge, *op. cit.,* pp. 29-35.

[46] *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Oct. 20, 1972.

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A second type of arrangement might be termed a *production-sharing joint venture.* The Japanese are presently considering a proposal to help finance development of the Tyumen oil fields and construction of an eastern extension of the Soviet pipeline system (from Irkutsk to Nakhodka on the Sea of Japan). The Japanese would provide a credit of approximately 1 billion dollars,[47] and as Kiichi Saeki observed in these pages, the Japanese are seeking to limit any loans extended to the USSR to a term of five years with no grace period for repayment and to establish a production-sharing arrangement wherein the Japanese credit would be repaid by delivery of oil to Japan at prices lower than world market prices, thereby assuring the Japanese a profit.[48] In this arrangement, there would be no need for Japanese surveys of the Tyumen fields or participation in construction and extraction. So far, however, there has been no indication that the Japanese and Soviet negotiators have reached agreement on this project.

[47] See *The New York Times*, Jan. 9 and Nov. 25, 1972; also, *Forbes* (New York), Dec. 1, 1972, pp. 25-26.

[48] Saeki, *loc. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

Project "North Star"

The third and most ambitious form of joint venture under consideration is one which would likely lead to an unparalleled Western *participation in decision-making* because of the size of Western investment funds involved. While the North Sakhalin and Yakutsk gas projects (mentioned above and apparently now in abeyance) are two examples, the most prominent current proposal is the so-called Project "North Star," for the extraction, liquification, and export of gas to the West from the Urengoiskoe

Construction of the oil pipeline from Aleksandrovskoe to Anzhero-Sudzhensk during 1971. The 850-kilometer link to major Siberian production centers and points east was completed in early 1973.

—Photo from Novosti via Sovfoto.

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field of West Siberia. According to the US firms negotiating with the Soviet Union—Tenneco, Inc., Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, and Brown & Root, Inc.—a credit of 3 billion dollars (US) and an additional 700 million in cash provided by the USSR would finance purchase of American-made transmission equipment (compressors and 1,500 miles of 48-inch steel pipe capable of withstanding temperatures of minus 60 degrees Fahrenheit) and construction of a plant at the ice-free port of Murmansk to liquify the gas for shipment to the east coast of the United States. The US credits would consist of a 6-percent loan of 1.5 billion dollars from the Export-Import Bank and a loan of equal amount from various US banks, insurance companies and suppliers, the latter guaranteed by the Export-Import Bank. In addition, the American partners would build a fleet of 20 specialized LNG (liquified natural gas) tankers at an added cost of 2.6 billion dollars. The USSR would repay the credits and earn an additional 10.8 billion dollars (which could only be spent in the US) by deliveries of gas over a 25-year period beginning in 1980.[49]

In light of the magnitude of the undertaking, the need for Western technological know-how, and the adverse effects on American lenders of any interruptions or delays in supply of West Siberian natural gas, it is likely that the American parties to the deal will expect and require a considerable measure of direct participation in Soviet operations. In the first place, there is the issue of on-site inspection to assure Western investors of the adequacy of gas reserves and to permit them to estimate extraction costs. On the first count, the firms negotiating on Project "North Star" seem assured of sufficient gas reserves.[50] However, there is a distinct need for Western technicians to survey the gas fields for the purpose of making accurate cost estimates and to share in decision-making with their Soviet counterparts in order to insure proper installation and operation of specialized Western technical facilities in severe climatic conditions. This would entail further arrangements for communications, housing, transportation, and working facilities.

Western equipment is used in laying the Medvezhe-Nadym-Punga gas pipeline during 1972. Before placement in the trench, the pipes are heated by gas burners and wound with multilayer insulation.

—Photo by L. Polikashin, Novosti, via Sovfoto.

Another set of problems revolves around the interest charge on credits and various questions of pricing and repayment. If the USSR is granted long-term credits at low interest, then pricing of the natural gas delivered as repayment would have to assure the Western purchasers of a profit on resale. Next, the United States government, for one, is unlikely to grant the Soviet Union credit terms more favorable than it grants other nations. Should such major capital projects based on credit proliferate, they might overtax capital markets and make it more difficult for the USSR to get favorable interest rates and repayment terms. Furthermore, according to *The New York Times* of April 5, 1973, it is possible that the USSR may balk at requirements of the US Export-Import Bank for disclosure of Soviet foreign-reserve balances as a precondition for extending credits in the amounts indicated for Project "North Star." While such requirements are standard procedure for Export-Import Bank operations, such disclosure would be unprecedented for the Kremlin.

Although the negotiations concerning Project "North Star" are continuing amidst an atmosphere of considerable optimism, it is not clear when or even whether the joint project will be finalized. Agencies of the US government involved in approving the project have reportedly shown concern over the price of the Soviet natural gas (about three times current wellhead prices in the US), but the US firms involved in the negotiations have argued that domestic prices are likely to rise to similar levels by 1980.[51] Clearly the future of this project is closely linked to the whole question of the nature

[49] For discussion of the project, see *Oil and Gas Journal*, Nov. 13, 1972, pp. 97-99; *The Washington Post*, Nov. 13 and Dec. 26, 1972; and *The New York Times*, Jan. 9, 1973.

[50] *The New York Times*, Jan. 9, 1973.

[51] *Ibid.*

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Petroleum processing at Perm, one of the cities which will draw on West Siberian oil fields.

—Photo from TASS via Sovfoto.

and success of Soviet-American efforts at promoting détente as well as to the issue of overall US energy policy.

The extent to which Project "North Star" could contribute to meeting overall Soviet energy requirements remains unclear. The opportunity to export significant quantities of natural gas at favorable prices in return for the importation and installation of advanced Western production and transmission technology should improve the Soviet capability for exploiting the reserves of the Urengoiskoe and related fields, either for additional exports to hard-currency areas or for domestic utilization. How soon this payoff would come and how large it might be cannot be answered definitively. Much depends on timing, the degree of Western help, the repayment terms of any final agreement, and the success of the Soviet Union in completing its part of the project. Without "North Star," the Soviet Union would have great difficulty becoming a net exporter of gas. Even with "North Star" it is not assured of becoming a net exporter by the early 1980's, although the possibilities are definitely improved. Depending on the terms of the deal—quantities, prices, and delivery schedules for natural gas—the USSR might find the capacities of the West Siberian fields totally mortgaged against the cost of imported Western equipment. Should the country be unable to complete the complex project on time, the USSR might even need to use other reserves to meet repayment.

* * *

What overall picture emerges from this examination of the vast West Siberian regional venture and of the various options and constraints facing the Soviet Union? What are the prospects for successful attainment of Soviet oil and natural gas targets through the exploitation of West Siberia's rich Tyumen Province?

Writing even before these targets were cut back (in the 1973 plan at least), the West German economist Werner Gumpel concluded that the USSR might find itself a net importer of both oil and gas by 1980. He posited an inland oil consumption of 613 million tons for the USSR in 1980 and quoted Soviet estimates placing domestic oil production in that year at 607 million tons or "more than 500 million tons," as compared with original plan targets of 690 to 710 million tons. If a deficit in oil production does materialize, it might be covered by substituting natural gas or by importing oil. Since the original gas output target (680 to 720 billion cubic meters in 1980) has now been scaled down to 536 billion cubic meters, substitution in the required volume cannot be carried out. The alternatives would be to lower consumption or import oil or gas to make good the deficit.[52]

A less pessimistic view, at least as regards gas production, is provided by Frank J. Gardner, International Editor of the *Oil and Gas Journal*. While he attributes the poor performance of 1972 to "a major breakdown in the Kremlin's vaunted long-range industrial planning," and notes that "the Communists haven't been able to coordinate their field developments with the construction and efficient operation of gas-treatment plants and new pipelines," he predicts that the USSR will again be a net exporter of natural gas by 1975.[53]

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[52] "Soviet Oil and Soviet Middle East Policy," *Wissenpolitik* (Cologne), No. 1, 1972, pp. 110-11. L. Zevin, in *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 7, 1971, pp. 17-26, predicted Soviet importation of 60-90 million tons of oil and 40-50 billion cubic meters of gas annually from the Middle East by 1985.

[53] *Oil and Gas Journal*, No. 1, 1973.

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But what if, for reasons of poor planning, insufficient investment, or the sheer difficulty of the task, West Siberia fails to pick up the slack in Soviet oil and gas production and the 1975 targets are not met? Neither cutbacks in domestic consumption nor reductions in export commitments seem admissible. Reduced domestic consumption would predictably impede overall economic performance and efficiency. A cutback in deliveries to Comecon—on top of mounting East European consumption of oil and gas—would force Moscow's partners to seek new sources of fuel, an approach not favored in the past by the Kremlin.[54] Alternatively, the USSR could reduce oil exports to the West, as it did in 1969, at the cost of reduced hard-currency earnings.[55] But judging from Soviet salesmanship at the Eighth World Petroleum Congress, held in Moscow in June 1971, this prospect is clearly unattractive to the Soviet leaders, particularly since oil and gas exports appear to figure so strongly in developing East-West commercial relations.[56]

In attempting to offset a shortfall in domestic output of oil and gas, the USSR would be forced to expand production in older fields, import oil and gas, or seek alternative energy sources. Expansion of production in the Ural-Volga fields would lead to oil recovery at an uneconomic ratio of 1.1 with water. Imports of oil from most Arab countries would be a heavy drain on Soviet hard-currency reserves, although Moscow might import natural gas or oil from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya in exchange for military or industrial equipment. Iraq, in particular, might repay Soviet military and economic aid totaling almost one billion dollars by delivering crude oil. In fact, the USSR and its allies are currently helping Iraq develop the facilities to produce and export 50 to 100 million tons of crude oil annually from the North Rumaila fields. (But there is doubt as to how long military shipments can finance oil imports from Iraq.) As another alternative, the USSR might feel constrained to exploit low-quality, high-cost coal deposits in the Moscow basin.

The role of oil and gas in the Soviet quest for economic efficiency during the Ninth Five-Year Plan is clear, and acceleration of increases in production of these commodities depends on the highly uncertain West Siberian project. This enterprise is fraught with technological difficulties and problems of cost and capital scarcity. It is integrally linked to important political issues—the allocation of limited domestic funds and the question of enlisting Western capital and know-how in West Siberian development. Moreover, the complexity of the task would seem to call for increasingly sophisticated models of integrated regional planning, and it remains to be seen whether the Soviet leadership will recognize and act on this reality.

If the Soviet Union can resolve these many interrelated issues, its economy may be in a position to perform more efficiently on an improved energy base. If not, energy difficulties may obstruct Soviet domestic economic development, complicate the economic and political relations of the USSR with its Comecon partners, and limit the prospects for expanding commercial relations with the United States and other developed industrial nations.

[54] *Platts Oilgram* (London), Feb. 13, 1970, p. 1, predicted an East European oil deficit of 84 million tons by 1980. The Polish agreement with British Petroleum for the latter to furnish supplies of petroleum products in lieu of Soviet deliveries is a notable exception to past policy (see *The Economist* [London], July 10, 1971, p. 90).

[55] The year 1969 was the first in which exports to the non-Communist world declined since the USSR became a net exporter of oil in 1955. Such exports have been the Soviet Union's "largest single source of foreign exchange . . . about 350 million dollars in 1969." J. Richard Lee, "The Fuel Industries," in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970, p. 35.

[56] See reports carried in *The Washington Post* in June 1971, and Robert Ebel's comments in *World Petroleum* (Washington, DC), June 1971.

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The Shaping of Soviet Religious Policy

By Bohdan R. Bociurkiw

Official expositions of Soviet religious policy have changed remarkably little since Lenin's times. According to "Leninist principles," religious organizations must be completely separated from the state and the school system, and their activities restricted solely to the "performance of religious rites." Every person should be free to profess any religion whatsoever—as long as his religious practices do not interfere with the public order or with other citizens' freedom of conscience—or alternatively he should be free to recognize no religion; in either case, his beliefs must not expose him to legal or economic discrimination. The state should treat all faiths and religious organizations equally and not interfere with their internal activities as long as they do not violate Soviet laws. In contrast to the state, the Communist Party is considered to have an obligation to strive actively for the complete emancipation of the masses from religious "prejudices." To this end, the party conducts systematic scientific-atheist propaganda—supposedly without, however, offending the religious sentiments of believers.

Both the state and the party are said to have continuously and consistently carried these principles into effect. If administrative repressions were applied in the past against some churchmen or sectarians, it was only because they violated Soviet laws; but now most of the clergy and the faithful are loyal Soviet citizens. The large majority of the Soviet population is said to have abandoned religion as a result of education and scientific-atheist propaganda; "inevitably," therefore, the number of clergy, houses of worship, theological schools and monasteries has sharply declined in the USSR. There never was nor could there ever be "religious persecution" in the Soviet Union, since the state has always strictly enforced Soviet laws "guaranteeing" freedom of conscience for all Soviet citizens.[1] During the past decade, Soviet spokesmen have slightly amended this official version of the regime's religious policy by admitting that the cultural-educational function of the Soviet state involves the dissemination of a scientific-atheist world-view.[2] Aside from this small concession to the obvious, however, official descriptions of Soviet religious policy have continued to tend toward concealing rather than elucidating the realities of church-state relations in the USSR.

A somewhat more realistic view of Soviet church policy has emerged from the growing number of Western and émigré studies on religion in the USSR, though many of these analyses have also tended to be overdrawn. On the whole, they have treated Marxist-Leninist atheism as the chief motivating force behind Soviet religious policy and the complete eradication of religion as its grand objective. The Soviet regime has been portrayed as ruthlessly and consistently striving toward this goal, restrained only by the opposition of believers and by foreign pres-

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[1] See G. T. Utkin, "Religion and the Church," in *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe Izd-vo Sovetskikh Entsiklopedii (hereafter GISE), Vol. 50, 1957, pp. 642-43; Alexei Puzin, *Religion in the USSR*, Moscow, Novosti, n.d.; Vladimir A. Kuroedov, *Religiia i zakon* (Religion and the Law), Moscow, Znanie, 1970.

[2] See, e.g., Yu A. Rozenbaum, "The Separation of Church and State in the USSR, "*Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), No. 3, 1972, p. 64.

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sure; any signs of Soviet toleration or concession have been interpreted either in terms of these domestic and foreign deterrents or as a temporary reward to subservient religious leaders for political services rendered to the regime.[3]

Both Soviet and Western sources have ascribed to the regime's church policy more single-mindedness and consistency than can in fact be detected; they have also overemphasized ideological motives in the Soviet treatment of religion. While the official explanations have stressed the "norms" of Soviet policy in this field and have identified "what ought to be" with "what is," dogmatically assuming that constitutional formulas represent a correct description of Soviet practice, Western critics have concentrated on the "outputs" of Soviet ecclesiastical politics, in particular on the effects of Soviet legislative and administrative measures on the Russian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations.

The present analysis is less concerned with such specific measures and their impact on particular religions than with the broad and, to some extent, systemic determinants of Soviet religious policy. The article will attempt to identify and analyze these determinants, in particular the underlying motives and attitudes of the top policy-makers. It will also explore disagreements over the choice of means to attain objectives in this field—differences arising in part from the interaction between religious policy and such other considerations as domestic security; the peasant, nationality, and foreign policies of the regime; and the changing requirements of political socialization. Finally, the article will examine the institutional framework within which Soviet religious policy has been shaped and will distinguish the various elements in Soviet society which have influenced policy decisions.

Attitudes of the Soviet Elite

At least three interrelated attitudes underlying the Kremlin's religious policy may be inferred from the political culture and behavior of the Soviet elite. The first appears to be rooted in the memory of the Russian Orthodox Church's interdependence with Tsarist autocracy, its collaboration with the anti-Bolshevik forces during the 1917 Revolution and the Civil War, and its early opposition to the Soviet regime—a memory which has thus tended to identify institutional religion as an instrument of the internal and external enemies of the Soviet system.

A second major strand in Communist thought has its roots in the vulgarized, militant version of Marxist atheism developed in the writings and pronouncements of Lenin and his followers, who were strongly influenced by the native anti-clerical tradition. Leninism has "explained" religion not merely in terms of the masses' cultural backwardness and ignorance but also as a deliberate "fraud" (*obman*) designed to prevent the toilers from attaining a true consciousness of their class interest by dulling and distorting their senses and paralyzing their will. Unlike classical Marxists, Lenin did not trust the "objective" social-economic processes to emancipate the masses from religious "illusion." His impatience with these slow-working processes, combined with his distrust of the masses' rationality, reinforced the Bolshevik inclination to accelerate "objective" secularization processes by agitation, manipulation and force.[4] At the same time, the party's claim to collective infallibility generated its quasi-religious intolerance of "false" teachings, making it incapable of any meaningful dialogue with religious believers and encouraging it to answer critics of Soviet atheism and the regime's religious policy with verbal abuse and "administrative methods."

The third attitudinal element motivating religious policy has been the regime's compulsion to suppress those institutions and organizations which could not be effectively integrated into the Soviet political system and transformed into the party's "conveyor belts." After the consolidation of the party dictatorship in the USSR, religious organizations were the only legally existing institutions which remained outside the party's ideological controls and—what is more—disseminated teachings that could not be

[3] See, *e.g.*, John S. Curtiss, *The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917-1950*, Boston, Peter Smith Publishers, 1953; Matthew Spinka, *The Church in Soviet Russia*, New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1956; Alexander Kischkowsky, *Die sowjetische Religionspolitik und die Russische Orthodoxe Kirche* (Soviet Religious Policy and the Russian Orthodox Church), Munich, Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, 1957; Walter Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1962; Nikita Struve, *Christians in Contemporary Russia*, New York, Scribner, 1967; Robert Conquest, *Religion in the USSR*, New York and London, Praeger, 1968; and Giovanni Codevilla, *Stato e Chiesa nell' Unione Sovietica* (State and Church in the Soviet Union), Milan, Jaca Book Edizioni, 1972.

[4] For the best available collection of Lenin's writings and pronouncements on religion, see *V.I. Lenin ob ateizme, religii i tserkvi* (V.I. Lenin on Atheism, Religion and the Church), Moscow, Mysl, 1969. Also see this writer's "Lenin and Religion" in Leonard Schapiro and Peter Reddaway, Eds., *Lenin: The Man, The Theorist, The Leader. A Reappraisal*, New York and London, Praeger, 1967, pp. 107-34.

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reconciled with the Bolshevik political culture, thus serving to hinder the political socialization of a large segment of the Soviet population. In contrast to its role in all other public associations in the country, the party could not establish itself as a "leading core" of religious organizations, nor could the *nomenklatura* system ensuring party control over personnel appointments be effectively applied in the selection of ecclesiastical and sectarian leaders. While the pretense of a "separation" of church and state had to be maintained at the level of overt governmental supervision over the activities of religious organizations, the continuous concern of the leadership about these "islands" of ideological nonconformity and potential political subversion impelled it to surround religious organizations with a close network of covert police controls. Eventually, "voluntary" submission to such controls, renunciation of any public criticism of the Soviet treatment of religion, and commitment to the positive support of Soviet policies at home and abroad became the price that religious groups had to pay for continued legal existence.[5]

The configuration of attitudes stemming from the historical memory, the ideological legacy, and the authoritarian aspirations of the regime has naturally affected the Communist elite's perception of religion. Viewed through these several prisms, the church (and any form of institutionalized religion) has appeared to the Bolsheviks as a kind of commercialized vice,[6] catering to the displaced needs of the ignorant

[5] On this process of "normalization" of the Russian Church's relations with the Soviet regime, see William C. Fletcher, *A Study in Survival: The Church in Russia, 1927-1943*, New York, Macmillan, 1965. Also see this writer's "Church-State Relations in the USSR," *Survey* (London), January 1968, pp. 4-32.

[6] This analogy was suggested by the late Metropolitan Sergii (Voskresensky), Patriarchal Exarch for the Baltic States, in his account of church-state relations before the last war, written during the German occupation and published in the US: "The Church in the USSR before the War," *Rossiia* (New York), Oct. 9-13, 1945.



The small church of Simeon Stopnik today serves as the site of an aquarium off Moscow's showcase boulevard, Kalinin Prospekt.

—Wide World Photos.

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and backward elements of society and diverting them from socially useful endeavors—a vice providing a livelihood to a parasitic stratum of the clergy which, despite its professions of loyalty, has always been inherently hostile to the Communist world-view and determined, should a suitable occasion arise, to subvert the Soviet order.[7] To the Communists' way of thinking, religion—though rooted in the "lagging consciousness" of the least advanced social strata and nourished by certain collective and individual misfortunes—would have declined much faster after the "liquidation" of the old exploiting classes if not for such factors as the continuous agitation of *tserkovniky i sektanty* (churchmen and sectarians) and the "infiltration of bourgeois influences" from abroad. The official line holds that as long as a large segment of society remains addicted to this "spiritual drug," the state cannot completely suppress religion without driving religious "addicts" into desperate resistance, which might endanger the regime. The latter must, nevertheless, attempt to minimize the influence of religion on society through such means as suppression of religious propaganda,[8] vigorous atheist indoctrination, compromise of the church and the clergy in the eyes of believers, progressive reduction in the number of licensed houses of worship and clergy, and provision of substitutes for religious rites and traditions. Above all, the authorities must prevent religious organizations from recruiting new adherents, especially among the youth. The security agencies should maintain a constant and close surveillance over the dispensers of "religious opium" to prevent them from violating the above restrictions and from using their power over the believers against the interests of the Soviet system. At the same time, the state must withdraw for socially useful purposes the excessive profits accumulated by the clergy from their "fraudulent activities."

Within this frame of reference, hostility, contempt and suspicion have dominated the feelings of the Soviet elite toward religion, with significant effect on the process of policy formation. Among the top policy-makers, such feelings seem to have been periodically activated by a variety of stimuli issuing, for example, from the party's ideological apparatus, the police, or the special government agencies in charge of religious affairs—agencies which have been strategically located to help develop the "inputs" of Soviet ecclesiastical policy. A review of the official rationalizations of past antireligious campaigns shows that the most frequent signals triggering top-level crackdowns have been stepped-up charges that *tserkovniki* and *sektanty* were threatening Soviet society in one or another of three basic areas: (1) internal security (by allegedly engaging in "counterrevolutionary activities" and "espionage," by "infiltrating Soviet institutions," by "violating Soviet law," by "preaching disobedience to Soviet authorities"); (2) political socialization processes (by "poisoning the minds" of or "spiritually mutilating" the "children and youth," by "opposing education and culture," by "reinforcing old, backward, reactionary customs," by "rekindling nationalist prejudices," by "subverting communist moral norms"); or (3) economic performance (by committing "economic sabotage," by "wrecking," by "diverting time and resources from production").[9]

Allegations of such activity reaching the policy-makers have no doubt stimulated and reinforced their hostility toward religion. But it has taken more to transform hostility into major policy initiatives. Generally, such stimuli have had to be reinforced by extraneous pressures generated by factional conflicts; reversals in the nationality, peasant or foreign policies of the Kremlin; real or imagined internal or external threats to the regime; etc.

As in some other policy fields, Soviet decision-making in ecclesiastical matters has followed a spasmodic "from campaign to campaign" course—a behavioral pattern owing to the over-concentration of decision-making at the top of the Soviet political system, where the multitude of policy concerns confronting the Kremlin leaders has made it impossible for them to deal with religious matters in any continuous and systematic manner. Neverthe-

[7] The speed with which religious organizations abandoned their loyalty to the Soviet regime, once they found themselves under the German occupation during World War II, no doubt reinforced this view.

[8] Nominally allowed under the terms of the 1918 Soviet Russian Constitution, the "right to religious propaganda" was withdrawn by a 1929 constitutional amendment.

[9] See F. Garkavenko, Ed., *O religii i tserkvi. Sbornik dokumentov* (Religion and the Church. Collection of Documents), Moscow, Izd-vo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1965. At different times individual "threats" have been associated with specific religious denominations. Thus, charges of "reinforcing old, backward, reactionary customs" have usually been reserved for Islam; accusations of "espionage" were at first aimed primarily at the Roman Catholics, but were applied, along with "sabotage" charges, to all religious denominations during the 1930's; the "rekindling of nationalist prejudices" has invariably been ascribed to "non-Russian" denominations—Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and in particular the Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Uniates in the Ukraine.

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less, published party and government decisions on religion have always claimed consistency and continuity in Soviet policy in this field;[10] new policy tacks have never been attributed to changes in the party's attitude toward religion but rather explained as necessary and justifiable *responses* to shifts in ecclesiastical attitudes toward the Soviet regime. "Positive shifts in the latter respect have been described as "necessitated by life itself," while negative ones have evoked charges of "complacency" or "lack of vigilance" on the part of responsible officials.

Contradictory Tendencies

In terms of its ultimate objective, the CPSU has never abandoned its commitment to create a completely atheistic society, whatever private views may have been held by its leaders concerning the immediacy, or even the attainability, of this end. However, in the choice of means designed to realize this objective—and in the timing and application of short-range policies to individual denominations, nationalities, geographic regions, and social strata—the Communists have shown considerable flexibility, not to mention inconsistency, traceable to a variety of factors. Thus, from the very beginnings of the Soviet regime, its leaders have differed over the role to be assigned to the government and the law as opposed to that relegated to the party and the "revolutionary initiative of the masses" in combating religion; there have also been divergent views with respect to the optimal speed and methods of antireligious struggle and over the tactical uses of religion. Disagreements among sections of the party elite over the proper translation of ideology into religious policy have also been affected by differences in their institutional "loyalties," their occupational roles, and their clienteles.

Perhaps of greatest significance for the course of Soviet church policy has been the continuing tug-of-war between the "fundamentalist" tendency, entrenched primarily in the party Agitprop organization and the Komsomol apparatus, and the "pragmatic" orientation displayed by party and state workers charged with the practical functioning of the system, as well as in the ranks of the police. Characteristic of the "fundamentalist" viewpoint has been an emphasis on continuous and intense antireligious struggle and hostility "on principle" to all forms of religion and every church and sect. From the first, the "fundamentalists" have opposed any form of cooperation between church and state, and indeed have taken the position—once held by Lenin—that the more reactionary and obscurantist the religion, the greater the success that could be achieved by antireligious propaganda.[11] Aiming at the speediest possible liquidation of religion, they have been inclined to resort to restrictive legislation and administrative coercion to combat different faiths.

The "pragmatists," on the other hand, have differentiated among religious groups in terms of their readiness and capacity to further or thwart the current political and economic objectives of the Kremlin. This approach has called for rewarding the friends and punishing the enemies of the regime. Less optimistic about the immediate success of atheistic propaganda, the "pragmatists" have persistently striven to "Sovietize" religious organizations, both for reasons of internal security and for the sake of the regime's legitimization among the believing masses. Unlike the "fundamentalists," who have sought to establish Communist ideology as a prime source of the system's legitimacy, the "pragmatists" have been mindful of the continuing importance of religious traditions in shaping the social values of many Soviet subjects. Hence their emphasis on securing from all religious groups in the country a *de jure* recognition of the Soviet regime as "providentially ordained" and entitled to believers' obedience, "not from fear but from conscience."[12]

These two tendencies, each nourished by a facet of Leninism—the "fundamentalists" by its utopian assumption of the infinite malleability of human nature, and the "pragmatists" by its pessimism about the practical possibility of raising the masses to the level of the elite's consciousness"—have clashed repeatedly at different stages of Soviet church policy. Yet, in one sense, the two trends have complemented each other. Repressive measures have tended to "condition" the various churches and sects to accept the Soviet political platform and have helped to make their leaders into pliant tools of the official policy. At the same time, the more subtle "Sovietiza-

[10] See *ibid.*

[11] See in particular Lenin's two 1913 letters to M. Gorky, reproduced in *V.I. Lenin ob ateizme . . .*, pp. 270-75.

[12] For an early exchange on this point between M. Latsis (a Chekist) and P. Krasikov, see *Izvestiia* (Moscow), Dec. 2 and 14, 1919.

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

Metropolitan Pimen of Krutitsky and Kolomna, pictured in January 1971 at Novo-Devichy Monastery in Moscow, where he was Acting Patriarch prior to his election as Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia in June 1971.

—Photo from TASS via Sovfoto.

tion" of these religious groups has weakened their capacity to resist the regime's assaults on religion.

The Sovietization of religious groups has had important consequences for the government's role *vis-à-vis* "loyal" religious groups. For, once the authorities established effective controls over the "registered" churches and sects and approved their statutes and leadership, they had to abandon the early *divide et impera* tactics toward these groups, including the incitement of the rank-and-file believers against the clergy and the hierarchy. Religious dissent in the form of intrachurch opposition to the government-approved ecclesiastical rules and leaders became the main threat to Soviet control over religious organizations, assuming the dimensions of political dissent as well.[13] Hence, we see the paradoxical spectacle of the admittedly atheistic authorities intervening in internal ecclesiastical conflicts or interchurch clashes to suppress dissenters or to force the absorption of some religious groups by the more "patriotic" or "loyal" churches.[14]

[13] See this writer's paper, "Religious Dissent and the Soviet State," in Peter Potichnyj, Ed., *Papers and Proceedings* of the *McMaster Conference on Dissent*, Hamilton, Ontario, McMaster University, 1972, pp. 73-112.

[14] To cite some examples, in 1943-44, the Soviet authorities forced the absorption of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (reconstituted during the German occupation of the Ukraine) into the Russian Orthodox Church. In 1945-49, they assisted in the "conversion" of the Uniates in the Western Ukraine to Russian Orthodoxy. After 1961, they intervened actively to crack down on the dissident elements among the Evangelican Christians-Baptists.

The unifying principle resolving this apparent contradiction between the "fundamentalist" and "pragmatic" tendencies in Soviet church policy and supplying some consistency to the party's meandering line on religion has been the Leninist formula subordinating the struggle against religion to the "interests of the class struggle of the proletariat.[15]

Interdependent Policy Considerations

In the post-1917 context, this formula meant the subordination of ideological purity and consistency to the immediate considerations of the regime's political survival, security and power. With the later consolidation of the Soviet system, the need for political resocialization became an increasingly important factor affecting the Soviet treatment of religion, while the emergence of Soviet-type regimes in Eastern Europe after World War II supplied an external dimension to the Kremlin's church policy. The different phases of Soviet development have involved an ongoing alignment of church policy with the changing party line in several realms—most specifically, internal and external security, peasant policy, nationalities policy, and foreign affairs. Let us examine the effect on religious policy of these concerns.

[15] See Lenin's 1909 article "On the Relationship of the Workers' Party to Religion," in *V.I. Lenin ob ateizme. . . .*, pp. 72-73.

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(1) Considerations of internal and external security have always been present in Soviet policy-making in the religious field. During the early years of Bolshevik rule, the severe legislative and administrative measures and selective terror applied against the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches were at least in part motivated by Soviet fear of their collusion with the Whites and the Poles, respectively.[16] The intervention of the Soviet authorities in 1922 in support of the Renovationist *coup d'église* was affected to some extent by the propaganda activities of Russian ecclesiastical and political émigrés, who were counting on the Orthodox Church to eventually rescue Russia from Bolshevism.[17] During the 1930's, accusations of "espionage," "sabotage" and "terrorism" figured prominently in the sweeping purges of the leaders and clergy of all denominations—attesting to the Soviet view of churches as at least potentially subversive organizations.[18] Stalin's converse concessions to the Church during World War II were no doubt motivated by a desire to defuse what he viewed as an "internal" ecclesiastical front for the sake of maximum mobilization of the country's war efforts.

From the very beginning of Soviet rule, religious organizations were treated as a "security problem" necessitating not only close police surveillance of "churchmen and sectarians" but also the infiltration of their ranks with collaborators, informers and agents-provocateurs. Despite the establishment of special government agencies for religious affairs, an intimate involvement of the security organs in ecclesiastical affairs has remained a permanent feature of Soviet church-state relations.[19]

(2) The linkage between religious and peasant policies—though of declining importance with the progressive urbanization and secularization of Soviet society—derived in the first decades of Communist rule from the stronger and more lasting hold of religion on the peasant masses, which constituted the least politically socialized stratum of the new society and which had little vested interest in the Soviet system. At least until World War II, sharp turns in Soviet religious policy coincided with major shifts in the regime's peasant policy: thus, the introduction of the New Economic Policy was paralleled by a relatively lenient policy toward believers, with some sects (especially those preaching communal living) being granted special concessions by the Commissariat of Agriculture during the 1920's.[20] With reverse consistency, the collectivization drive was accompanied by a massive escalation of antireligious propaganda linking the clergy to the kulaks as the chief enemies of collectivization. Given reports in more recent years indicating that the great majority of religious congregations are in rural areas and that at least twice the proportion of practicing believers live in the countryside as in the cities,[21] such questions as the effect of religious practices on peasant productivity—or the extent to which antireligious pressures might drive peasants into passive opposition or even deliberate work slowdowns—are still relevant to the makers of Soviet policy.

(3) Because of the intimate interrelationship between religious and national cultures, nationality policy has been an important factor affecting the Soviet line on religion. Examples can be cited from

[16] See Boleslaw Szczesniak, Ed., *The Russian Revolution and Religion*, South Bend, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1959, *passim*.

[17] See the relevant documents of the émigré Russian Church Synod at Sremski Karlovci, held in November-December 1921 (*ibid.*, pp. 58-62). Prepared by a violent press campaign against the "churchly counterrevolution" and preceded by the arrest of Patriarch Tikhon, the *coup* involved the seizure of the central and local administration of the Russian Orthodox Church by a group of "progressive" clergy who proposed to "renovate" the church by purging it of its "counterrevolutionary" leadership and ideology and by bringing its organization, teachings, and political orientation "closer to life"; above all, the *Obnovlentsy* ("Renovationists") hoped to reach a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet regime which would improve the legal and material position of the clergy. Whether or not the authorities masterminded this takeover, they openly supported the "Renovationists" by preventing the Tikhon-appointed deputies from assuming office, by arresting or deporting the principal ecclesiastical opponents of the new "progressive" church administration, and by withdrawing "registration" from the priests and parish congregations which refused to recognize it.

[18] Typical samples are F.M. Putintsev, *Politicheskaia rol i taktika sekt* (The Political Role and Tactics of Sects), Moscow, GAIZ, 1935; and Boris Kandidov, *Tserkov i shpionazh* (The Church and Espionage), Moscow, GAIZ, 1938.

[19] See in particular Antoni Starodworski, *Tragedja Cerkwi Prawoslawnej w ZSSR* (The Tragedy of the Orthodox Church in the USSR), Warsaw, Instytut Naukowego Badania Komunizmu, 1934, pp. 90-107; Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser, Eds., *The Soviet Secret Police*, London, Methuen, 1957, pp. 23, 126; and the more recent accounts by religious dissenters in the USSR appearing in two volumes edited by Michael Bourdeaux, *Religious Ferment in Russia*, London, Martin, 1968, and *Patriarch and Prophets*, New York, Praeger, 1970, *passim*.

[20] See Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, pp. 287-96.

[21] *E.g.*, in the Ukraine, by the mid-1960's, only 11 percent of all houses of worship were said to be located in urban centers: Anatoly O. Ieryshev. *Dosvid sotsiolohichnykh doslidzhen relihinosty* (Experience of Sociological Studies of Religiosity), Kiev, V-vo Akademii Nauk URSR, 1967, p. 68. A. Okulov, Director of the Institute of Scientific Atheism in Moscow has reported that "in some cases" believers constitute up to 15 percent of urban dwellers and up to 30 percent of the rural population: *Nauka i religiia* (Moscow), No. 8, 1967, p. 16.

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every period of Soviet history. Thus, in the early years of Soviet rule, a moderate policy toward such faiths as Judaism, Islam and Buddhism reflected the relatively tolerant treatment of the national minorities concerned. A similar correlation existed between the "Ukrainization" policy of the early 1920's and the early Soviet tolerance shown to the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the Ukraine. The reversal of Soviet nationality policy by the end of the 1920's brought in its wake destructive attacks on "national religions" as bastions of "bourgeois nationalism." The same Ukrainian Autocephalous Church was forced to "dissolve" itself in 1930, following the alleged "discovery" by the secret police that it was acting as a "cover for the mobilization of guerrilla cadres" in an underground League for the Liberation of the Ukraine.[22] While the Russian Orthodox Church shared the persecutions of the 1930's, the progressive rehabilitation of Russian nationalism in the guise of "Soviet patriotism" prepared the way for the regime's reevaluation of the historical role of the Russian Church and for the dramatic reversal of the regime's relationship with the Moscow Patriarchate during World War II.[23] The immediate postwar years provided one of the most striking demonstrations of the interrelationship between Soviet nationality and religious policies, when the Soviet authorities not only suppressed the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church in the Western Ukraine but also—in the tradition of Nicholas I—joined with the Russian Church in forcibly "converting" the Uniates to Orthodoxy.[24] As a final, well-known example, the last two decades have seen a steady increase in Soviet propaganda identifying Judaism with Zionism and pro-Israeli sympathies.[25] It seems clear that Soviet intolerance of the so-called "bourgeois nationalist" content of religion has sprung in part from fear that "national" denominations might offer an autonomous organizational framework for dissent movements.

(4) Numerous links can be detected between Soviet religious and foreign policies. This interrelationship has derived both from the sensitivity of foreign public opinion to the fate of religion or of specific denominations in the USSR and from the Kremlin's desire to neutralize religiously-motivated hostility in other countries to the Soviet regime and to communism in general. The early years of the the regime offer several examples of pressure from foreign governments affecting the Soviet treatment of leading religious figures[26]—though such interventions were bitterly resented by the Kremlin and, in the long run, did not improve the status of the respective denominations as a whole. As a rule, the Soviet authorities have been more responsive to appeals and criticism coming from their foreign friends and neutrals than to those of their enemies.

Soviet treatment of individual churches and sects, especially since World War II, has been affected by the extent to which they could or would advance foreign policy objectives of the regime. This treatment has further depended on the differing degrees of correspondence between the external interests of the Soviet state and those of the individual religious groups, ranging from a high positive correlation in the case of the Russian Orthodox Church to a negative one in the case of Judaism. Denominations like the Roman Catholics, subordinate to an international ecclesiastical center abroad, have of course been of different political utility to the regime than—for example—the Armenian Church with its Catholics of Echmiadzin claiming spiritual authority over all Armenians, not only those in the USSR but also the more numerous diaspora.[27]

During the interwar period the price of limited Soviet toleration for any religious group involved a commitment by that group to renounce any foreign intervention on its behalf, even in times of severe antireligious attacks, and an obligation to promote support of the Soviet system among its followers in other countries.[28] Since the 1940's, the Russian

[22] See *Izvestiia*, Nov. 22, 1929; and Dymtro Ihnatiuk, *Ukrainska avtokelfalna tserkva i Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy* (The Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine), Kiev, Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1930.

[23] See Nicholas S. Timashev, *Religion in Soviet Russia (1917-1942)*, London, Sheed & Ward, 1943, pp. 114-18.

[24] See this writer's "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine: A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (Ottawa), Vol. VII (1965), pp. 89-113.

[25] See, *e.g.*, Joshua Rothenberg, "Jewish Religion in the Soviet Union," in Lionel Kochan, Ed., *The Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917*, London, Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 175-79.

[26] The release of Patriarch Tikhon from prison in 1923 was, in part, the result of British intervention, while the freeing and banishment to Poland of the already condemned Roman Catholic Archbishop Cieplak was due to strong Polish pressure. Similarly, Rabbi Joseph Schneerson of Liubavichi, sentenced to death in 1927, was instead allowed to leave the USSR as a result of foreign pressure.

[27] Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, pp. 150-53.

[28] Following a "normalization" of relations between the regime and the Russian Orthodox Church in 1927, the émigré bishops and clergy in the Moscow Patriarchate's jurisdiction were requested by Metropolitan Sergei to sign pledges of loyalty to the Soviet government. Similar requests were made of their cobelievers abroad by the leaders of certain other denominations in the USSR. On Metropolitan Sergii's repudiation of a campaign by foreign churches to defend his persecuted Church, see Fletcher, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-57.

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Among religious leaders attending services during the June 1971 Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church are (front row, from left) Metropolitan Philippos mar Theophilos, head of the Molobar Church; Bishop Kerlos of Ethiopia; Cardinal I. Willebrandts; and Vazgen I, Supreme Patriarch-Catholicos of All-Armenia.

—Photo from TASS via Sovfoto.

Orthodox Church and certain other "loyal" religious denominations have assumed more active roles in espousing Soviet foreign policy objectives and conducting propaganda among their coreligionists abroad,[29] through the channels of bilateral and multilateral interchurch relations and organizations, including the Christian Peace Conference and—since the 1960's—the World Council of Churches, as well as through participation in the pro-Soviet "peace" movements. The religious organizations have helped the regime both by projecting a positive image of the Soviet system and by mobilizing support for certain Soviet policy initiatives among churches in other Communist states and in developing countries. They have also been instrumental in neutralizing or at least weakening anti-Soviet forces in some foreign churches throughout the establishment of "friendly" relations with these churches (*e.g.*, with the Vatican). By making the establishment and continuation of bilateral and multilateral ecclesiastical relations with foreign churches dependent to a large degree on the suspension by the latter of their public criticism of the Soviet regime, the churches of the USSR have in a sense projected some of the requirements of Soviet domestic religious policy onto churches and ecumenical organizations outside the Soviet sphere of control.[30]

The shifting patterns of Soviet control over Eastern Europe since World War II have added a new dimension to Soviet religious policy. Over the years, the Soviet model of church-state relations has been emulated to differing degrees in the various East European countries, and the Soviet Union appears to have exerted some influence over the religious policies of these states.[31] In the early postwar years, political penetration was paralleled by the expansion of the influence of the most privileged of the churches in the USSR—the Russian Orthodox Church—over the Orthodox churches of the "people's democracies." The weaker these churches were in their respective countries, the more dependent they became on the Moscow Patriarchate, through which Soviet influence could be channeled to the Orthodox national minorities.[32] On the other hand, the greater the extent of the subsequent "desatellization" of these countries, the less was the influence retained by the Kremlin and the Patriarchate on their ecclesiastical affairs. Nonetheless, through the medium of bilateral ecclesiastical relations, the Christian Peace Conference and "co-ordinated" actions in the WCC and other ecumenical bodies, the churches of the USSR have tried with varying success—to assist Soviet attempts to retain control over the foreign policies of its East European allies.

This contribution of the Russian Orthodox Church, and—to a lesser extent—some other denominations[33] to Soviet foreign policy has placed them in a limited bargaining position with the Soviet regime which they could use to gain or maintain concessions at home and to blunt the impact of internal anti-religious measures, at least on the central apparatus of the respective religious organizations. It is hardly a coincidence, for example, that the "external relations" of the Moscow Patriarchate greatly expanded in the years 1959-64, a period when the Russian

[29] In particular, the Russian Orthodox Church has been trying to "reunite" the Orthodox Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian émigrés and thus to remove them from the influence of "anti-Soviet," "schismatic" churches abroad.

[30] A one-sided arrangement which does not, *e.g.*, prevent the Russian Orthodox Church from occasionally echoing the Kremlin's criticism of foreign governments.

[31] *E.g.*, the suppression of Uniate churches in Romania and Czechoslovakia and their "conversion" to Orthodoxy, as well as Warsaw's refusal to grant official recognition to the remnants of the Ukrainian Uniate Church in Poland, appear to have been influenced by the Soviet government.

[32] *E.g.*, the Autocephalous Orthodox Churches of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

[33] Notably, the Evangelical Christians-Baptists, Lutherans, and Moslems.

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Orthodox Church (along with other denominations) was under massive antireligious attack at home.[34]

With the consolidation of the Soviet political system, the usefulness of "Sovietized" churches as agencies of political socialization for the "backward" social strata has evidently been declining (except, perhaps. in the territories annexed to the USSR after 1939[35]). From the regime's point of view, the Soviet educational system, the communications media, and the youth organizations are obviously more reliable agents to induct the young generation into Soviet political culture. The family, however, has remained an important agent for the transmission of religious values. As a rule, the party ideological apparatus—including the Agitprop, cultural, and educational sectors bearing primary responsibility for political socialization and adult indoctrination—has been the mainstay for the "fundamentalist," militantly antireligious orientation in Soviet religious policy. Almost every time Soviet leaders have called for an assault on the "remnants of the past in men's consciousness," or for counter-attacks against alien "ideological influences," or for an accelerated education of the "new Communist man," their exhortations have signalled a renewed attack by the party propaganda agencies on religious "survivals" and organizations, and the latter have borne the brunt of "remedial" administrative measures.

The Institutional Framework

Soviet secretiveness with respect to religious policy formulation makes it extremely difficult to analyze all the elements that go into the process. Before attempting to identify the various interest groups that directly or indirectly bring their influence to bear, let us examine the institutional framework within which the policy has been shaped and implemented.

It can be safely assumed that major policy decisions in the religious field[36] have involved the top decisional units of the Soviet system—the Politburo (or one-time Presidium) of the CPSU Central Committee, and the Council of Ministers (previously the Council of People's Commissars, or Sovnarkom).[37] But the information on which such decisions have been based—including desiderata of the groups and institutions concerned and feedback from past policies—has reached the top policy-makers largely through several subordinate agencies which have then been called upon to interpret, augment and implement these decisions. As these comparatively "visible" institutions have no doubt exercised an important influence over Soviet religious policy-making, they deserve to be examined in some detail.

Following the adoption in 1918 of the "Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State and of the School from the Church"—the first major elaboration in law of the party's program on religion—Lenin's government divided up the tasks of implementing ecclesiastical policy among several different agencies of the new Russian republic. Within the Commissariat of Justice, a subdivision later known as the Department of Cults was charged with "general supervision over the implementation of the Separation Decree." The Commissariat of Internal Affairs was entrusted with the "administration" of the provisions on religion requiring the "legalization" of religious groups, the "sanctioning" of ecclesiastical conferences, the "registration" of parish congregations and the clergy, and the "leasing" of nationalized houses of worship to congregations allowed legal status (in practice these duties devolved upon the administrative departments of the local Soviets). The Cheka—the first of a long line of police organizations—assumed responsibility for

[34] An examination over several years of the official *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii* (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate) shows that during and since the crackdown of the 1960's a lion's share of the Holy Synod's business has concerned the external relations of the Patriarchate.

[35] This is explained by the shorter period of Soviet rule, the far greater percentage of believers, and consequently the concentration in the annexed territories of a great majority of the active religious congregations in the USSR.

[36] To offer a partial and very brief list of such decisions: the adoption of the "Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State" in 1918; the regime's intervention in support of the "Living Church" *coup* and the arrest of Patriarch Tikhon in 1922; Tikhon's release in 1923; the acceptance of Metropolitan Sergii's 1927 Declaration as a basis for a "normalization" of church-state relations; the launching of a mass antireligious campaign and the revision of Soviet legislation on "cults" in 1929; the adoption of a "religious NEP" in 1943, and the 1945 Sovnarkom resolution restoring to the Church limited rights of a juridical person; the two 1954 Central Committee decrees on antireligious work; the 1958 or 1959 decision to launch a new antireligious campaign and the subsequent withdrawal frfom religious groups of some of their wartime concessions. For details the reader is referred to Curtiss, *op. cit.*, and this writer's "Church-State Relations in the USSR," *loc. cit.*

[37] In the latter case, it has probably been the "inner cabinet," that made the decisions (*i.e.*, the wartime State Committee on Defense and the postwar Presidium of the Council of Ministers).

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"combating churchly counterrevolution"—*i.e.*, for the systematic surveillance and infiltration of churches and sects. Finally, antireligious propaganda was initially made the responsbility of a special "political education" unit of the Commissariat of Education, working under the "guidance" of the party's Agitation Department.[38]

This wide dispersal of responsibilities led to tensions, policy conflicts and jurisdictional squabbles among the agencies involved and in the party apparatus. Major conflicts had to be resolved at the Politburo or the Sovnarkom level and, on several occasions, Lenin personally intervened to overrule decisions.[39] Such problems soon led to the periodic reshuffling of responsibilities from one agency to another and to the creation of new party organizations to oversee religious policy. In a few instances, *ad hoc* bodies were formed to oversee particular projects—for example, a secret Trotsky-led committee guided the confiscation of church treasures in 1922.[40]

In the same year, a standing "Commission on the Implementation of the Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State" was established at the Central Committee level. Headed by Emelian Yaroslavsky, this semi-secret body also became the instrument of the Secretariat in planning, guiding and coordinating the activities of the party and state agencies, trade unions and other "mass organizations" on the "anti-religious front" (hence its informal designation as the "Antireligious Commission"). Throughout the 1920's, the "Commission" played an important role in policing the implementation of party policy and resolving disputes among the professional "antireligionists" (*antireligiozniki*).[41]

Emelian Yaroslavsky, prominent antireligious writer and head of the former Union of Militant Godless, pictured in 1939 upon nomination for election to the USSR Academy of Sciences.

—Photo from Sovfoto.

In 1925 Yaroslavsky was also named to head another brainchild of the Agitprop Department of the Central Committee—a mass atheistic organization called the Union of Godless (renamed in 1929 the Union of Militant Godless). Drawing on cadres and resources of the party, Komsomol, trade unions, the army, the Commissariat of Education and other institutions, the Union became the chief vehicle for combating religious beliefs and practices among the population, reaching a nominal membership of five million by 1932.[42]

Meantime, in 1924, the aforementioned Department of Cults in the Commissariat of Justice was abolished and its responsibilities transferred to a

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[38] See P. V. Gidulianov, *Tserkov i gosudarstvo po zakonodatelstvu RSFSR* (The Church and the State in RSFSR Legislation), Moscow, Izd-vo NKIu, 1923, p. 3. See also *Revoliutsiia i tserkov* (Moscow), No. 1-2, 1924, pp. 111-12. With respect to police controls, while there is little official documentation available, contemporary Soviet accounts abound in references to the far-reaching powers of the Cheka-GPU/OGPU-NKVD/NKGB-MGB/MVD-KGB over religious groups. See Metropolitan Sergii (Voskresensky), *loc. cit.*, and the two volumes by Bourdeaux cited above.

[39] For example, during 1921 Lenin ordered the party Secretariat to tone down its antireligious propaganda and compelled the Central Committee to moderate its resolutions on the elimination of believers from the party membersihp: See *V.I. Lenin, Polnce sobranie sochinenii* (Complete Collected Works), 5th edition, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1965, Vol. LII, pp. 140, 386; ;and Vol. XIV, 440, 721. In December 1922 Lenin overruled decisions of the "Little Sovnarkom" dissolving the Department of Cults within the Commissariat of Justice, thereby prolonging its life until 1924: See *Lenin na khoziaistvennom fronte* (Lenin on the Economic Front), Moscow, 1934, pp. 98-100.

[40] See the 1921-22 correspondence in the Trotsky Archive, Harvard University, item T 728, T 736. See also Joan Delaney, "The Origins of Soviet Antireligious Organizations," in Richard H. Marshall, Jr., Ed., *Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union, 1917-1967,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971, pp. 103-10.

[41] See Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, Vol. XLV, p. 692; *Izvestiia Tsentralnovo Kommiteta RKP(b)* (Moscow), No. 11-12 (47-48), November-December 1922, p. 17; and S.N. Savelev, "Emilian Yaraslovsky and the Surmounting of Anarchistic Influences in Antireligous Work in the USSR," *Yezhegodnik Muzeia istorii religii i ateizma* (Yearbook of the Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism), Vol. VII, Leningrad, Izd-vo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1964, pp. 37-49.

[42] See Fedor N. Oleshchuk, *X let Soiuza Voinstvuiushchikh Bezbozhnikov v SSSR* (Ten Years of the Union of Militant Godless in the USSR), Moscow, OGIZ-GAIZ, 1936.

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"Secretariat [later called Permanent Commission] for the Affairs of Cults" attached to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The membership of this body consisted of representatives of the Executive Committee, the Commissariats of Justice, Internal Affairs, and Education: the police apparatus (reorganized in 1924 as OGPU), and the trade unions.[43] Though the Commission on Cults formally continued in existence until 1943,[44] the circumstantial evidence available suggests that during the 1930's, when the problem of religion in the USSR came to be equated with that of domestic "counterrevolution," the OGPU's successor—the NKVD—assumed major responsibilities for dealing with "churchmen and sectarians."

The quiet dissolution of the Union of Militant Godless early in World War II was the harbinger of a rather dramatic reversal in Soviet religious policy toward limited toleration of "loyal" believers, culminating in a historic meeting of Stalin with three senior hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church in September 1943.[45] This rapprochement led to the creation of new state institutions to oversee religious activities. In the fall of 1943, a Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church was established —a mark of the special recognition accorded by the regime to the largest and most "patriotic" church in the USSR—and placed under the leadership of a veteran police specialist in religious affairs, G. G. Karpov. In 1944 all other religious groups were brought under a parallel agency, the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults. By unpublished legislation, the two Councils were given all-union status as agencies of the federal Council of People's Commissars, with the authority to assign "plenipotentiaries" to the republic governments and to the executive committees of *oblast* soviets. The functions of the Councils were officially described as those of advising the government on matters pertaining to "religious cults," drafting legislation on religious activities, providing liaison between religious organizations and the government, and assisting in the satisfaction of the legitimate needs of recognized churches and sects.[46]

For a decade or so, the emphasis of the work of these two councils was on their function as "go-betweens" in church-state relations, and in this capacity they apparently provided useful services. However, there is much evidence to indicate that the new institutional framework—far from diminishing police controls over religious activity—in fact facilitated the penetration of the ecclesiastical apparatus by the security organs.[47]

From the mid-1950's on, the retreat of Nikita Khrushchev (*et al.*) from the "religious NEP "of the 1940's impelled the Councils to act increasingly as agents of the regime in enforcing strictures on religious activity. The new party line—sounded as early as 1954 in a call for the resumption of systematic "scientific-atheist" indoctrination—apparently encountered some initial opposition from the Council for Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and other quarters, paving the way for the eventual dismissal of Karpov in 1960.[48] In the years 1959-65, the regime resumed a full-scale frontal attack on organized religion, apparently with the ready cooperation of the Councils.[49]. When the tide finally subsided, the two organs were merged in early 1966 into a single "Council for Religious Affairs," which has remained in operation to the present. According to its chairman, Vladimir Kuroedev (writing in August 1966), the new Council was given "a much greater role and greater responsibility in supervising observance of the laws on cults" and "correspondingly greater powers" to combat religious dissent.[50]

[43] M. I. Shakhnovich, *Lenin i problemy ateizma* (Lenin and Problems of Atheism), Leningrad, Izd-vo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1961, p. 578; and *Otdelenie tserkvi ot gosudarstva. Dopolnenie k knige P.V. Gidulianova* (The Separation of Church and State. Supplement to Book of P. V. Gidulianov), Moscow, Iuridicheskoe Izd-vo NKIu RSFSR, 1929, p. 12. In 1932, the Commission assumed from the NKVD the now largely theoretical powers of sanctioning national church conferences and setting procedures for registration of, and reporting by, individual religious organizations; *Kommunisticheskaia partiia i Sovetskoe pravitelstvo o religii i tserkvi* (The Communist Party and the Soviet Government on Religion and the Church), Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1959, pp. 93-95.

[44] According to V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, "Freedom of Conscience in the USSR," in his *Izbrannye sochineniia,* (Selected Works), Moscow, Izd-vo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1959, p. 86.

[45] On this event and its aftermath, see Fletcher, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-115.

[46] See A. Kolosov, "Religion and Church in the USSR," in *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia,* Vol. on the SSSR, Moscow, GISE, 1948.

[47] Wolin and Slusser, *op. cit.*, p. 126. Several postwar defectors from the USSR with KGB or military intelligence backgrounds have attested to such wide police controls over organized religion.

[48] The almost simultaneous dismissal of Karpov and the resignation of the Patriarchate's chief political spokesman, Metropolitan Nikolai (Yarushevich) of Leningrad, attested to such opposition to the shift in the government's religious policy.

[49] Charges that the two Councils had been abusing their powers to strangulate organized religion in the USSR figured prominently in protests of the Orthodox and Baptist dissenters during the 1960's. See L. Ilichev's address of November 1963 on the "Formation of the Scientific Worldview and the Atheistic Upbringing," in *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 1, 1964, pp. 22-46.

[50] Kuroedov, who had replaced Karpov in 1960, was quoted in *Izvestiia,* Aug. 30, 1966.

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On the propaganda front, the vacuum left by the dissolution of the Union of Militant Godless was only partially filled in after the war by the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge, an organization designed to mobilize the resources of the Soviet intelligentsia for the work of "adult education" among the masses. Early in the course of its renewed assault on religion, the Khrushchev regime attempted to assign to this organization (since renamed Society "Knowledge") responsibility for an intensive antireligious propaganda campaign.[51] However, despite repeated proddings from the party, the Soviet intelligentsia showed little enthusiasm for the task of antireligious propaganda. Thus, the main burden of the atheist campaign had to be assumed by the Agitprop apparatus under the guidance of L. Ilichev, Khrushchev's chief ideological lieutenant.[52]

The Spectrum of Interest Groups

Within this changing institutional framework, several organizational interests and functional groupings have been able to play an important role in shaping or modifying Soviet religious policy. With little information available on how influences are brought to bear, only the vaguest silhouettes can be drawn of group actors performing in the shadow theater of Soviet religious policy.

In terms of direct access to religious policy-makers, the party "ideologues," the "priests" of the ruling faith, have from the very beginning enjoyed the advantages deriving from the role ascribed by the Bolsheviks to ideology in guiding political practice, as well as from Agitprop's control over the media of mass communication. Their vested interest in the antireligious struggle was easy to legitimize in terms of the Leninist ideological legacy, while their "news-management" function could be utilized to magnify the internal and external threats of religion and otherwise affect the perception of religion on the part of the policy-makers. The chief "allies" of the professional *antireligiozniki* have been functionaries in the Komsomol and the trade union apparatus, army political personnel and, in more recent times, school teachers—that is, groups performing crucial roles in the political socialization of youth.

Functional and psychological differences between the party's ideological and executive *apparatchiki* have on occasion placed the latter (the "doers") in opposition to the antireligious workers (the "talkers"), especially when the cadres and resources recruited for atheistic campaigns—or the resentment of believers over such drives—have threatened the fullfillment of economic tasks for which the party and the government executives and economic managers were responsible. During World War II, similar priority considerations led the professional military cadres to display considerable indifference in the face of increasing manifestations of religiosity among the army rank and file. For their own reasons, then, these functional groupings have occasionally assumed a "tribunate" function on behalf of the politically disfranchised believers. The excessive zeal of the interwar Union of the Militant Godless may have contributed to the unfavorable image of the professional *antireligioznik* reportedly held by many party executives—an image which has apparently combined the features of a politically irresponsible fanatic with those of a cultural vandal and hooligan, a parasitic "red priest" whose militant abuse of the believers has contributed to the survival of religion in society.

The police—the early Cheka and its successive reincarnations—have been deeply involved in the control and manipulation of religious groups, both directly and through the governmental bodies charged with the enforcement of Soviet religious policy. As has already been noted, in contrast to the "fundamentalists" in the party Agitprop organization, the police have spearheaded from the earliest years of the regime a "pragmatic" line aiming at the "Sovietization" and political exploitation of institutional religion. An important consideration underlying Chekist "pragmatism" appears to be the realization that believers can be controlled much more effectively when allowed to operate in the open, within "registered" congregations presided over by "registered" priests, than when driven underground into the hands of "illegal" clergy. One may also assume that the police have had a collective vested interest in the continuing existence of institutional

[51] On this subject see *Nauka i religii*, No. 2, 1962, pp. 3-14, and No. 3, 1962, pp. 9-20. Also see this writer's "Destalinization and Religion in the USSR," *International Journal* (Toronto), Summer 1965, pp. 316-21.

[52] Khrushchev's massive antireligious campaign of 1959-64 appeared to combine several elements: it was an important political resocialization undertaking in connection with his grand design to "build communism" in the "present generation;" it was an aspect of his "destalinization" course—a return of the original "Leninist principles" in the Soviet religious policy; and, possibly, it was a concession to the party "ideologues" disconcerted and demoralized by his ideological innovations and pragmatic experiments in other policy spheres.

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religion—along with other potentially "subversive" elements—to justify their vast establishment and to maintain their power in Soviet politics. Like the Agitprop, the police exercise considerable control over channels of communication—especially covert ones—and thereby directly and indirectly influence top-level decision-making in the realm of religion. It was indeed mainly through police channels that ecclesiastical and sectarian leaders had to bargain with the Soviet authorities during a good part of the interwar period.[53]

To turn to the various religious groups themselves, how have believers been able to influence the course of the regime's policy? During the early years of the Soviet system, certain sectarian groups captured the attention of the Bolshevik leadership because of their cooperative rural life-style and economic efficiency, and for a while were championed as the "vanguard" of the peasant class (though with a "false consciousness"); however, their influence was short-lived.[54] Not again until the early 1940's did religious leaders—this time the hierarchs of the Russian Church—gain occasional direct access to top Soviet government leaders. For at least a decade after World War II, the two aforementioned Councils for ecclesiastical affairs provided religious groups with a regular channel for voicing their wishes and complaints to the government. As in the interwar period, however, the transactions arranged through these liaison bodies were carried out in an atmosphere of secrecy; contacts between church and state representatives were never made in the open except on ceremonial occasions. Such "closed-door" negotiations were undoubtedly to the advantage of the authorities, making it easier for them to disregard their own "cult legislation" and to manipulate ecclesiastical leaders. After the regime renewed its attack on religion in 1959, in the process enlisting the aid of the two councils on religious affairs, these mechanisms came under increasingly vocal criticism from the ranks of the believers.

During the 1960's, important dissent movements emerged both within the Orthodox Church and among the Evangelical Christians and Baptists. The dissenters challenged the pattern of church-state relations as nothing more—nor less—than "collusion" between timid or corrupt religious leaders and atheistic state officials, the result of which would only be the demoralization and eventual destruction of the respective churches.[55] By appealing directly to the Soviet authorities, as well as to churches and public opinion abroad, these dissidents probably contributed more to the abatement of the anti-religious campaign by 1965 than the "loyal" church leaders themselves. Ironically, the latter were then able to capitalize on the threat posed by the dissenters to secure some concessions from the government, which by the late 1960's was eager to undercut protest.

In the years since 1966, the ranks of the original religious dissenters have been swelled by protesters from other faiths as well as by Soviet political dissidents. These elements have continued to bear the brunt of a wide array of administrative, judicial and police repressions (albeit such actions are now directed less against religion in itself than against the "crime" of dissent). Nonetheless, they have provided religious believers with new, bold voices that have been amplified through the media of *samizdat* (underground literature) and broadcasts from abroad, and through the supportive protests of some well-known Soviet intellectuals.[56]

The rise of religious dissent in the USSR, which has broken the seal of silence imposed upon the religious organizations as one of the conditions of their legalization, is part of a wider and deeper process set in motion by Khrushchev's program of "destalinization." With the decline of the worst excesses of terror, the erection of some legal safeguards against official arbitrariness, and the resulting abatement of feelings of fear and political inefficacy, an embryonic public opinion began to emerge in the Soviet Union. Despite the post-Khrushchev retreat from "destalinization" and the reinforcement of coercive methods and mechanisms, public opinion has continued to germinate, helping to articulate the demands of social groups which have hitherto seen their views misrepresented

[53] For the best documented case illustrating this practice, see a history of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church during the 1920's, written by its first head, Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivskyi: *Istoriia Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy. Rozdil 7: Vidrodzhennia Ukrainskoi Tserkvy* (History of Ukrainian Orthodox Church: Part 7. Rebirth of the Ukrainian Church), Winnipeg, John Gryshchuk Foundation, 1961.

[54] See Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, pp. 287-96.

[55] See a 1965 letter to N. V. Podgorny from the priests Nikolai I. Eshliman and Gleb P. Yakunin in Bourdeaux, *Patriarch and Prophets*, pp. 189-94, and discussion on pp. 195-254, 276-303.

[56] The most recent example of such protests was a letter from Alexander Solzhenitsyn to Patriarch Pimen accusing the Patriarchate of sacrificing the Church's interest for the sake of good relations with the atheistic regime; reproduced in full in *Russkaia mysl* (Paris), March 30, 1972.

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Christmas Mass in January 1972 at the Patriarchal Bogoyavlensky Church in Moscow.

—Photo by B. Trepetov, TASS, via Sovfoto.

(*e.g.*, the intellectuals and the nationalities) or which have been politically disfranchised (*e.g.*, the believers). The common themes now sounded by the more vocal members of such groups are demands for "the rule of law," "publicity" and open government, and "respect for human rights."[57] In this emergent public opinion, religious dissenters have found a powerful stimulus and source of strength to carry on their struggle for a genuine separation of the church from the state, for real guarantees of freedom of conscience, and for the equalization of believers' rights with those of non-believers.

During the past decade, the makers of Soviet religious policy have been confronted not only by open criticism from believers and more general demands for freedom from various dissidents, but also by indirect yet important pressures from other non-religious sectors of society. To cite one development as an example, the "cultural nihilism" of some Soviet functionaries during Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign—which resulted in the destruction of a number of religious structures and objects of historical or artistic value—has led to the formation of volunteer public societies for the protection of historical and artistic monuments, helping to stem the tide of atheistically-motivated vandalism. A number of otherwise "loyal" Soviet writers have also spoken out in defense of religious monuments, traditions and values.

Paradoxically, the secularization processes in Soviet society—which in the past have been more effective than official antireligious measures in weakening religion's hold on the population—have also undermined the ideological appeals of communism, including dogmatic "scientific atheism." There is continuing evidence today of a resurgence of nationalism—Russian and non-Russian—which has partly filled in the resulting vacuum. Among Soviet youth of various nationalities, the search for cultural indentity and continuity with the past seems to have engendered a new appreciation of religious tradition as an integral part of their own national cultures.[58] It seems just possible that religion may find a new lease on life as the most important remaining link with the past and as a repository of firmer moral values than those offered by the ambiguous Communist "moral code."

It is too early to determine the specific effects of these processes on Soviet religious policy; but there seems little doubt that before long the Communist leadership will have to undertake a basic reassessment of that policy in the context of the profound changes going on in Soviet society.

[57] See this writer's "Political Dissent in the Soviet Union," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), April 1970, pp. 74-105.

[58] L. A. Filippov, "On Militant Materialism and Atheism," *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 3, 1972, pp. 73-74.

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Books

The USSR and the Environment

By Jack Perry

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN: *The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union.* Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1972.
PHILIP R. PRYDE: *Conservation in the Soviet Union.* New York, Cambridge University Press, 1972.

SOVIET ATTITUDES with respect to the problem of environmental protection, which form the subject matter of the two books under review, represent a relatively new area of interest for Western observers of developments in the USSR. The matter first attracted outside attention in the mid-1960's when the battle over pollution of Lake Baikal erupted in the Soviet press to become an ecological *cause célèbre*. Even Western scholars at that time knew little about the Soviet ecological situation, but it became readily apparent to students of Soviet politics that deterioration of the environment was becoming an active issue in the USSR when Soviet writers such as Mikhail Sholokhov, Oleg Volkov, and Leonid Leonov—as well as others less privileged—came out with sharp criticisms of official policies in *Literaturnaia gazeta* and *Komsomolskaia pravda*.[1] Even after this publicity, however, the scope and substance of the Soviet debate on environmental issues remained obscure, and little was known about the institutional aspect of environmental decision-making in the USSR—*i.e.*, about what groups were in contention and what their respective positions were. Even Soviet specialists within the US government continued to devote relatively slight attention to the subject until the autumn of 1971, when studies were begun to work out the lines of what was eventually to become the US-USSR Environmental Agreement signed by Presidents Nixon and Podgorny in May 1972.

In part, the unawareness in the US and elsewhere of Soviet environmental developments reflected simply a lack of interest in something that seemed to have little bearing on the major political issues involved in Soviet relations with the rest of the world. Even as public interest in the environmental problem began growing, students of Soviet and international affairs tended to regard the subject, at most, as peripheral to their primary concerns. This reviewer, for example, while serving at the US Embassy in Moscow in 1964, had occasion to pay a visit to Lake Baikal, and as an amateur environmentalist I was deeply impressed not only by the preciousness of the lake but also by its ecological fragility. However, it never occurred to me to mention the environmental problem in my trip report, and I am not sure who in Washington would have read that section of the report had I written it.

Another reason for outside unawareness of Soviet environmental problems, of course, has been that the Soviet authorities persisted for some time in pretending that no such problems existed or in obfuscating the issue by claiming the inherent superiority of the socialist system in solving problems connected with population growth, conservation of natural resources, and the like.

In the last couple of years, however, our knowledge of Soviet developments in the environmental field has grown impressively as area specialists have begun giving the subject increased attention. In addition to some informative articles published in various journals,[2] we now have the two books under review—one by Pro-

[1] See, *e.g.*, *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), Feb. 6, March 18 and 30, April 10, 13, and 15, 1965; Jan. 29, June 2, 1966; *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), May 11, 1966. Leonov's article (*Literaturnaia gazeta*, March 30, 1965) is reprinted in *Pryde*, pp. 220 *ff.*

[2] *E.g.*, Keith Bush, "Environmental Problems in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1972.

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fessor Goldman of Wellesley College and the other by Professor Pryde of California State University at San Diego—which represent the first broad and systematic treatments of environmental problems in the USSR.

Philip S. Gillette, who commented on both books in *Perspective*,[3] noted that Goldman's seemed to be written primarily for a non-specialized audience (the chapter on Lake Baikal had originally appeared in *The New Yorker*), while Pryde's seemed intended more for scholars and environmental specialists. The two studies nevertheless complement each other well, for Goldman seeks to describe the actual extent of pollution, citing telling examples as reported in the Soviet press, while Pryde concentrates rather on Soviet conservation policies and practices, focusing particularly on land use. Despite these quite different perspectives, the two authors come to strikingly similar conclusions. Both find that the Soviet authorities, though well-disposed toward conservation *per se*, have nonetheless succumbed to their own produce-or-perish mentality and allowed the nation's environmental problems to assume serious proportions—as serious in a number of vital areas as in the United States. The two authors also agree that the Soviet system, notwithstanding its strong centralization of authority and its emphasis on long-range planning, has not proven in any way superior to the decentralized, free-enterprise system of the United States when it comes to confronting and solving environmental problems. Both books conclude with urgent appeals for cooperation rather than polemics over which country's environmental record is better (or worse):

Goldman (p. 291): *So far no one political system, be it the American model or Soviet socialism, seems to have a monopoly on all the right answers. Far from it. We must learn to cooperate with each other and our environment. If we fail to do so, no one will be the winner.*

Pryde (p. 178): *In both countries it is a matter of will, not of means. The fact that the United States excels the USSR in some areas of conservation is no grounds for complacency; it is also worse in some, and outstanding in very few. In the final analysis, there is little to be gained from an exercise in intercontinental polemics over who is "least worst." There is still much to be done in both countries and, as yet, still time to do it. The livability of our spaceship Earth rests in the balance.*

AS ONE READS these books and notes the progress made toward bilateral cooperation through the conclusion of the US-USSR Environmental Agreement, one's thoughts are inevitably drawn to the striking similarities, as well as the dissimilarities, in the two countries' evolving attitudes toward their environments. A fundamental similarity stems from the historical fact that the two nations both inherited vast continental areas which they believed it their manifest destiny to explore, settle and exploit. It is not surprising, in view of the seemingly inexhaustible resources of these areas, that the process took place in both countries with very little regard for conservation. Something of the same thoughtlessness can be discerned in the past unconcern of Americans for the virtual extinction of the bison and the attitude that produced the old Russian notion that the only good wolf is a dead wolf. And Americans' past disregard for the preservation of their forests finds a parallel in the still common Soviet image of the man who fells the most trees as a hero.

On another plane, Americans

[3] *Perspective* (Washington, DC), August 1972, pp. 151-52, and November 1972, p. 213.

Reviewers in This Issue

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have tended to share with Soviet citizens—at least until rather recent times—the idea that progress equates with growth, that the most important criterion of national success lies in the steady upward rise of GNP or, in the Soviet case, the fulfillment of planned targets of output growth. Now, perhaps, more Americans than Russians have begun to reexamine this attitude and to speak of "the limits of growth," although —as Pryde reports (pp. 165-66)— a few daring Soviet environmentalists have also come out with the same idea—for example, P. Oldak, who wrote in *Literaturnaia gazeta,* June 3, 1970:

We must be willing to slow our economic growth by probably 7 to 10 percent for several years to divert funds to rescuing the balance of nature.

When it comes to treating the environmental problem as a public issue and a field for governmental action, however, there are perhaps more dissimilarities than similarities between the two countries, and these dissimilarities derive largely from the more fundamental differences between the two systems. In the United States, not only has there been a phenomenal growth of popular concern about protecting the environment, but the resultant pressure on both the private and governmental sectors to take appropriate action has been highly effective. In the USSR, on the other hand, the pressure for environmental action has come from a rather small and unorganized band of scientists and intellectuals, who have managed to express their views publicly only through occasional articles in *Literaturnaia gazeta* or other publications. Their admirable efforts have indeed helped to arouse public concern, but lacking any organizational base, these efforts have tended to become diffused in the complex party-government bureaucracy and have not succeeded in bringing about any change in the fundamental orientation of the system toward growth at any cost. Hence the paradox that the potential strengths of the system for combating environmental dangers have been offset by other characteristics of the system itself. The result is that while Soviet officials directly involved in environmental matters are now showing an increasing willingness to recognize that the USSR and the US face problems of similar magnitude in this area, the Soviet bureaucracy as a whole remains reluctant to acknowledge that they, no more than Americans, can afford to look with complacency on an unrestrained cycle of economic growth and population growth.

But there are hopeful indications that this official attitude, too, has begun to change. Moscow's decision to enter into the US-USSR Environmental Agreement was itself a significant indication of change, and the report on environmental measures delivered by V. A. Kirillin, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, before the Supreme Soviet in September 1972 was another.[4] In any event, the two books under review help to remind us that the preservation of the environment is a cause that demands action on the part of all nations. Though Benjamin Franklin spoke in quite a different context, his words are apt in this case, too: "We must all hang together, or we shall all hang separately."

[4] For Kirillin's report, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 20, 1972. (English translation of excerpts in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* [Columbus, Ohio] Oct. 18, 1972.)

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Ostpolitik--Westpolitik

By Melvin Croan

PETER BENDER: *Die Ostpolitik Willy Brandts oder Die Kunst des Selbstverständlichen* (Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* or the Art of the Self-Evident). Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1972.
HEINZ LIPPMANN: *Honecker. Porträt eines Nachfolgers* (Honecker. Portrait of a Successor). Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1971.

SEVERAL YEARS AGO, while serving as Foreign Minister in West Germany's Grand Coalition government headed by Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, Willy Brandt remarked: "We must start from the status quo. What else is there to start from? But it would be against nature and against reason to renounce any desire for future development."[1]

These basic thoughts have inspired West German *Ostpolitik* as it has unfolded under Brandt as Chancellor. His helmsmanship has set Bonn's course toward a détente with the East based on "existing realities" in Europe—*i.e.*, on West German acceptance of established post-World War II borders and recognition of the existence of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a separate German state. At the same time, looking beyond the status quo, Brandt's *Ostpolitik* envisages a step-by-step development of East-West cooperation in Europe which will ultimately heal the present division of the continent into antagonistic camps. A key element in this longer-term perspective is the vision of a transformation of the hostile estrangement between the Federal Republic and the GDR into a genuine rapprochement between the two Germanies.

Peter Bender's analysis of Brandt's *Ostpolitik* focuses particularly on the present government's decision to accept the status quo as a starting point toward rapprochement. The author pointedly criticizes the "illusions" that, in his view, characterized West German policy toward the East until Brandt became Chancellor in 1969, and he offers a spirited defense of the wisdom of Bonn's subsequent initiatives. The book is nevertheless much more than a mere partisan tract designed to answer domestic critics of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. It is a detailed and thoroughly reliable account of the tangled skein of diplomacy and politics that has shaped the Bonn government's approach to the Eastern problem from the immobilism of the Adenauer era to the dynamic realism of the Brandt period. Curiously enough, however, Bender pays scant attention to Brandt's long-term aspirations with regard to future relations with the GDR, and he consequently has little to say about the obstacles that may obstruct the hoped-for reconciliation of the two Germanies.

Since the publication of Bender's book, substantial progress has been made toward restoring relations between the Federal Republic and the GDR, as evidenced by the conclusion of a General Treaty between the two governments. It is nevertheless apparent that East Germany's leaders still continue to perceive West German *Ostpolitik* as a potential threat to their own security. Although they have agreed to a number of contacts with the Federal Republic, they have simultaneously redoubled their efforts to enforce ideological "delimitation" (*Abgrenzung*) from the West and have unleashed a domestic campaign against "social democratism" to drive home the point. And despite all the specific improvements in relations between the GDR and the Federal Republic, there has been no move toward dismantling the Berlin Wall or the heavy fortifications along the GDR's frontier with the Federal Republic. As Erich Honecker explained in a candid interview with C. L. Sulzberger of

[1] Willy Brandt, *A Peace Policy For Europe*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968, p. 122.

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The New York Times, "they remain as existing realities." [2]

HONECKER'S WORDS might just as well have come from the lips of Walter Ulbricht, whose retirement as head of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) in May 1971 clearly facilitated what progress has since been made toward détente. A partial explanation of this apparent paradox can be gleaned from Heinz Lippmann's study of Honecker, which provides a timely political "portrait" of the man who, as Ulbricht's successor, is now destined to play an important role in a delicate and complex period of intra-German and European international politics. Based in part on the author's personal acquaintance with Honecker, Lippmann's book contains much fresh or previously little-known material. Though open to criticism on certain points of interpretation, the study constitutes a genuinely open-minded and basically well-balanced assessment and should serve to correct some of the misconceptions prevalent in the West concerning the East German leader.

The book is divided into three parts. The first part, entitled "Childhood and Youth," relates what is known about Honecker's upbringing as a Communist miner's son in the Saar, setting it against a general background description of the distinctive socio-economic conditions then prevailing in that region, and showing that young Erich's early commitment to communism was an entirely natural outgrowth of the influences surrounding him. Part 1 then goes on to trace his early career through the time of his arrest for illegal activity in Nazi Germany and his subsequent incarceration from 1935 to 1945. Here, Lippmann draws upon hitherto unpublished material provided him by the East German Committee of Anti-Fascist Resistance Fighters to show that Honecker's imprisonment was really a much less psychologically scarring experience than previous Western accounts have suggested.[3] According to Lippmann's information, the prison in which Honecker was confined was "correctly" run, and he was not subjected to solitary confinement for any length of time, if at all. Indeed, toward the end of the war he was assigned to work outside the prison walls, and in March 1945 he managed to escape, apparently without the authorization of the underground KPD network.

The second part of the book deals with Honecker's role as a "participant" in the building and exercise of Communist party power in East Germany during the decade 1945-55. Here the author draws heavily on his own former personal relationship with Honecker, under whom he served in the *Freie Deutsche Jugend* (FDJ), the East German youth organization. His description of Honecker as a skilled and dynamic FDJ leader is sharply at odds with the conventional picture of the man at that time as a dour, wooden, and not particularly intelligent subaltern. According to Lippmann, Honecker—though occasionally given to ill-considered acts of independent initiative — demonstrated genuine organizational talents which were fully appreciated by his superiors. As a result, he was assigned in 1955 to spend a year in the Soviet Union in order to prepare to take over far more important duties involving the political direction of East German security and military affairs.

The third part of the book is devoted to Honecker's performance in this new role and his gradual emergence as Ulbricht's heir-apparent. In this reviewer's opinion, Lippmann's treatment of these matters is far less satisfactory than his account of Honecker's earlier career, perhaps because for this later period he has had to rely exclusively on published East German sources. For one thing, the case he makes for believing that mounting differences between Honecker and Ulbricht played a significant part in the latter's retirement seems greatly overdrawn. On the basis of what we know at present, it appears most probable that it was the Russians who forced Ulbricht to step down, but that they as well as the entire East German elite were anxious to choose a successor who would preserve an appearance of political continuity, with the end result that the choice fell quite naturally on Honecker.

What caliber of leader, then, is the new East German party chief? Lippmann, in comparing Honecker's basic personality traits with those of his predecessor, pinpoints both his strengths and his weaknesses. According to Lippmann, Honecker appears less aloof than Ulbricht, more capable of genuine personal friendships, and more considerate of his subordinates. These qualities have earned him greater personal popularity, but by the same token—in Lippmann's view—Honecker runs far greater risk of becoming enmeshed in a political clique composed of his own personal

[2] *The New York Times*, Nov. 23, 1972, p. 1.

[3] In his interview with Sulzberger, Honecker made light of his prison experience, quoting the old German adage: "Prison is good for your health—if it doesn't kill you."

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friends within the ruling elite. The author also sees Honecker as commanding more consistent credibility than his predecessor thanks to his directness and forcefulness, and at the same time as sharing Ulbricht's political acumen, personal toughness and resourcefulness, and a frame of mind that is essentially anti-intellectual. In Lippmann's judgment, these are the fundamental characteristics that have made Honecker a successful *apparatchik,* and they help to explain certain peculiarities of his behavior, such as the paradox that, although "by his very nature an anti-bureaucrat, he seeks to combat bureaucracy by bureaucratic methods."

In light of this analysis, it is not surprising that Honecker has acquiesced to a Soviet policy on the German question that Ulbricht did his utmost to oppose, yet has at the same time emerged as a forceful protagonist of *Abgrenzung* from the Federal Republic. As the East German regime gains in international stature and domestic stability, its attitude toward West Germany may eventually soften, but under Honecker such an outcome is by no means foreordained. For the time being, West German *Ostpolitik* and East German *Westpolitik* can scarcely be regarded as two sides of one and the same coin.

East European Nationalism

By Anna M. Cienciala

PETER F. SUGAR and IVO J. LEDERER, Eds.: *Nationalism in Eastern Europe.* Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 2nd ed., 1971.
FRANCOIS FEJTÖ: *A History of the People's Democracies: Eastern Europe Since Stalin.* Trans. by Daniel Weissbort, New York and London, Praeger, 1971.

A COMMON EMPHASIS on the role of nationalism in the modern history of Eastern Europe forms a unifying—if somewhat tenuous—link between the two books under review, which otherwise differ sharply in time-span surveyed, format, method of treatment, and intended audience. On the one hand, the study edited by Professors Sugar and Lederer, compiled primarily for students of East European history, traces the evolution of national consciousness in the various East European countries from its roots in the 19th century through World War I, giving little attention to developments after 1918. Except for an introductory chapter setting the general theme of nationalism, moreover, the book deals with each country separately, bringing together studies by nine different historians, each writing on the country of his particular specialization. On the other hand, the book by François Fejtö—a well-known Hungarian-born writer on contemporary East European affairs, who has long been a resident of France—deals with nationalism within the framework of a general historical survey of the development of the East European "people's democracies" in the post-Stalin period (since 1953). The book was written as a sequel to the author's earlier *Histoire des démocraties populaires* (Paris, 1952), which traced the East European regimes through the Stalin era, and both books were obviously intended for general French (and other) readers interested in East European developments but without specialized knowledge of the area and its affairs.

The two books are both excellent in their quite different ways, yet neither is without shortcomings. The specialist contributors to the Sugar-Lederer volume provide thorough accounts of the history of ideas in the individual East European countries; however, the book suffers from a weakness that has characterized virtually all works on nationalism to date: a lack of adequate attention to the process by which the ideas of the national elites come to be as-

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similated by the masses to form a *national* consciousness. Similarly, while one can agree with Fejtö that "scholars and intellectuals have made history" (p. 314), perhaps the more relevant and fascinating question is just how this came about. Professor Lederer perhaps puts his finger on the root problem when he observes that what is needed in order to learn more about the process of assimilation by the masses of a sense of national identity is an investigation of the formation of public opinion during the 19th century. The methods he suggests are content analysis of the contemporary press, examination of memoirs, and study of such statistics as may be available on the level of education, literacy rate, etc. (Some examples of this kind of information are cited by a few of the authors of the separate essays.)

DESPITE THE LACK of adequate resort to material of this sort, the contributors to *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* do venture some opinions as to what factors were most instrumental in building up a national consciousness among the masses. Professor Sugar contends that education was a primary factor; others point to resentment against misrule by outsiders; and still others stress the influence of the native intelligentsia, especially writers and poets.

While agreeing that the intellectual community (whether teachers or writers) can influence the thought of the masses, this reviewer believes that the process works both ways, and that the essential precondition for the outbreak of nationalist revolutions in 19th-century Europe generally was the emergence within ethnic groupings of a mass feeling of dissatisfaction with the circumstances of life under alien domination. Thus, careful study of the Serbian, Greek and Romanian nationalist revolts of the early 19th century suggests that all three were triggered by a general sense of indignation at intolerable conditions regarded as resulting from alien rule. It is interesting to note that the masses who participated in these revolts were for the most part illiterate.

In light of these considerations, the reviewer is somewhat surprised by Professor Sugar's assertion that nationalism in Hungary and Poland "remained aristocratic until the end of the Second World War," and that "the spirit animating it did not change even if the personalities involved in it were non-nobles" (p. 49). The facts prove not only that the leaders of the rebellious nationalist movements often included members of the non-aristocratic classes, but that the ideals motivating these leaders were frequently democratic and not aristocratic at all. Even in those lands with native aristocracies—and Poland and Hungary were both in this category—the revolutionary leaders belonged to the gentry rather than to the magnates, and they combined demands for independence with demands for democratic government.

Thus, for example, political liberalization and peasant emancipation were among the principal aims of the Polish gentry revolutionaries in Galicia in 1846 and 1848. It is true, to be sure, that in most cases the leaders from the Polish and Hungarian gentry did not favor extending democratic rights to ethnic "minorities," but their attitude in this respect was hardly any different from that of middle-class liberals in Western Europe (as evidenced, *e.g.*, by the attitude of British political leaders toward the Irish Catholics and Britain's colonial subjects). Moreover, there were instances in which the Polish and Hungarian liberal gentry did come close to granting equal rights to other ethnic groups—as, for example, in the case of the Polish "Reds" of 1863 and their successors, the Polish socialists, and of Karolyi and Jaszi in Hungary. Finally, as for Professor Sugar's contention that Polish and Hungarian nationalism remained aristocratic until the end of World War II, he certainly cannot fail to know that Polish and Hungarian peasants fought for their countries in 1919-20, and their motivation for doing so surely did not come from dedication to aristocratic ideals.

It is also misleading, in this reviewer's opinion, for Professor Sugar to claim that the aristocratic elites who assumed leadership roles in Eastern Europe in the 19th century used nationalism only as a means of enhancing their political positions (p. 12). This may have been true of the national leaders of Hungary and Austrian Poland (Galicia) *after* they were accorded political autonomy (*de jure* in the case of Hungary, and *de facto* in that of Austrian Poland) in 1867. It was not true, however, of the earlier Hungarian nationalist leader, Louis Kossuth, and his followers, who had consistently sought both autonomy and parliamentary democracy for Hungary, and who actually established a shortlived republic during the revolutions in 1848.

The key elements of nationalism in Eastern Europe were, in fact, everywhere the same—whether expressed by Czech bourgeois leaders; by Polish, Roman-

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ian or Hungarian aristocrats; by the officer caste or by liberal democrats. They stressed the right to national independence or self-government, employment of the native tongue in education and administration, and the right to "historic" frontiers—which incidentally always included minorities of other nationalities. In all cases, moreover, the demand for self-determination went hand in hand with a demand for democracy, although it must be admitted that the latter was not as strong among some national elites as among others. If, in insisting upon the right to govern their own respective national groups, the members of the national elites had been interested solely in substituting themselves for another set of elite leaders, then it seems unlikely that they would have coupled that demand with a demand for democracy.

IN CONTRAST TO the Sugar-Lederer volume's focus on the formative period of East European nationalism, Fejtö deals with the continuing role of established nationalism in the quite different setting of Communist-ruled Eastern Europe since the close of the Stalin era. And though nationalism is certainly a major theme in Fejtö's book, his analysis of it is incidental to a general chronological survey of political developments in the East European Communist states from 1953 through 1968, which he supplements with a discussion of "Structures and Tendencies." While logical enough, this organization unfortunately gives rise to considerable overlapping and repetition. Also, though the author has some useful insights to offer, the value of his book is somewhat diminished, in the opinion of the reviewer, by the fact that the author, who is not a political scientist, largely limits himself to a historical account of events without an adequate attempt at political analysis.

Fejtö's account amply confirms the fact that nationalism is still very much an integral part of the general political-economic life of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. Except for the East German government, which rules only part of the divided German nation, all the East European states stress the continuity of national traditions, and the individual Communist parties have, in varying degrees, taken on the character and attitudes of "national Communist" parties. The momentous events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary and of 1968 in Czechoslovakia demonstrated, moreover, that nationalism is still strong enough to act as a catalyst of economic-political discontent. (It should be pointed out, however, that there were little, if any, nationalistic overtones in the events of December 1970 in Poland, which are not covered in Fejtö's book.)

It is also clear from Fejtö's account that the leadership of the Soviet Union, at least since 1955, has come to recognize the link between the nationalism of the East European peoples and their aspirations for economic and political liberalization. In both 1956 and 1968, the Soviet leaders tried to assuage the pressures for liberalization by channeling them into moderate programs of reform, and there is indisputable evidence that on both occasions they hesitated before deciding to resort to force (in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968). In light of these observations, it seems strangely inconsistent for Fejtö to label Brezhnev "a raging barbarian bureaucrat" (p. 317).

Soviet efforts to placate East European nationalism also cast doubt on the validity of Fejtö's attempt to liken the Soviet role in Eastern Europe to that of Tsarist Russia in the 19th century and of Nazi imperialism in the 20th (p. 187). Tsarist Russia did not recognize any nationalism other than its own, and Hitler's Germany aimed at the total eradication of any nationalities daring to stand in the way of the Third Reich's imperialist ambitions and refused to recognize the national interests of vassal states when these interests conflicted with its own. Even Fejtö—with curious inconsistency—seems to accept Raymond Aron's contention that Stalin himself, by investing the Soviet Union's postwar East European satellites with formal sovereignty, left the door open to their eventual de-satellization (p. 243). In this reviewer's opinion, Stalin acted as he did simply because as a realist he understood that permanent Soviet military occupation and annexation of Eastern Europe would be impossible.

In his analysis of post-Stalin trends, Fejtö places heavy stress on the influence of Communist China and Yugoslavia on the changing scene in Communist Eastern Europe. It is undoubtedly true that the Sino-Soviet quarrel and the Yugoslav example have been important elements in encouraging the growth of independence in the East European states. Nevertheless, the reviewer believes that Moscow's increased readiness to adjust to East European pressures was probably a more decisive factor. Though the Soviet Union, like any great world power, sets limits on how much independence it will tolerate on

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the part of the states within its sphere of dominance, these limits have clearly expanded in recent years, and the present Soviet leadership has shown an increased flexibility in trying to accommodate East European desires for economic reform and greater national autonomy.

To sum up, then, the two books under review are important contributions to our knowledge of the past and present of nationalism in Eastern Europe. It is a pity that the Sugar-Lederer volume generally stresses the 19th century to the detriment of the interwar and World War II periods. These witnessed the consolidation of the nationalist ethos on a mass scale. The weakness of the Fejtö book lies chiefly in its preoccupation with facts, to the detriment of analysis. Also, the author does not sufficiently stress the assimilation of national traditions by the various governments of Eastern Europe. Despite these drawbacks, however, both works provide much valuable information for those who wish to become better acquainted with East European nationalism.

Rival Agricultural Models

By Stephen Osofsky

ROY D. and BETTY A. LAIRD: *Soviet Communism and Agrarian Revolution.* Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1970.
ARTHUR E. and JAN S. ADAMS: *Men vs. Systems—Agriculture in the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia.* New York, Free Press, 1971.
JAMES R. MILLAR, Ed.: *The Soviet Rural Community.* Urbana, Ill. and London, University of Illinois Press, 1971.
W. A. DOUGLAS JACKSON, Ed.: *Agrarian Policies and Problems in Communist and Non-Communist Countries.* Seattle and London, Univ. of Washington Press, 1971.

THE ORGANIZATION of agriculture has long been one of the major problems facing Communist regimes—a reflection of the fact that the economies of most of the countries where communism has come to power have been predominantly rural in character. The four books under review address themselves to the manner in which a number of Communist regimes have dealt with this problem, examining the collectivized systems these regimes have adopted and assessing their effectiveness as compared with non-collectivized agriculture in other countries.

The Lairds' small volume explores the historical roots and present dimensions of agrarian problems in the Soviet Union, their diagnosis of these problems leading them to urge developing nations that are land-short and labor-rich to adopt a non-specialized and intensive type of private farming rather than the Soviet collectivized system of large, mechanized farms. Pointing out that the abundant use of labor can, under certain conditions, be more productive than heavily mechanized cultivation, they cite as an illustration the small-scale, labor-intensive, and less mechanized farming of Western Europe, where yields are higher per acre than they are on the large-scale, mechanized farms of the US (though the latter make good sense in US conditions of abundant land and a national food surplus).

The Adamses' study represents an attempt to develop some general conclusions about "Communist agriculture" on the basis of observations made during an extended 1967 visit to the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The authors visited a variety of farms in each country and talked to agricultural technicians, administrators, managers, scholars and politicians, although they were generally unsuccessful in their attempts to talk with actual farm workers. Despite the obvious shortcomings of using such an experience as the basis for a generalized study (*i.e.*, the superficiality of the impressions gained during a single tour, and the probably atypical character of the farms they were shown), their observations are generally perceptive and serve to verify the

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relatively poor conditions of farm life as well as the state of constant work slowdown that seems to characterize operations on both state and collective farms (particularly the latter) in all three countries. The chapters on Poland are of particular interest because they show that Polish agriculture now consists predominantly of small (mostly 12 acres or less) privately-owned farms, and that these substantially outperform the much more mechanized state and collective farms, earning their owner-operators incomes significantly higher than those of state and collective farm workers. The Adamses' study would have been still more interesting had it been extended to cover Yugoslavia's experience in dealing with agriculture, which has somewhat paralleled that of Poland. In particular, an examination of Yugoslav methods of manipulating and stabilizing farm size in the private sector would have provided a natural complement to the authors' study of Polish experience.

The Millar volume, consisting of 15 papers originally presented at a 1969 symposium sponsored by the University of Illinois, represents a major contribution to the literature on the Soviet agricultural system. The quality of the individual papers is consistently high, especially those in Part III (entitled "Recent Trends in the Rural Economy"), which contains contributions by such well-known specialists as Karl-Eugen Wädekin, Norton Dodge, David Bronson and Constance Krueger, Folke Dovring, and the editor, James Millar. The papers of Jerzy Karcz ("From Stalin to Brezhnev: Soviet Agricultural Policy in Historical Perspective") and Alexander Vucinich ("The Peasants as a Social Class") are also highly impressive. Taken all together, the compilation provides a comprehensive, multifaceted and coherent analysis that is interdisciplinary in approach, combining the perspectives of history, law, economics, sociology and literature.

THE JACKSON study is also based on a symposium, this one sponsored by the University of Washington in 1967, and comprises papers presented by 16 scholars, mostly economists, together with the comments of various discussants. The four-year delay in publication was not at all the fault of the scholars involved, but it unfortunately results in a certain staleness of the factual materials presented. The compilation nevertheless represents a pioneering effort in the comparative study of agricultural systems, both Communist and non-Communist. There are four papers on the Soviet system, including one by French economist Henri Wronski on the role of Soviet consumer cooperatives (a subject on which there are few fairly up-to-date sources of information in English). There are also four essays on agriculture in the People's Republic of China, one by Karl Wittfogel comparing Chinese and Soviet agricultural experience, and one dealing with agriculture on Taiwan. The remaining papers include a highly useful comparative study by Konrad Merkel of agriculture in East and West Germany, two studies comparing agricultural performance in North and South Korea, and one paper on Japanese agriculture. (Given the importance of postwar developments in Japan's agriculture, it is unfortunate that the single paper dealing with that country is rather narrowly focused on the subject of areal crop specialization instead of providing a general survey that would have been more valuable from a comparative standpoint.)

The Jackson volume's papers and comments dealing with agriculture on the Chinese mainland generally support the conclusion that China's version of collectivization, though not as economically and socially disruptive in its early stages, nor as extractive in its application, as that of the Soviet Union, has nonetheless proven unsuccessful from the standpoint of raising agricultural productivity. According to Leslie Kuo (p. 279), there has been no significant increase in Chinese agricultural productivity since collectivization, and Werner Klatt supports this view in maintaining that the rate of growth of China's farm output between 1957 and 1965 was zero. Anthony Tang points out further (p. 296) that there was no observable technical progress or modernization on Chinese farms between 1952 and 1965. In his view, the Great Leap Forward and the organization of the communes were not primary causes of the absence of agricultural growth after 1959, but rather represented desperate attempts to overcome the stagnation that already gripped Chinese agriculture prior to the adoption of these measures. Both Lawrence Lau (p. 337) and Shigeru Ishikawa (p. 347) agree that the Chinese, in instituting the egalitarian system of distributing income that was initially tried in the communes, in effect repeated—in a far more dramatic fashion—the Soviet error of destroying the individual farmer's incentive to put forth greater production effort. Finally, the papers and discussions on China underline the essentiality of achieving a better

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balance between industrial and agricultural development if distortions of incentives and of efficient production specialization, with a consequent impairment of productivity, are to be avoided.

THE INCLUSION in the Jackson study of Professor S. C. Hsieh's paper on the agriculture of Taiwan permits an illuminating comparison between the large-scale, collectivized farming practiced on the China mainland and Taiwan's system of predominantly small, family-owned, and intensively cultivated farms. According to Professor Hsieh, farms on the island average little more than one hectare (2.471 acres) in size, with an average of only three workers per farm; yet Taiwan's total agricultural output showed an impressive average growth rate of 8 percent annually over the period 1945-1960 (unfortunately, the paper cites no figures for more recent years). The author points out, moreover, that this growth record was achieved without any sizable increase in total cultivated area, principally through the use of such intensive methods of cultivation as double-cropping, relay planting, intercropping, and close spacing, all of which take maximum advantage of the tropical and subtropical climate. Produce accounting for 75 percent of the value of total annual farm production goes into commercial markets, refuting the notion that small-scale farms are not conducive to a thriving commercialized agriculture. Besides intensive cultivation, Professor Hsieh cites other factors contributing to Taiwan's success in agriculture, particularly the 1949 land reform which sharply reduced the incidence of tenant farming, and a variety of government measures to promote flood control, irrigation projects, improved communications, channels for the dissemination of technical agricultural information, and the formation of farmers' cooperatives.

Hsieh concludes that Taiwan's agricultural experience proves that all the problems and disadvantages of small farms can be overcome, and he further maintains (p. 394) that technological and organizational modernization such as Taiwan has carried out can enable other Asian nations to achieve a rate of economic growth sufficient to eliminate the necessity of checking population growth. The latter contention strikes this reviewer as a rather tenuous generalization, particularly since it is not supported by precise data relating the rate of population increase to resource capacity in Taiwan as compared to corresponding data for other Asian countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, South Vietnam and Malaysia.

The comparisons provided in the Jackson volume of agriculture in North and South Korea and in East and West Germany likewise tend to favor the non-collectivized systems—albeit with some reservations in the Korean case. Professor Ki Hyuk Pak finds North Korea's large and substantially mechanized collective farms, at best, only marginally more productive than the largely unmechanized, family-owned farms of the South averaging less than three hectares in size. But while Pak takes an optimistic view of the future development of agriculture in the South, his countryman, Professor Young C. Zeon, points to the fact that crop yields in the South remain chronically low and suggests that the South Korean government needs to devote greater resources to agricultural development relative to those devoted to industrial expansion. Konrad Merkel's paper on Germany concludes that the family-owned farms in the Federal Republic, ranging in size from 10 to 50 hectares, have significantly outperformed the larger collective and state farms of East Germany, and he attributes the poor performance of the latter, in substantial measure, to ineffectual management practices.

THE CONSENSUS of opinion that emerges from the findings and views of the many scholars who participated in producing these four volumes is that the Soviet model of collectivized agriculture —both at home and in its adaptations elsewhere—has proven remarkably inefficient and that this inefficiency has been due primarily to flaws that are inherent in the basic Soviet conception of agricultural organization. Marx and Engels, and after them Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev, were addicted to the notion that agricultural labor could be effectively organized along the same lines as labor in industry and, furthermore, that the same "economies of scale" attainable in industry could likewise be realized in agriculture —in other words, that farms should be as large as possible. What they failed to understand was that in agriculture intensity of cultivation is as important as the acreage of farms, and that the law of diminishing returns dictates a search for the optimal rather than the maximum possible size of farming units.

As these studies show, agricultural experience in Taiwan, Japan, Western Europe, and even in Communist Poland has shown that very small farms—by Soviet and

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Chinese standards—can produce efficiently by adopting intensive farming techniques and labor-saving technology. Yet dogmatic beliefs and a vested interest in perpetuating a system that has been all but enshrined in Soviet doctrine caused Khrushchev to continue enlarging the size of Soviet farms through kolkhoz amalgamations and the creation of bigger sovkhozes. In 1965 Brezhnev's admission that some farms were too large to be well-administered prompted the start of discussions in the Soviet press concerning the optimal size of farms, but as yet there has been no sign of any fundamental reconsideration of the system.

In part, the lack of success of the existing system stems from failure to recognize agriculture as a largely biological process. Successive Soviet regimes have tried to subject agriculture to the same sort of controls exercised in industry, to replace the judgment of the field worker by an inflexible plan that cannot possibly anticipate the multiplicity of unpredictable natural problems that the farmer has to deal with. The result has been that Soviet farmers cannot react spontaneously to fast-changing field conditions, but must either await orders from above or risk being charged with insubordination. The system thus denies decision-making authority to those who are closest to production conditions and consequently best able to respond to unexpected situations.

Agricultural operations also differ from those in industry in that they are by nature diverse, multifunctional and idiosyncratic, and consequently do not lend themselves to fixed, clearly-defined work assignments or regular shifts. Moreover, the fact that agricultural work is characteristically performed over large areas instead of in one place as in the case of an industrial plant presents formidable problems for the official control network. Instead of incurring the tremendous costs of maintaining an army of control personnel, it would be far more efficient to activate the self-interest and personal initiative of the farmers by rewarding them for maximizing productivity. As things stand at present, Soviet peasants habitually exercise most of their ingenuity in simulating hard work and merely meeting officially-prescribed delivery quotas. This attitude has resulted not only in stagnant production but also in poor-quality produce—the latter because the system relies on success indicators expressed in terms of physical volume in order to simplify planning and accounting procedures.

It was, of course, Stalin who more than anyone else set the mold of the Soviet system of collectivized agriculture that still remains fundamentally unchanged today. His primary objectives in doing so were to gain control over the hitherto independent peasantry and over the terms of resource distribution between industry and agriculture. Once these objectives were attained, he proceeded to reduce the agricultural sector and the peasantry to a state of virtual servitude, depriving agriculture of capital investment and diverting from it resources to finance rapid industrialization. As a result of these policies, Soviet agriculture in 1953 was still burdened by a primitive transportation network and incredibly low levels of mechanization, electrification, and chemical fertilizer use. The incomes of collective farm members remained extremely low, and the peasants had to rely on the sale of produce from their private plots for the bulk of their incomes. Long working hours, poor schools, and inadequate transportation facilities tended to perpetuate the semiliterate condition of the peasants, whose exodus from the countryside in search of a better life was curbed by an internal passport system. Despite such curbs, many of the more skilled and ambitious managed to leave the farms, with the result that the agricultural work force tended to become disproportionately made up of older men, women, and the very young.

IN THE POST-STALIN period, to be sure, various steps have been taken to remedy the poor performance of Soviet agriculture. For one thing, as economists David Bronson and Constance Krueger point out in the Millar volume (p. 229), higher procurement prices paid by the state for crop deliveries have resulted in a dramatic increase in farm workers' wages, bringing the average income of the individual state farm worker (exclusive of revenue from private plots) up to about 75 percent of the average income of industrial workers (as of 1967), as compared with 53.9 percent in 1953. The corresponding figures for collective farm workers are 48 percent in 1967 as against 17.9 percent in 1953. In addition, post-1953 reforms have for the first time given collective farmers guaranteed minimum wages and retirement pensions. Still further, the collective farms themselves have benefited from the discontinuance of discriminatory tax, credit and pricing policies, and under Khrushchev and his successors there has been an impressive increase in the volume of

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capital investment in farm mechanization, rural electrification and road construction, irrigation, and chemical fertilizer production.

Parallel with these moves, Khrushchev inaugurated a series of attempts to rationalize the huge and cumbersome complex of planning, procurement-coordination, and control organs for agriculture, but these attempts took the form of a succession of erratic administrative reforms involving alternate cycles of decentralization and recentralization. Robert Miller, writing in the Millar volume (p. 80), sees the chief intent behind all of Khrushchev's administrative modifications as having been to bring agricultural administrators into closer contact with actual farm production, but he concludes that perhaps the most important lesson taught by Khrushchev's experiments in this area was, paradoxically, that the involvement of party officials in the management and technical aspects of agriculture was a counterproductive anachronism—a lesson which Miller feels Khrushchev's successors have taken to heart. One might go further and suggest that Khrushchev's frantic search for a "cure-all" administrative solution failed because he was treating the symptoms rather than the disease.

In any event, these various measures thus far appear to have been unsuccessful in generating any significant rise in farm labor productivity. Economist Folke Dovring (Millar, pp. 273-74) attributes this failure in large part to the oversized work forces customarily employed on the farms and their low level of skills. Alexander Vucinich (Millar, pp. 315-16) suggests that the Soviet leaders, by continuing a policy of limiting educational opportunities in rural areas and thus holding down the skill-level of farm labor, may be deliberately fostering rural underemployment in order to prevent urban industrial underemployment.

Moreover, while the Soviet rural population is certainly much better off now than under Stalin, the farmers and their families still suffer to some degree from the Stalinist legacy of neglect. The relatively low level of consumer goods and services available to the rural population attests to a continuing official policy that appears to discriminate in favor of urban dwellers. As the Adamses observed when they toured Soviet rural areas in 1967, indoor running water and toilets remained a rarity even on the more modern collective farms (pp. 48, 64). Cultural, medical, and public service facilities have also remained markedly less extensive than those provided in urban areas, and these conditions—in addition to the fact that farm work still requires much heavy manual labor (because of lagging mechanization) and long hours—have tended to produce a sullen, work-evading peasantry with little real incentive to raise their low level of productivity.

IN SUM, the four studies under review generally concur that, if one posits maximization of production and minimization of cost per unit of output, together with a labor input consistent with an effective system of incentives, as the desired goals in agriculture, the collectivized, command-type farming systems, with their centrally planned and imposed production quotas, have proven themselves economically inefficient as well as administratively unwieldy and irrational. The Lairds, the Adamses, and German economist Werner Klatt (in Jackson, p. 465) go further and suggest that countries with Soviet-type agricultural systems would be well-advised to abandon them in favor of either genuine farm cooperatives or economically viable family farms. The Adamses (p. 254) express the view that adoption of a loose type of farm cooperative like the Polish agrarian circles, which make modern agricultural equipment and technology available to small farmers, could stimulate the modernization of small-scale agriculture in East European conditions. The Lairds, however, see little possibility that the Soviet Union will ever decollectivize agriculture, mainly because of political and ideological considerations: they argue that too much of the prestige of Marxism-Leninism is invested in the existing system, and also that "to abandon collectivization would be to undercut the Communists' most important argument for persuading national liberation movements in predominantly peasant, developing nations to accept the Soviet lead" (p. 61).

On the latter point, German economist Otto Schiller (Jackson, p. 243) disagrees with the Lairds in seeing little evidence of any effort on the part of the socialist states, including the USSR, to propagate the collectivized system of agriculture in the Third World. Certainly, this reviewer would hardly consider the Soviet agricultural model the most effective weapon in Moscow's arsenal for persuading Third World countries to look to the USSR for leadership. To date, in fact, none of the non-Communist but left-oriented regimes in Africa, for example, has seen fit to adopt this model, although Mali, Guinea, Ghana under Nkrumah, and Algeria have supported Soviet positions and accepted Soviet economic aid.

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Indo-Soviet Relations

By Surendra K. Gupta

J. A. NAIK: *Soviet Policy Towards India: From Stalin to Brezhnev.* New Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1970.
DEVENDRA KAUSHIK: *Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan.* New Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1971.

ONE OF THE MOST interesting developments in postwar international diplomacy has been the establishment of close and friendly relations between the Soviet Union, the most powerful Communist country in the world, and India, the world's largest democracy. Since the political systems of the two nations are so fundamentally different, it is certainly not ideological affinity that has brought them together. One must rather look to the national interests of the two countries for an understanding of their complex relationship. An excellent study by Arthur Stein, published in 1969, considered this question from the viewpoint of India's interests.[1] The two books under review look to the other side of the coin, seeking to explain Moscow's reasons for working so assiduously in the last two decades to gain prestige and influence on the Indian subcontinent. The books are also important because they are the first major studies undertaken by Indian scholars on this subject.

J. A. Naik's volume in particular deserves to be considered a major work, although it has weaknesses as well as strengths. One of its important failings needs to be stated at the outset. Namely, like some other writers, Naik proceeds from the assumption that the USSR's accommodative policy toward India evolved only after Stalin's death and that Stalin's policy was one of "indifference" or "hostility." As specific evidence for this, he cites an alleged lack of coverage in the Soviet press of the declaration of India's independence on August 15, 1947. According to Naik,

. . . this utter indifference, accompanied by hostile posture, was reflected in the Soviet publicity organs, which did not even bother to note the proclamation of Indian independence. Neither Pravda *nor any other Soviet paper of importance carried the news of Indian independence.*

This statement reiterates a mistake made by a number of other scholars who apparently have not given a careful enough reading to the Soviet press of the Stalin era or fully analyzed his policy toward India. The Soviet news media did in fact publish news of the Independence Day celebrations in New Delhi,[2] and they also covered Indian Ambassador Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit's Moscow press conference of August 15 and publicized her message to the Soviet people issued on that day.[3] Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov also sent a message of greetings and congratulations to the Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.[4]

At the time of her arrival in Moscow some months earlier, moreover, Mrs. Pandit had received very special treatment from the Soviets, a fact noted in *Time* magazine, which attributed it to her anti-Western statements at the United Nations General Assembly session in the fall of 1946.[5] However, India's support of some Soviet positions at that session (for example, on the use of the veto), gave way to new positions in the fall of 1947 backing the Western powers' stance both on the veto and on the question of Korea's future; in fact, on the latter issue there was a direct verbal clash between the Indian and Soviet delegates.[6] This change in New Delhi's attitude led Mos-

[1] Arthur Stein, *India and the Soviet Union*, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1969.

[2] "Ceremonies in Connection with the Declaration of India's Independence," *Izvestia* (Moscow), Aug. 16, 1947.

[3] "Message of Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Indian Ambassador to Moscow," *Pravda* (Moscow) and *Izvestia*, Aug. 16, 1947.

[4] "Molotov's Congratulations to Jawaharlal Nehru," *Aj* (a Hindi daily published in Varanasi, India), Aug. 24, 1947, p. 5.

[5] "Robin Redbreast," *Time* (New York), Sept. 8, 1947, pp. 27-28.

[6] See this author's "Soviet-Indian Relations, 1946-47: From Cooperation to Hostility," a paper presented at the Western Conference of the Association of Asian Studies, Tucson, Arizona, October 1969.

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cow in turn to respond with hostility toward Indian independence in general and New Delhi's foreign policy in particular. Yet Moscow's attitude was to soften once again in the early 1950's, as India became critical of US policy toward Korea, China, and the peace settlement with Japan.

A REALIZATION of these several turns in Soviet and Indian postures during the Stalin era is essential for an understanding of Soviet-Indian relations in the post-Stalin period, for it underscores the fact that it has always been the national interests of the two countries which have determined their attitudes and policies toward one another. Whenever their interests have been in conflict, there have been strains and even bitterness in their relationship; when they have found a mutuality of interests, their relations have been friendly.

Despite the above limitation, Naik offers a good analysis of Moscow's policy toward India as it was pursued by Stalin's successors. The most important event bringing about a new alignment of forces on the subcontinent was the United States' decision in 1954 to supply arms to Pakistan and to persuade her to become a member of the US-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Nehru opposed the formation of an anti-Communist military alliance in Asia and was especially critical of the US-Pakistan alliance, since it affected India directly. The Soviets, who were of course already aware of the deterioration in US-Indian relations because of differences over aspects of the Korean question and the issue of a peace treaty with Japan, now saw specific gains to be made by cultivating better relations with India. No doubt Moscow calculated that rapprochement with India and support for the policy of nonalignment in general could lead to better relations with other nonaligned nations in the region, helping to counteract the strategic threat posed by SEATO. Moreover, friendship with India—a non-Communist country and a major power in the Third World—might improve Moscow's standing with countries elsewhere in the world which might still be suspicious of Soviet intentions. As Naik says,

In Soviet foreign relations . . . Russia's building up a close relationship with India had more than a bilateral significance for the former, as the Soviet leadership used the model of the Indo-Soviet relationship as a proof of its policy of coexistence with countries following other political systems.

In the author's view, there were also economic inducements leading Moscow to favor closer relations with India. While economic aid has generally been represented by its donors as an act of generosity—and the Soviets have been no exception in this respect—such aid generally has had strings attached to ensure that part of it would be used by recipients to buy machinery or other items from the aid-giving country. Naik thus sees a relationship between the Indo-Soviet rapprochement and the fact that in post-Stalin Russia, with an annual increase of about 9 percent in its gross industrial product, "there was an obvious compulsion on Soviet foreign-policy makers to face the problem of finding markets for Russia's heavy-industry producing economy." This is an important point, and one regrets that Mr. Naik has dealt with it rather briefly.

Once the Soviets decided to befriend India, they went all the way to extend support—economically, politically, and militarily. In addition to providing aid to such projects as the Bhilai and Bokaro steel plants, the Soviets gave full support to India on Kashmir and Goa. Even on the China-India border dispute, the Soviets, for the most part, appeared to be neutral, or more pro-Indian than pro-Chinese. Militarily, the Soviet Union became the major supplier of weapons to India.

WHY DID INDIA respond so enthusiastically to Soviet overtures? India's concern with the US-Pakistan alliance, Washington's support to Pakistan on the Kashmir question, and US indifference to India's position on Goa—all these have been cited as reasons by other writers. In addition, Naik, in one of the most valuable portions of his book, cites Soviet help to India in the areas of heavy industrial development and oil exploration. He points out that because of a severe shortage of steel in the early 1950's (indicated by an import level of one million tons of steel in 1955), the Indian government decided to construct large steel plants in the period of its Second Five-Year Plan.

For help, India first approached "her traditional trade partners in the West." She got two kinds of responses, both disappointing. First, according to a report quoted by Naik, India received "sermons about creating a favorable climate for private foreign investment, about the advantage of importing steel . . . rather than producing it . . . and [about] the need to concentrate on infrastructure." Second, even when aid was offered,

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the proposed rate of interest was very high. For example, the West German firms, Krupp and Demag, when approached for help in constructing the Bhilai steel plant, reportedly offered credits at an annual interest rate of 12 percent. Later, the Soviet Union not only agreed to provide credits for Bhilai at 2.5-percent (!) interest but also agreed to repayment in the form of Indian goods.

In the case of another major steel plant, Bokaro, India again had to rely on the Soviets for aid. Although Naik does not mention all the details, Nehru first requested assistance from the US. Impressed with how Bhilai had become a showpiece of Soviet economic assistance, both President Kennedy and then US Ambassador to India John K. Galbraith favored US participation in the construction of Bokaro, but the US Congress would not approve aid for a project in the public sector. Nehru thereupon withdrew his request for aid and approached the Soviets, who were more than willing to oblige.

A second important field in which the West forfeited the opportunity to go to India's assistance was oil exploration. According to Naik, Western experts who were approached by the Indian government for advice about the possibilities of such development expressed the opinion that the country was "oil dry" and that it would be a waste of money to undertake explorations in India. Here again, Moscow stepped in to provide assistance, and Soviet experts uncovered reserves said to amount to a "record performance in world oil history." Today, India has its own fast-developing oil industry.

To what extent have the Soviets been able to influence India's foreign policy? Although Indian leaders usually deny any partiality to the Soviet Union, it would be almost impossible for them not to feel special consideration for a country which has not only provided economic assistance in many critical areas, but which has also provided political support on several questions which India considers vital to her interests. Naik cites the case of India's stand on Germany as one in which the Soviets were gradually able to "pressure" New Delhi into modifying its stand.[7] Thus, Indian support of Bonn's position on the problem of German reunification was still manifest in an Indian-German joint communiqué issued in 1957, after the visit of the West German Foreign Minister to New Delhi; but by 1961 a Soviet-Indian joint communiqué issued in Moscow after talks between Nehru and Khrushchev referred to "the existence of the [two] German states" and said that "any attempt to change the frontiers will have dangerous consequences." According to Naik, the Indian side thus "abandoned its hitherto-followed German policy and offered *de facto* recognition of East Germany, obviously a concession to the demanding Kremlin." It should be noted, however, that Moscow was long unable to persuade India to extend formal diplomatic recognition to East Germany, despite a very active pro-Soviet lobby on this question[8]; obviously, New Delhi did not want to go so far as to jeopardize her good relations with Bonn, which had given India considerable economic assistance. Only after Bonn and Moscow signed a treaty of rapprochement did India formally recognize East Germany (in October 1972), feeling this step would no longer hurt Indian-West German relations.

Despite the fact that Soviet ties have been beneficial to India, Naik has some warnings for his countrymen. Although India continues to be important in Soviet considerations, he argues that there can be no permanency about the relationship. Future Soviet policy toward New Delhi, he says, will be "largely determined by India's utility to Soviet Russia in the latter's regional and global needs," and Soviet economic assistance to India could be affected by a different Soviet posture toward New Delhi. In his view, neither nonalignment *per se* nor India in itself is vital in the Kremlin's foreign policy considerations, and the development of any strains in their relationship might lead to a diminution of both aid and trade.

Secondly, he warns of a more serious danger. Although denying any effort on Moscow's part to propagate communism in India in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, he asserts that "the spread of communism abroad is one of the objectives of Soviet power since the days of Lenin, and the Soviet state has not yet abandoned it, nor is it likely to abandon it . . . so long as the Communist Party controls life in Russia." Specific-

[7] One might also refer to such other cases as the Indian stand on Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968—a stance which would probably have been more critical had not India been so dependent on Moscow. See Kuldip Nayar, *Between the Lines*, Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1969, p. 101.

[8] *E.g.*, see several articles in *Blitz* (a popular pro-Soviet Bombay weekly): Kunhanandan Nair, "The Blockade is Broken: Time for India to Recognize GDR," Sept. 6, 1969, p. 10; "India-Wide Campaign to Recognize GDR," Sept. 20, 1969, p. 10; and "Professor Norden Tells *Blitz* . . . Time for Full Normalization of Indo-GDR Ties," Dec. 12, 1970, p. 10.

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ally with respect to India, he writes:

To the extent which the Soviet influence in India increases and adds up to Indian dependence [on the USSR] . . . in the economic, political and military fields, the objective of communization is likely to increasingly figure in Soviet calculations regarding India.

Notwithstanding his oversights in regard to the Stalinist period, Naik has written an important book, providing, from an Indian viewpoint, a balanced evaluation of Soviet policy toward India.

DEVENDRA KAUSHIK'S book falls into a different category. It is not an objective, scholarly presentation of Soviet policy toward India and Pakistan, but rather the work of a Soviet protagonist. Kaushik, it might be mentioned, has written articles for the pro-Soviet Indian CP organ, *New Age,* and the pro-Soviet leftist weekly, *Link;* also, a book of his on Soviet Central Asia has been published in the USSR and reviewed favorably in the Soviet press.[9]

Much of the work under review is devoted to defending Soviet actions or policies toward India since 1917. While he admits that the Soviets acted wrongly at times, he argues that this was not a matter of questionable motives or sincerity but of Moscow's being misguided by others. For example, an incorrect Soviet evaluation of the Indian national bourgeoisie in the 1920's was not the fault of Lenin or his cohorts, but rather the result of "the ultra-left sectarian assessment . . . by Indian representatives in the Comintern" (he cites the roles of Manabendra Nath Roy at the Second Congress and of Shaukat Usmani and Saumendranath Tagore at the Sixth Congress). Similarly, the reasons for the condemnation of Gandhi in early Soviet writings lie, according to Kaushik, either with Gandhi himself ("in the complexity of Gandhi's world outlook [and] contradictions in some of his practical actions") or "in the lack at that time of data for a thorough and all-round investigation of Gandhi's activities." The closure of the Tashkent Military School for Indians after the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement of March 1921 did not take place because the agreement had prohibited Communist propaganda activity but because of "internal bickerings between rival Indian groups."

Concerning Soviet policy toward India and Pakistan in more recent years, Kaushik approvingly quotes a Soviet statement which characterizes Moscow as "a sincere and *disinterested* friend" (emphasis added) of both, working very hard to bring about a settlement of their disputes. If there have been problems in Soviet-Indian or Soviet-Pakistani relations, the causes for these lie not in the selfish or wrong motives of the Soviets but in some action of India or Pakistan. Thus he approves Moscow's neutral posture during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 (because any other stand "would only have aggravated the conflict") without analyzing why the Soviets had taken sides on the Kashmir question in the past and why they found it advantageous to abandon that stand in 1965. Even Moscow's decision to provide Pakistan with arms in 1968, which at the time created severe strains on Soviet-Indian relations, is blamed on the Pakistanis, not the Soviets: Kosygin, during his visit to Pakistan in early 1968, "was greeted with slogans like 'Give us tanks, not tractors.' Under these circumstances the Soviet Union was constrained to give a very limited quantity of arms to Pakistan."

Although Kaushik is thus uninterested in appraising Soviet foreign policy in terms of Moscow's objectives and requirements in different periods, or in assessing the value of either India or Pakistan in Moscow's scheme of things, his book does have one great merit: he shows that Moscow has been consistently interested in *both* India and Pakistan. A major policy statement by Georgi Malenkov in August 1953 has often been quoted by both Western and Indian writers to indicate the importance placed on India by the post-Stalin leadership; but another paragraph on Pakistan in the same speech has generally been ignored. In rectifying this mistake, Kaushik has focused attention on the fact that while good relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union did not develop as Malenkov had hoped, Moscow never gave up the hope of cultivating better relations with Pakistan and of drawing it away from the West. It is only in the light of this approach that much of Moscow's later policy toward the Indian subcontinent can be understood.

In sum, the books by Naik and Kaushik provide examples of two kinds of writing currently being done in India on the Soviet Union and its policies toward the Indian subcontinent. One is scholarly and dispassionate, the other biased and opinionated. Yet, in different ways, both books add to our understanding of the complex Indo-Soviet relationship.

[9] See, *e.g.*, V. Makarenko, "An Indian on Central Asia," *Aziia i Afrika sevodnia* (Moscow), December 1971, pp. 58-59.

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